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Abstract
We see reasons as practical expressions of an agent’s identity; we expect that if 
they govern and direct an agent’s action they must be intimate products of his or her 
nature and circumstances. Yet we also believe that reasons are subject to external 
appraisal; agents can be wrong about their reasons, and external judgements concerning 
those reasons exert normative pressure. These thoughts are not necessarily incompatible 
while they remain informal intuitions. However, they are a source of conflict in 
philosophical theory.
I believe that the best way to satisfy the intuition that reasons are intimately ours 
is to follow the work of Bernard Williams, who claimed that only internal reasons exist: 
those which depend on the agent’s motivations. In developing the case for internal 
reasons I attempt to show that it also goes some way to satisfying the intuition that our 
reasons are subject to external judgement, by allowing that we may be separated from our 
reasons by deliberative obstacles.
Admittedly, this satisfaction is only partial. Many theories attempt to show that 
reasons possess normative power precisely because they are not dependent on contingent 
factors such as motivations. I consider several such theories, particularly those which 
claim that aspects of human rationality determine the reasons of all agents. I attempt to 
show that they fail, partly due to specific flaws in their arguments, but also more 
generally because they assume that reasons must be universal.
The consideration of such arguments also helps develop the case for internal 
reasons. They reveal a common pattern of motivation and behaviour regarding reasons 
which is expressed in philosophical theory and in everyday talk. I argue that what is 
revealed is a virtue, and that, under the familiar name of reasonableness, this virtue 
provides the normative component our account needs, showing that the dependence of 
reasons on motivations is compatible with our common intuitions about reasons.
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1. The Argument fo r  Internal Reasons
1.1 Reasons
Reasons matter. They matter because they express our rational nature, because 
they distinguish our actions from the sort of brute response to stimuli we might expect 
from an animal, a plant or even an inanimate object, and because, when we say that 
someone acted for a reason, we say something about choice and will. The existence of 
reasons is what makes it possible for us to ask the question, ‘Why did you do that?’ It is 
through our reasons that we justify and explain our actions to each other and to ourselves.
Furthermore, reasons do not just matter as abstract principles which remain in the 
background. We can stay silent about our reasons, but we rarely do. Our reasons for 
action, our thoughts about the reasons o f others, and the deliberation which produces 
them, are all regarded as proper topics of everyday discussion. So, rather than keeping 
our judgements about the reasons of others to ourselves, we express them, and we do so 
with the intention of producing an effect, whether that effect is limited to informing 
others about our attitudes, or whether we hope to encourage or dissuade an agent 
embarking on a course o f action. A challenge to someone to produce his or her reasons is 
likely to get a response. Even when the challenge is unexpected and we have no 
obligation to respond to the challenger, the thought that even a stranger might think that 
we are acting without good reasons is somehow discomfiting. Unlike many other 
philosophical preoccupations, such as the nature of knowledge, truth and the material 
world, the existence of reasons and the question of whether action is justified are subjects 
we talk about every day, albeit usually within the context of individual instances of 
action. Because talk of reasons is part of our everyday commerce with one another, we 
should take our everyday expectations and intuitions regarding reasons particularly 
seriously.
When we examine our everyday understanding of practical reason, I believe that 
we find an apparent conflict between two powerful intuitions. The first of these is that an 
agent’s reasons for action are intimately bound up with the agent’s concerns, 
commitments, affections, projects, relationships and other things that have a motivational 
component. This intuition highlights the appropriateness of the language we use when we 
say not just that there is a reason for A to <|> but that A has a reason to (J). It is most 
apparent when, for example, we say of a man, ‘He has his reasons,’ meaning that there 
are reasons for his actions, even if few of us are likely to fathom them. This intuition 
emphasises the likelihood of difference between the reasons of agents, and acknowledges 
the possibility that exhortations to act for a particular reason might legitimately, if 
frustratingly, be met with the response, ‘But I just don’t care.’ We can label this the 
individualistic intuition. At the same time, and in apparent contradiction, we have the 
intuition that external judgements about reasons ought to persuade agents and correct 
behaviour; that we can identify reasons which agents never knew they had, and that once 
these reasons have been pointed out to them they ought to have some bearing on their 
action. This intuition emphasises the ability of reasons to stand independently o f the 
agent’s ability or willingness to apprehend those reasons, and acknowledges that 
statements such as, ‘But you’ve got every reason to <|>!’ have more than just rhetorical 
force. We can label this the universalistic intuition. The apparent conflict between the
4
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individualistic intuition and the universalistic intuition has been reflected in philosophical 
debate. The individualistic intuition seems most closely compatible with theories such as 
that of David Hume, in which reason is taken to be subordinate to motivations, and it is 
allowed that reasons may vary between individuals as their motivations vary. The 
universalistic intuition seems most closely compatible with those theories in which 
rationality is taken to be the fundamental determinant o f reasons, and consequently 
universal reasons are taken to apply to all agents regardless of their motivations.
It is not necessary to solve the apparent conflict between our everyday intuitions 
by showing that one is correct and the other mistaken, for we can achieve an 
understanding of practical reason which satisfies them both; or so I shall argue. However, 
this understanding is not achieved by staying neutral in the philosophical debate. I believe 
that the Humean position is the correct one, and that by taking into account recent 
developments of this position by Bernard Williams, as well as exploring and developing 
the position further ourselves, we can show both that it provides the best theoretical 
articulation and the best resolution o f these two fundamental intuitions about reasons. In 
the first part of this thesis, then, I shall attempt to establish an essentially Humean 
position which not only shows how our reasons must be intimately ours, but also goes 
some way to satisfying the universalistic intuition by showing how our reasons can be 
obscure to us, and consequently why we may be subject to the judgements of external 
observers about our reasons.
However, I do not expect that this initial version of the account will fully satisfy 
the universalistic intuition. It will further emphasise the individuality o f agents: their 
characters, their motivations, and even the way their reasoning happens to go in particular 
instances of deliberation. Consequently, it will need to answer challenges from those 
writers who seem to be driven predominantly by the universalistic intuition, and who 
favour an absolute conception of reasons as transcending the interests and motivations of 
the agent. I will attempt to show that the proposed account can resist such challenges and, 
furthermore, that such challenges depend on a conception of reasons which is not itself 
justified. I will also attempt to show that these challenges help us to understand the 
motivations underpinning the universalistic intuition, and that this understanding enables 
us to modify our account in a way which both better satisfies this intuition and stays true 
to its Humean origins.
These Humean origins are where we start our discussion.
5
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1.2 Humean Origins
Hume’s theories are primarily expressed in A Treatise o f Human Nature, An 
Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles 
o f Morals. I am not going to attempt to summarise all o f Hume’s work here. Much of it is 
concerned with topics which do not directly touch the matter of our discussion, such as 
causality and perception, and much that does deal with topics of interest to us comprises 
attempts to explain specific varieties of human behaviour, such as keeping promises, 
submitting to government and so on. This means that the elements of Hume’s theory 
relevant to our discussion can be grasped by examining a relatively small number of key 
concepts and arguments. Before starting this examination, however, we should 
acknowledge a characteristic that pervades Hume’s work. This is a distinctive blend of 
pessimism about the ability o f reason to provide us with categorical foundations in the 
areas essential to our lives, combined with an optimism about our ability to go on with 
our lives nevertheless, and is best illustrated by an extended quote from the end of the 
first book of the Treatise, at a point when Hume takes himself to have shown that reason 
alone cannot support our beliefs in everyday phenomena such as causation and the 
persistent existence of objects:
The intense view of these manifold contradictions and imperfections in human reason 
has so wrought upon me, and heated my brain, that I am ready to reject all belief and 
reasoning, and can look upon no opinion even as more probable or likely than 
another. Where am I or what? From what causes do I derive my existence, and to 
what condition shall I return? Whose favour shall I court, and whose anger must I 
dread? What beings surround me? I am confounded with all these questions, and 
begin to fancy myself in the most deplorable condition imaginable, inviron’d with the 
deepest darkness, and utterly depriv’d of the use of every member and faculty.
Most fortuitously it happens, that since reason is incapable of dispelling these 
clouds, nature herself suffices to that purpose, and cures me of this philosophical 
melancholy and delirium, either by relaxing this bent of mind, or by some avocation, 
and lively impression of my senses, which obliterate all these chimeras. I dine, I play 
a game of backgammon, I converse and am merry with my friends; and when after 
three or four hour’s amusement, I would return to these speculations, they appear so 
cold, and strain’d and ridiculous, that I cannot find in my heart to enter into them any 
further.1
This blend of optimism and pessimism introduces a tension which we will meet 
many times through our discussion: the tension between the possibility of using reason to 
seek more and more fundamental justifications for our beliefs and actions, and the 
ravenous tendency of reason to consume any justifications we offer without ever being 
satisfied. Hume’s pessimism produces his conviction that a relentless use o f reason will 
sweep away all foundations, and his optimism produces his conviction that we can 
nevertheless believe and act with justification. The elements of Hume’s theory that are o f 
direct interest to us can be loosely divided into those which express his pessimism by 
placing restrictions on the role of reason in influencing action, and those which express
1 A Treatise o f  Human Nature, Book I, Part IV, Section VII, page 316.
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his optimism by providing a constructive account of morals and virtue. We will consider 
the former now, as an introduction to our own basic position, and shall return to the latter 
much later.
To understand the restrictions Hume’s theory places on reason we must have 
some understanding of his account of psychology, which begins with his taxonomy of the 
contents of the mind. In the very first sentence of the Treatise, Hume claims that, ‘All the 
perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds, which I shall 
call IMPRESSIONS and IDEAS.’2 At this stage Hume claims that the main distinction 
between ideas and impressions is in the ‘degrees of force and liveliness, with which they 
strike upon the mind.’3 It soon becomes apparent, however, that the most significant 
distinguishing characteristic of impressions is their primacy. The primacy of impressions 
is such that both the production and character of the experiences that constitute them are 
beyond our control. By contrast, ideas are secondary, as they are produced by reflection 
and imagination rather than direct experience, and, according to Hume, the character o f 
their experience is limited to what has previously been experienced as impressions. The 
clearest example of the distinction between impressions and ideas is perhaps that between 
sensory perception and the memory of that perception. If I see a duck then I have an 
impression of a duck (a complex impression in Hume’s terms, as my visual image of the 
duck is made up of lots of individual, simple impressions4). If I think about the duck after 
it has flown away then I have an idea o f a duck. If the duck had feathers of a colour I had 
never experienced before I would not be able to imagine this colour until I had seen it; I 
would not be able to produce the idea without the preceding impression. To take another 
example from Hume, ‘We cannot form to ourselves a just idea of the taste of a pineapple, 
without having actually tasted it.’5 Although the case of sensory perception is the best 
way to illustrate the distinction between ideas and impressions, it also prompts obvious 
challenges. We could ask, for example, whether the direct perception of an object such as 
a duck really has primacy over our possession of the concept of a duck as a distinct 
object; contrast, for example, the experience of a casual visitor to a nature reserve who 
sees a duck, and a full time warden at that reserve, who sees not just a duck, but a 
particular species of duck, and possibly even a particular individual duck. When 
considering the experience of the warden we might wonder whether ideas precede 
impressions, or whether we ought to think in terms of precedence at all. Fortunately, as 
we are not directly concerned with the empiricist account of sensory perception, we can 
note the distinction between impressions and ideas within Hume’s theory and move on to 
the next distinction which concerns us.
Just as the first book of the Treatise starts by making a distinction, so does the 
second: ‘As all the perceptions of the mind may be divided into impressions and ideas so 
the impressions admit of another distinction into original and secondary.’6 According to 
Hume, original impressions are those arising from direct sensory experience, while 
secondary impressions are those which ‘proceed from some of these original ones, either
2 Treatise, Book I, Part I, Section I, page 49.
3 Treatise, Book I, Part I, Section I, page 49.
4 Treatise, Book I, Part I, Section I, page 50.
5 Treatise, Book I, Part I, Section I, page 49.
6 Treatise, Book II, Part I, Section I, page 327
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7immediately or by interposition of its idea.’ This distinction introduces the concept of 
the passions, which Hume classes as secondary impressions. Passions can best be 
understood as impressions whose content is sentimental rather than sensory, although 
they have the same primacy as sensory impressions. That is, their causes are not under 
our immediate conscious control, and their corresponding ideas cannot be formed without 
having experienced the passion first. We cannot successfully imagine what it is like to 
feel angry, for example, if  we have never experienced anger. However, there is a crucial 
difference between sensory impressions and the passions, in that the passions are 
motivational; they are capable of leading to action. Hume offers an extensive taxonomy 
of the passions, identifying, ‘pride, humility, ambition, vanity, love, hatred, envy, pity, 
malice, generosity,’ as well as, ‘desire, aversion, grief, joy, hope, fear, despair and
o
security.’ However, he also argues that despite this array of passions, each of which has 
its own distinctive character, their motivational aspects reduce in the end to the 
expression they give to pain and pleasure: “ Tis easy to observe, that the passions, both 
direct and indirect are founded on pain and pleasure, and that in order to produce an 
affection of any kind, ‘tis only requisite to present some good or evil. Upon the removal 
of pain and pleasure there immediately follows a removal of love and hatred, pride and 
humility, desire and aversion, and of most of our reflective and secondary impressions.’9
For us, the most important step comes when we combine the primacy of 
impressions, the status of the passions as impressions, and the ability of the passions to 
motivate. The implication of combining these elements is that the production of 
motivational states is analogous to the production of direct sensory experience. Of 
particular importance is that the production of impressions, whether sensory impressions 
or passions, has no necessary connection with reason. We do not use reason to discover 
what liver tastes like; that is simply the impression produced by eating liver. And we do 
not reason to the like or dislike of the taste of liver; the passion of like or dislike is simply 
the impression produced by the taste of liver. And it is this that leads to the expression of 
Hume’s general scepticism about our ability to find foundations for action in reason in 
one of his most infamous and often quoted claims: ‘Reason is and ought only to be the 
slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey 
them.’10
Unfortunately, this claim can sometimes be taken as the sum of what Hume has to 
say about the relationship between reason, action and the passions. As we shall see, there 
is rather more to his theory than the claim that reason is the slave of the passions. 
However, we should also note that even this provocative claim has rather more 
sophisticated implications than is sometimes imagined. In particular, we should note that, 
although it is expressed in a primarily negative form, it does not just deny a role to reason 
in the production of action, but allows a role as well. The role it denies is a motivational 
one, and is further expressed by Hume when he says, ‘Since reason alone can never 
produce any action, or give rise to volition, I infer that the same faculty is as incapable of 
preventing volition, or of disputing the preference with any passion or action.’11 The
7 Treatise, Book II, Part I, Section I, page 327.
8 Treatise, Book II, Part I, Section I, page 328.
9 Treatise, Book II, Part III, Section IX, page 485.
10 Treatise, Book II, Part III, Section III, page 462.
11 Treatise, Book II, Part III, Section III, page 462.
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point being made here is not that Hume expects passion to win in a battle with reason. 
When he observes that, ‘Nothing is more usual in philosophy, and even in common life, 
than to talk of the combat of passion and reason, to give the preference to reason, and1 9 *assert that men are only so far virtuous as they conform themselves to its dictates,’ he is 
not arguing that the preference ought to be given to the passions. Rather, he is arguing 
that reason and the passions are not even sufficiently similar kinds of entity as to come 
into conflict with one another. Within Hume’s theory passions are original existences 
with their own distinctive experiential characters, whereas reason is ‘the discovery of 
truth and falsehood.’13
The strength of Hume’s conviction that passions and reason are distinct entities is 
expressed when he says, in another infamous passage, ‘’Tis not contrary to reason to 
prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger. ’Tis not contrary 
to reason for me to chuse my total ruin, to prevent the least uneasiness of an Indian or 
person wholly unknown to me. ’Tis as little contrary to reason to prefer even my own 
acknowledg’d lesser good to my greater, and have a more ardent affection for the former 
than the latter.’14 It is this sort of claim which can alarm people who hope, contrary to 
Hume, that reason is the master of the passions rather than the slave, and which creates 
the possibility of a bogeyman we shall meet later on: the sensible knave. Despite this fear, 
I do not think that anyone would seriously contest the claim that the passions -  or 
whatever modem term we would use to label them -  are capable of producing action. To 
do so would simply be to deny common experience. The challenge, then, in establishing a 
Humean or neo-Humean position, is not to show that the passions can produce action, but 
to demonstrate that the passions are necessary to produce action and that the action 
produced by passions can be understood as action for reasons. The picture we have 
painted so far, of passions which are produced with little control over their occurrence 
and no control over their character, yet are supposedly responsible for all rational action, 
seems at this stage to be thoroughly at odds with what we have called the universalistic 
intuition. Much of the rest o f this thesis will attempt to address this concern, and there are 
already some elements present in Hume’s theory which help us to do this.
The difference in kind between reason and the passions does not mean that there 
is no interaction between them at all. In contrast to the motivational role it denies to 
reason, the claim that reason is the slave of the passions explicitly allows reason an 
instmmental role. Slavery may be a subordinate relationship, but it is a relationship 
nonetheless. In its most basic form, and the form most straightforwardly implied by the 
claim that reason is the slave of the passions, the instrumental role of reason is to discover 
those courses of action by which passions can be satisfied. However, once we consider 
what is required to perform this role, we discover that the claim implies that reason can 
produce and dispel passions. Hume makes this implication clear when he says that, ‘The 
moment we perceive the falsehood of any supposition, or the insufficiency of any means 
our passions yield to our reason without any opposition,’ and, ‘I may will the 
performance of certain actions as means of obtaining any desir’d good; but as my willing 
of these actions is only secondary, and founded on the supposition, that they are causes of 
the suppos’d effect; as soon as I discover the falsehood of that supposition, they must
12 Treatise, Book II, Part III, Section III, page 460.
13 Treatise, Book III, Part I, Section I, page 510.
14 Treatise, Book II, Part III, Section III, page 463.
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become indifferent to me.’15 This idea, that reason can create or dispel passions, may 
seem to contradict the idea that reason is incapable of motivating, or that reason and the 
passions are so distinct as to be incapable of coming into conflict. At the very least it 
might seem to support the idea that even if the passions are required to produce action, if 
reason can produce passions, then action may ultimately be entirely governed by reason. 
This apparent contradiction can be resolved if we remember that Hume does not claim 
that reason plays no part at all in the guidance and production of action, but rather claims 
that reason alone cannot produce action. The point of the quotations just given is that if 
the agent possesses an original passion, the conclusions of reason excite or dispel 
passions with regard to actions insofar as those actions are shown to be useful or 
detrimental to the satisfaction of that original passion. Reason only excites or dispels 
passions by virtue of the motivational efficacy of the original passion, in a model of 
motivation which conforms to what R. Jay Wallace refers to as the ‘desire-out, desire- 
in’16 principle, even though he rejects the principle himself. To appropriate the language 
of another writer who rejects the Humean model of motivation, Thomas Nagel, we could 
say that, within such a model, it is reason which allows passions to ‘transmit their
17influence over the relation between ends and means.’
The existence of the instrumental relationship between reason and the passions 
also makes it possible for the passions to be justified by reference to reason, albeit in an 
extremely limited way. Hume argues that the only time a passion can be called 
‘unreasonable’ is when it, ‘is founded on the supposition or the existence of objects 
which really do not exist,’ or when, ‘we chuse means insufficient for the design’d end,
1 Rand deceive ourselves in our judgment of causes and effects.’ In other words, passions 
can only be called unreasonable when they are based on these particular varieties of false 
belief, although even then, according to Hume, “ tis not the passion, properly speaking, 
which is unreasonable, but the judgment.’19 This limited allowance for passions to be 
unreasonable to the extent that they are based on false beliefs is obviously consistent with 
a limited conception of reason as the discovery of truth and falsehood. However, the 
possibility that passions or judgements could be called unreasonable at all shows that, 
however limited, Hume’s theory has room for a norm of rationality.
Furthermore, in addition to these basic allowances that reason has some authority, 
Hume’s theory also contains three elements which he does not recognise as part o f 
reason, but which operate in co-operation with reason, to the extent that they may be 
confused with it. Firstly, because he denies that reason alone is capable of discerning 
phenomena such as causation and the existence of the physical world which we 
nevertheless accept as part of our everyday lives, he allows that the gaps left by reason 
are filled by the imagination: ‘So that upon the whole our reason neither does, nor is it 
possible it ever shou’d, upon any supposition, give us an assurance of the continu’d and 
distinct existence of body. That opinion must be entirely owing to the IMAGINATION.’20 
Secondly, he argues that the same operation of the imagination which leads us to believe
15 Treatise, Book II, Part III, Section III, page 464.
16 How to Argue about Practical Reason, in Mind (July 1990), page 370.
17 The Possibility o f  Altruism, page 34.
18 Treatise, Book II, Part III, Section III, page 463.
19 Treatise, Book II, Part III, Section III, page 463.
20 Treatise, Book I, Part IV, Section II, page 244.
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in phenomena such as cause and effect also leads us to adopt general rules which, while 
they may not be based on evidence which is as consistent as that which implies causation, 
nevertheless informs our behaviour and judgements: ‘Shou’d it be demanded why men 
form general rules, and allow them to influence their judgment, even contrary to present 
observation and experience, I shou’d reply, that in my opinion it proceeds from those 
very principles on which all judgments concerning causes and effect depend.’21 Finally, 
Hume divides our passions into those which are calm and violent, allowing that not all of 
the passions which drive us seize us with the same urgency, but that some are barely 
perceptible. Now, Hume would be at pains to insist that these elements of his theory are 
not part o f reason. In particular, with regard to the calm passions he warns that, ‘Hence it 
proceeds, that every action of the mind, which operates with the same calmness and 
tranquillity, is confounded with reason by all those, who judge of things from the first 
view and appearance.’ However, insistence that these are not part of the formal capacity 
of reason does not prevent us from including them within a full account of practical 
deliberation.
All of the aspects o f Hume’s theories of motivation, psychology and reason come 
together in his account of virtue to show just how far his theory stands from an 
understanding of human action as brute response to stimuli. We will return to consider 
Hume’s account o f virtue in more detail later, but for now will simply observe that it 
concerns common human patterns of motivation and behaviour, and our attitudes towards 
these patterns, and attempts to explain them by reference to human nature and 
inescapable aspects of our circumstances as well as the variable characteristics of culture. 
The resulting account allows that basic physical responses such as pain and pleasure are 
capable of producing complex and sophisticated behaviour such as action in accordance 
with the virtues of benevolence, justice, loyalty and respect for law. In summary, Hume 
gives us an account of motivation in which reason mediates passion with more or less 
sophisticated results. Furthermore, we do not have to accept every element of Hume’s 
particular account of psychology to see that it is attractive, plausible and liveable.
However, for many this is not enough. The way in which Hume’s account 
disappoints is perhaps best expressed by his allowance for the existence of a character 
with whom we shall become familiar: the sensible knave. Although Hume believes in 
common motivations, resulting in common reasons and common conceptions of virtue, 
this does not mean that the possession of these reasons and virtues is universal or 
necessary. So, on Hume’s account, an agent who was not motivated by compassion or 
benevolence could ignore or even exploit the conventions and conceptions of virtue that 
others took as binding:
And though it is allowed that, without a regard to property, no society could subsist; 
yet according to the imperfect ways in which human affairs are conducted, a sensible 
knave, in particular incidents, may think that an act of iniquity or infidelity will make 
a considerable addition to his fortune, without causing any considerable breach in the 
social union and confederacy. That honesty is the best policy, may be a good general 
rule, but is liable to many exceptions; and he, it may perhaps be thought, conducts 
himself with most wisdom, who observes the general rule, and takes advantage o f all 
the exceptions.
21 Treatise, Book I, Part III, Section XIII, page 197.
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I must confess that, if a man think that this reasoning much requires an answer, it 
will be difficult to find any which will appear to him appear satisfactory and 
convincing. If his heart not rebel against such pernicious maxims, if he feel no 
reluctance to the thoughts of villainy or baseness, he has indeed lost a considerable
99motive to virtue; and we may expect that his practice will answer to his speculation.
In other words, the sensible knave may be a genuinely hopeless case, whose 
motivations do not provide the reasons for action which the rest of us share. Some people 
find this troubling, not just because the sensible knave is such an obviously reprehensible 
character, but because of the suspicion that if we allow that anyone does not share our 
reasons, we somehow exempt that person from judgement. In other words, although 
Hume’s account seems fully attuned with the individualistic intuition about reasons, it 
seems at odds with the universalistic intuition; the reasons of the sensible knave are 
intimately his, but he apparently escapes those reasons which the rest of us want to 
ascribe to him. Fortunately, even before we have begun to develop our account beyond 
the position which Hume sets out in the Treatise and the Enquiries, we can see the 
beginnings of the ways in which we can allay the concerns of those people troubled by 
the sensible knave. Firstly, we do not have to restrict our judgements of the sensible 
knave to ascriptions of reasons; all sorts of other judgements are available to us, such as 
those of dishonesty or selfishness, and these seem to get closer to the heart of the matter. 
Secondly, and rather more importantly for our discussion, Hume has introduced the 
possibility, albeit in a limited way, that the sensible knave is mistaken about his reasons. 
As we have seen, Hume allows that judgements about actions taken to satisfy passions 
may be called unreasonable when they are based on errors of fact; on beliefs about 
objects which do not exist, or about means which do not satisfy ends. The possibility of 
going wrong in these limited ways may not seem to provide enough room to contain our 
misgivings about the sensible knave, but it at least raises the possibility that an apparent 
knave shares our reasons but, due to some obstruction in his reasoning, is cut off from 
them; that is, that the ascription of reasons from an external perspective is justified. The 
more our understanding of practical reason allows that reasons may be hidden from an 
agent, the greater its potential for satisfying the universalistic intuition in at least one 
way: by showing that our attempts to persuade others of reasons they deny may be more 
than just browbeating, and consequently may not be futile. Of course, this is only one 
way of satisfying this intuition, and is unlikely to be enough for those in whom the 
universalistic intuition is particularly strong.
With this thought in mind, and with the Humean context of our discussion 
established, we can now start to build the position we want to defend by turning to the 
arguments of Bernard Williams.
22 Enquiry Concerning Morals, Section IX, Part II, 232.
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1.3 In tern aland External Reasons
The argument we are particularly interested in is expressed in two of Williams’ 
essays, ‘Internal and external reasons’ ' and ‘Internal reasons and the obscurity of 
blame,’24 and is further developed in his response to John McDowell’s essay, ‘Might
25there be external reasons?’ However, the themes of these essays also appear in 
Williams’ other writings, particularly those which echo Hume’s doubts about the power 
of purely rational enquiry.26 Indeed, Williams acknowledges his debt to Hume by starting 
his argument with a position which he labels the sub-Humean model: 6 A has a reason to <|> 
iff A has some desire the satisfaction of which will be served by his <()-ing.,27 O f course, 
as is indicated by the label ‘sub-Humean’ this simplistic position is not exactly the one 
which Williams wishes to defend or explore, and neither does he imagine that it 
adequately reflects Hume’s theory. As we have seen, although Hume claims that 
motivation is dependent on the passions, the passions are rather too complex to be simply 
labelled as desires, and the practical implications of humans possessing both complex 
passions and the capacity for instrumental reasoning are rather more profound than can be 
captured within the idea of the satisfaction of desires. However, even though the sub- 
Humean model is not directly espoused by Hume or Williams, it is nevertheless 
important. As well as providing a starting point, it encapsulates the thought that will be 
central to our account no matter how far we develop it: that practical reasons are 
somehow dependent on some aspect of our psychology, whether we call that aspect 
desire, passion, sentiment or motivation, which is itself not entirely subject to rational 
appraisal. The sub-Humean model is also important because, as we shall see, it is 
something like this model which writers who object to the idea that reasons are dependent 
on motivations often take themselves to be attacking, even though their criticisms may be 
irrelevant to more sophisticated accounts such as those of Hume and Williams.
Williams takes us the first step beyond the sub-Humean model not by talking 
directly about reasons, but by talking about what we mean when we make statements 
about reasons. He claims that when we ascribe a reason to an agent -  for example, by 
saying, ‘You a have a reason to c(),’ — we can intend this statement in one of two distinct
ways. We may intend it as a statement whose truth is dependent on what Williams calls
28the agent’s subjective motivational set. Or we may intend it as a statement whose truth 
is independent of the contents of the agent’s motivational set. So, to say, ‘Go on, buy it 
and treat yourself. You really want it, and that’s reason enough,’ is to make a statement of 
the first sort, while to say, ‘It doesn’t matter if you’ve stopped caring about winning or 
the future of the team. Just get out there and play!’ is to make a statement of the second 
sort.29 Drawing a distinction which we shall follow throughout this thesis, Williams calls
23 ‘Internal and external reasons’ in Moral Luck.
24 ‘Internal reasons and the obscurity of blame’ in Making Sense o f  Humanity.
25 ‘Might there be external reasons?’ in World, Mind and Ethics.
26 For example, see Ethics and the Limits o f  Philosophy, especially Chapter 10: ‘Morality, the peculiar
institution’, and the essays ‘Persons, character and morality’ and ‘Moral luck’ in Moral Luck.
27 ‘Internal and external reasons’, page 101.
28 ‘Internal and external reasons’, page 102
29 Or, more properly, may be to make a statement of the second sort. As we shall see, one o f the
complexities of this discussion is that statements about reasons may appeal to more obscure motivations 
than the ones they explicitly mention.
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those statements whose truth is dependent on the contents of the agent’s motivational set 
internal reason statements, and those statements whose truth is not dependent on the 
contents of the agent’s motivational set external reason statements. The central claim in 
Williams’ argument -  his equivalent to the thought encapsulated in the sub-Humean 
model -  is that there are no true external reason statements. That is, any claim that a 
reason exists regardless of the contents of the agent’s motivational set is false. This does 
not mean that the ascriptions of reasons contained in external reason statements are 
necessarily false; I may have a reason to play for my team because I want to impress 
somebody in the crowd or because I want to get the coach to stop haranguing me. What is 
false is the implication that even if my motivational set did not contain anything which 
provided such a relation to a reason to play, then the reason would persist.
We may ask why, if external reason statements are never true, anybody would 
ever make them. There are three immediate explanations, each of which supposes that the 
supposed external reason statements are not actually intended as such statements after all. 
Firstly, we may imagine that an apparent external reason statement is simply a mistake. 
Someone is insisting that an agent has a particular practical reason, but, through a 
thorough misunderstanding of his or her motivations, is just wrong. For example, my 
friend insists that I should try his home made ice-cream because I will like it, and I 
continuously refuse because I have a tooth cavity that makes eating any cold substance 
excruciatingly painful, but am too embarrassed to say so.
The second explanation is similar but rather more general. The person making an 
apparent external reason statement is actually making what Williams calls an optimistic 
internal reason statement. Such a statement may appear to be about external reasons, 
because it takes little account of variation in the psychology of individual agents, but 
actually concerns internal reasons because the person making the statement hopes that we 
all possess the motivations which lead us to act in accordance with the statement. So, 
someone who says that we all have a reason to give to charity may seem to be claiming 
that this reason exists regardless of our individual feelings of compassion or benevolence, 
but may rather be hoping that all of us possess, however well hidden, the motivations 
necessary to support this reason.
The third explanation for making external reason statements is rather more 
sinister. Williams suggests that many such statements are bluff31: that they are not 
intended seriously to persuade the agent that he or she has the reasons claimed in the 
statement, but are rather intended to give the agent reasons to act in accordance with the 
statement, by appealing to existing motivations such as the fear of being regarded as 
irrational. So, an unscrupulous salesman might say, ‘I don’t understand why you’re 
hesitating -  you’ve got every reason to buy this product,’ not because I do have every 
reason to do so, but because he hopes that invoking reason has the power to persuade me.
I think that while Williams’ identification of the phenomenon of bluff is insightful, 
neither it nor the other explanations we have considered exhaust the reasons why people 
make external reason statements. Sometimes they do not just want agents to act in 
accordance with the reasons which they claim they possess: they want them to actually 
have those reasons, and they want those reasons to transcend the accidents of the 
individual psychologies of agents. We will return to these motivations concerning
30 ‘Internal reasons and the obscurity o f blame’ in Making Sense o f  Humanity, page 40.
31 See ‘Internal and external reasons’, page 111.
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external reasons much later, in the final part of this thesis.
The claims made within Williams’ argument obviously require justification. 
However, before attempting to find such justification, we will pause for a moment to get 
our terminology clear. This is especially important as the terms ‘internal’ and ‘external’ 
are used in different ways in various areas of philosophy, some of which touch directly 
on our discussion. As we have seen, Williams talks about internal and external reason 
statements. However, as it is clumsy to continuously talk of statements, and as our main 
concern is with reasons, we will talk of internal and external reasons. We will also use 
the distinction between different types of reasons to distinguish between different types 
of writers. So, we will use the term internal reasons theorists to refer to those writers 
who maintain, with Williams and Hume, that reasons are dependent on motivations, and 
will use the term external reasons theorists to refer to those writers who maintain that 
reasons can exist independently of motivations.
Because we will often be talking of moral reasons and of motivation, we also need 
to distinguish our debate about internal and external reasons from the debate concerning 
intemalism and extemalism about moral motivation. This debate concerns the question of 
whether espousing a moral belief entails the possession of a motivation to act in
99accordance with that belief. The distinction is often first credited to W.D.Falk' and a 
version of it is expressed by Thomas Nagel when he says that, ‘Intemalism is the view 
that the presence of a motivation for acting morally is guaranteed by the tmth of ethical 
propositions themselves,’ and that, ‘Extemalism holds, on the other hand, that the 
necessary motivation is not supplied by ethical principles and judgements themselves,
• • • • 99and that an additional psychological sanction is required to motivate our compliance.’' 
Internalists about moral motivation need not be internal reasons theorists and external 
reasons theorists need not be externalists about moral motivation: one could argue that 
believed ethical propositions produce motivation in the absence of pre-existing 
motivations, or that believed ethical propositions could fail to motivate just because of a 
lack of prior motivations. Indeed, Nagel declares himself to be an internalist about moral 
motivation but, as we shall see, argues strongly for the existence of external reasons.34
As we are setting the terms of our discussion, we should also clarity how we will 
speak about the things that, on Williams’ and Hume’s accounts, give rise to reasons. We 
have already seen that there are several ways to refer to these entities, and we shall see 
several more. The term chosen by particular writers reflects the language of their times, 
but also reflects their theoretical positions. The term ‘passion’ does not have quite the 
same meaning to us as it had in the 18th century,35 but I expect that in both times it 
implies that what it refers to provides the impetus to action. Williams, who is concerned 
to make sure that we do not underestimate the range or complexity of motivations, 
deliberately adopts the technical term ‘subjective motivational set’ and gives it the
32 See “ ‘Ought’ and Motivation’ in Ought, Reasons and Morality.
33 The Possibility o f  Altruism, page 7.
34 The possibility for confusion between the terms is shown by Christine Korsgaard when, in her paper
‘Skepticism about practical reason’ she claims that Williams’ and Nagel’s understanding of intemalism 
is ‘almost identical.’ As we shall see, they are thoroughly at odds. ‘Skepticism about practical reason’ in 
Creating the Kingdom o f  Ends, page 329.
35 Or, indeed, the wide range of meanings it apparently had in the 17th century. For an extensive discussion
of the treatment of the passions in this period, see Susan James’ Passion and Action: The Emotions in 
Seventeenth-Century Philosophy.
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symbol S, although he recognises this as ‘unlovely.’36 As we shall see, writers who are 
sceptical about the role that non-rational psychological entities can play in the 
determination of reasons, tend to talk of desires, a term which carries implications of 
crudity and irrationality. For the sake of simplicity I shall mostly talk of motivations, 
although I shall also adopt the language of whatever writer we are discussing at the time.
The final aspect of terminology which we must settle is what we will call the 
account of practical reason defended in this thesis. I shall call it the internal reasons 
account, although it is not exactly the same as that which appears in Williams’ essays, 
nor is it exactly the same as that in Hume’s work. Furthermore, it is deliberately labelled 
an account rather than a system or a theory, both of which imply a degree of unity and 
comprehensiveness which I do not attempt to attain. The account is not complete, and 
although it will be more complete at the end of this thesis than it is now, it will never be a 
thoroughly systematic, unified whole. Rather it will be sufficiently sophisticated to be 
plausible, recognisable and resilient; and, I shall attempt to show, more so than any other 
alternatives we encounter.
Given this ambition, it is time to see how the claims about internal and external 
reasons we have adopted from Williams’ account can be justified. Williams’ own 
justification of his claim is quite terse: ‘If there are reasons for action, it must be that 
people sometimes act for those reasons, and if they do, their reasons must figure in some 
correct explanation of their action.’37 This claim implies much but its terseness is 
regrettable, as it can lead to simplistic interpretations. I believe that there are two 
complementary legitimate interpretations, and that they reflect two inescapably linked 
dimensions of reasons. The first interpretation is that it is a condition of practical reasons 
that they constitute forces capable of driving agents into action, so they therefore must 
contain a motivational component. This interpretation reflects the explanatory dimension 
of reasons; the thought that when we say that something was done for a reason, we can 
point to the reason as part of the explanation. This expectation that reasons can explain is 
undoubtedly part of our understanding of reasons, but it is not the only part. That it is not 
the only part is indicated by our tendency to use the language of reasons when explaining 
the behaviour of inanimate objects: ‘The reason for the avalanche was the heavy fall of 
snow last night.’ When talking of the reasons of rational agents we must say something 
more. This something more comes in the second interpretation of the claim that if  there 
are reasons for action, it must be possible that agents could act for them. This 
interpretation points out the normative implications of the claim: the ascription o f a 
reason constitutes a judgement, and to judge that an agent should act for a reason which 
he or she could not act for cannot be justified. This idea is often expressed as the 
principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. So, leaving aside the question o f motivation, a 
judgement that someone should stop a runaway car from rolling into a crowd of people is 
unjustified if it is physically impossible for the car to be stopped. Similarly, if  a particular 
motivation is a pre-requisite for a particular action, then the absence of that motivation is 
as much an obstacle to that action as any physical restraint. It is important to realise just 
how tightly these two interpretations, and consequently the explanatory and normative 
dimensions of practical reason, are bound up with one another. The possibility of 
explanation justifies normative judgement, while the judgement of normativity is what
36 ‘Internal reasons and the obscurity of blame’, page 35.
37 ‘Internal and external reasons’, page 102.
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elevates the ascription of reasons to rational agents above the explanation of the 
behaviour of inanimate objects. The normative judgement and the motivational impetus 
are both necessary to provide a reason.
It seems, then, that, despite Williams’ terse treatment of the subject, we can justify 
the claim that motivations within an agent are necessary for the existence of reasons for 
that agent; motivations underpin both normative and explanatory aspects of reasons. 
However, I think that there is also a less formal basis for the claim embedded within the 
internal reasons account; and that is the individualistic intuition about reasons which we 
introduced at the beginning of our discussion. Normativity and explanation are essential 
characteristics of practical reasons, but it is also an essential part of our common 
understanding of practical reasons that they are intimate to the agent, and that those 
reasons which are most important to the agent are those that lie closest to the essential 
elements of his or her identity. This is why, even though we expect that we will share 
many of our reasons with others, I do not expect that my reasons will be exactly the same 
as yours; and I expect that this difference is, at root, a function not just of the 
circumstances in which I find myself, but of who I am. So, the claim that reasons are 
dependent on motivations, an aspect of psychology which is thoroughly individual, not 
only captures the normative and explanatory aspects of reasons, but also satisfies our 
intuition that some of the most important reasons to agents are the ones which are most 
individually theirs.
However, as with Hume, there is more to Williams’ argument than the basic 
conditions for the existence of reasons. Hume went beyond his account of motivational 
psychology to provide accounts of morals, virtues, social conventions and their possible 
historical origins. Williams does not explicitly develop his account in this way, but does 
argue for three additional claims which are vital to his account: that we should have a 
broad and generous understanding of the deliberation that produces reasons; that we 
should have a similarly broad and generous understanding of those things which 
comprise our subjective motivational sets; and that the deliberative routes from our 
existing motivations to our reasons, and consequently our reasons themselves, are not 
fully determinate.
Williams’ most succinct expression of his position is as follows: ‘A has a reason 
to <|> only if he could reach a conclusion to tb by a sound deliberative route from the 
motivations he already has.’' The obvious question raised by this formulation is what 
constitutes a sound deliberative route. In ‘Internal and external reasons’ Williams says 
that although means-end, instrumental reasoning is the most obvious type of sound 
practical deliberation, it is by no means that only one:
But there are much wider possibilities for deliberation, such as thinking how the 
satisfaction of elements in S can be combined, e.g. by time-ordering; where there is 
some irresoluble conflict among the elements of S, considering which one attaches 
most weight to (which, importantly, does not imply that there is some one 
commodity o f which they provide varying amount); or, again, finding constitutive 
solutions, such as deciding what would make for an entertaining evening, granted
1 * 3 9  "that one wants entertainment.
38 ‘Internal reasons and the obscurity of blame’, page 35.
39 ‘Internal and external reasons’, page 10 1.
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And in ‘Internal reasons and the obscurity of blame’, he points out again that a 
sound deliberative route is not just the identification of means to ends:
There are many other possibilities, such as finding a specific form for a project that 
has been adopted in unspecific terms. Another possibility lies in the invention of 
alternatives. One of the most important things deliberation does, rather than thinking 
of means to a fixed end, is to think of another line of conduct altogether, as when 
someone succeeds in breaking out of a dilemma. Yet another line o f deliberative 
thought lies in the perception of unexpected similarities.40
This broad understanding of what constitutes a sound deliberative route means 
that we should not allow ourselves to get caught up in the somewhat limited debate about 
whether, by claiming that reasons are dependent on motivations, we are implying that we 
can reason about means but not about ends. Our account of internal reasons does imply 
that our ends are dependent on our motivations, but still allows that we can reason about 
these ends: our pre-existing motivations constrain our ends but they do not determine 
them.
As with the concept of sound deliberation the importance of the concept of the 
agent’s motivational set within Williams’ theory is not just that it determines the 
existence of reasons, but that it is understood broadly. Williams is as wary of the term 
‘desires’ as we are, noting that although it is convenient and familiar, ‘this terminology 
may make one forget that S can contain such things as dispositions of evaluation, patterns 
of emotional reaction, personal loyalties, and various projects, as they may be abstractly 
called, embodying commitments of the agent.’41 Furthermore, the contents of S are not 
fixed but dynamic. As Williams points out, ‘The process of deliberation can have all sorts 
of effect on S, and this is a fact which a theory of internal reasons should be very happy 
to accommodate.’42 Some of these effects may be of the particularly rational kind 
acknowledged by Hume, such as the instrumental desire for an object imagined to satisfy 
a more fundamental desire vanishing when it is realised that the object doesn’t satisfy that 
desire at all. But some of these effects may be less predictable and less directly rational, 
such as an upwelling of enthusiasm caused by imagining a particular goal or course of 
action.
It is this broad understanding of motivations and deliberation and the interaction 
between them which makes Williams’ account more than just the claim that external 
reasons do not exist, and which raises the possibility of an account of internal reasons 
which goes far beyond the sub-Humean model, but which retains the plausible and 
attractive aspects of Humean motivational psychology. Such an account seems even more 
possible when we consider the last additional element of Williams’ account: 
indeterminacy. The broad understanding of motivations and deliberation means that 
Williams emphatically does not imagine that, if we start with a comprehensive 
understanding of an agent’s motivations and of what constitutes sound deliberation we 
can lay out the agent’s reasons like a map. Rather, Williams allows that, ‘There is an
40 ‘Internal reasons and the obscurity of blame’ page 38.
41 ‘Internal and external reasons’, page 105.
42 ‘Internal and external reasons’, page 105.
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essential indeterminacy in what can be counted as a rational deliberative process,’43 and 
that, ‘Since there are many ways of deliberative thinking, it is not fully determinate in 
general, even for a given agent at a given time, what may count as ‘a sound deliberative 
route’; and from this it follows that the question of what the agent has reason to do is 
itself not fully determinate.’44 And this indeterminacy accords with our general 
experience of reasons and reasoning: we often feel that there is not a single, compelling 
reason for taking a particular action at a particular time, but rather an almost infinite 
range o f potential reasons and actions without any single right answer. It is a 
simultaneously luxurious and disconcerting feature of life for many of us fortunate 
enough to have lives which are not dominated by the practicalities of survival that this is 
more often the situation than not.
However, while we can allow and even welcome a certain indeterminacy in 
reasons, we should try to be rather clearer about what we mean by indeterminacy. I think 
that we can understand it best by considering three of its more important implications. 
Firstly, when we allow that what a particular agent has reason to do is indeterminate we 
allow that it need not be contrary to reason for agents with identical starting motivations 
and circumstances to deliberate to different and possibly contradictory conclusions about 
action, and yet for their reasons to be both justifiable and appropriate to them. This is 
possible because, once we acknowledge that imagination is an essential part of 
deliberation, we accept that reasoning can go in many different directions from the same 
starting point. Furthermore, once we allow that deliberation can modify motivations, we 
create the possibility that deliberation can be one way; that is, deliberation can modify 
motivations in a way which means that the original starting point and the deliberative 
routes away from it are no longer available to the agent. It may be helpful to illustrate this 
with an example. Imagine twin brothers in a country occupied by an invading force, both 
of whom are deliberating about whether to join the resistance or to try to survive within 
the constraints imposed by the occupier. For the purposes of this example we will 
imagine that they are identical twins to an implausible degree, with the same sets of 
motivations, circumstances and access to information. So, they are both proud of their 
country and hate the invader, but also both know the retribution exacted on resistance 
fighters and their families if  caught. While deliberating, one of them considers the proud 
tradition of his family in similar conflicts, the indignities he would suffer under 
occupation, and the respect afforded the resisters. He is fired with patriotism and dreams 
of heroism, and comes to regard anything but resistance as despicable capitulation. By 
contrast, the other considers his love for his family, their certain torture and death if  he 
was caught, and the futility of a few fighters in the face of the invading forces. He 
becomes depressed and resigned, seeing anything other than survival, with all the 
compromises that entails, as foolhardy posturing. Both end up with different reasons from 
the same starting point, and once they have reached those reasons, no longer have the 
same motivational set as the other. The obvious question is what could cause such 
divergence from the same starting point. We could work somewhat implausible triggers 
into the example, imagining these two brothers pondering side by side, one whose gaze 
falls on his father’s old rifle, and the other whose gaze falls on a picture of his family. 
However, I think that it is sufficient to acknowledge that, once we accept a broad
43 ‘Internal and external reasons’, page 110.
44 ‘Internal reasons and the obscurity of blame’, page 38.
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understanding of deliberation which includes the operation of the imagination, there is no 
set way that deliberation must go in particular circumstances; there are many ways to go 
which count as sound, and many of these are paths which cannot be retraced once taken.
The second important implication of indeterminacy is that we cannot determine 
exactly what an agent’s reasons are before that agent deliberates, because the existence of 
those reasons depends on the process of deliberation as well as the point from which 
deliberation starts. The example of the twin brothers living in the occupied country is 
useful once again here. Our first illustration of indeterminacy allowed that the two 
brothers could settle on contradictory reasons from the same starting point. Our second 
implication of indeterminacy is that even with a thorough understanding of the 
psychology of each brother, until actual deliberation is conducted and actual motivations 
are influenced, we cannot know or say that the reasons to join the resistance or to avoid 
conflict definitely exist. This does not mean that we cannot know any of the agent’s 
reasons; if  we allow that motivations give rise to reasons then some immediate 
motivations will directly produce some reasons, and the predictability of reasons will 
vary with the degree and complexity of deliberation required to produce them. However, 
at some stage we will reach the point beyond which the outcome of deliberation cannot 
be known prior to deliberation. We will return to this thought later, and particularly to the 
question of what precedes the motivations which emerge during deliberation.
The third implication of indeterminacy is perhaps the most important, as it 
concerns our nature as reasoning agents, rather than just the questions of how our reasons 
can diverge or what we can know about each others’ reasons. The allowance that our 
reasons are not fully determined prior to deliberation provides us with a sense in which 
we can be both rational and free. As we shall see later, some theorists, especially those 
who follow Kant, have attempted to show that rational beings are free precisely because 
their status as rational agents fully determines their reasons. Leaving such arguments 
aside for the time being, however, the idea that reasons are fully determined, whether we 
suppose that those determinate reasons are universal or particular to individual agents, 
implies that when we deliberate correctly we do not decide what to do, but rather 
discover those determinate reasons which were in place all along: it seems to leave us 
with no room for choice, or at most the choice between rationality and irrationality. By 
contrast, once we allow that reasons are not fully determined, we allow that when we are 
deliberating we are doing more than navigating a landscape which has already been laid 
out for us, but are involved in real choices in which we construct our reasons as well as 
discover them.
To some it may seem that if we not only allow indeterminacy, but positively 
embrace it, we are constructing a vision of chaos rather than of practical rationality. If 
deliberation can go in any direction, and if we cannot tell what reasons an agent may end 
up with, it may seem that we are no longer talking about anything recognisable as reasons 
at all. Of course, though, Williams is not proposing anarchy. Indeterminacy is only a part 
of the internal reasons account, even if it is an important part. Indeed, within his 
argument, Williams insists that reasons are subject to at least the same minimum 
standards of rationality that Hume imposed on whether a passion could be considered 
reasonable or not. As we saw, Hume allowed that passions which were based on certain 
types of false belief could be described as unreasonable. Williams expands on this 
thought by offering the example of a man who wants gin and is unaware that the gin
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bottle in front of him actually contains petrol.45 When we ask whether the man has a 
reason to drink what is in the bottle, Williams acknowledges that such action could be 
explained by reference to the agent’s false belief, but maintains that, precisely because 
the action would be based on a false belief, the agent does not have a reason to act that 
way.46 In other words, even if  we allow that reasons are indeterminate, and that what 
counts as a sound deliberative route is indeterminate, we do not allow that just anything 
could count as a reason or as a sound deliberative route. Allowing that reasons are not 
fully determined is not the same as allowing that they are arbitrary.
A picture of the deliberating agent is beginning to emerge. It is one in which the 
agent possesses a starting set of motivations, and a set of sound ways of proceeding from 
those motivations through deliberation. These ways of proceeding will produce practical 
conclusions which are capable of explaining and justifying actions. The agent does not 
necessarily have to follow all these paths for all these reasons to exist, but it has to be 
conceivable that they could be followed. The attraction of this picture is not only that it is 
plausible and recognisable and that it has room both rationality and freedom, but that, at 
least at first glance, it appears comprehensive and resilient. It can be used to account for 
basic actions, peculiar to the desires of a particular individual, but can also be used in the 
hands o f someone like Hume to construct a grand and general scheme of human 
behaviour. It does not seem as if there is much we need to add to the fundamentals of the 
account to encompass all of our motivations, actions and reasons.
As in our discussion of Hume’s scheme, though, we must acknowledge that 
Williams’ account of internal reasons seems, at least superficially, rather more agreeable 
to the individualistic intuition about reasons than it does to the universalistic intuition; the 
emphasis on motivations and the likelihood that external reason statements are mere bluff 
seems more compatible with the thought that our reasons are intimately ours than with 
the thought that we can legitimately make judgements about the reasons of others from an 
external standpoint. However, also as with Hume, Williams’ account contains some 
elements which indicate how it could potentially satisfy the appetite for objectivity 
underlying the universalistic intuition. The idea that deliberation must be sound implies 
that there is some standard, albeit an undefined and indeterminate one, which constrains 
what can be allowed to count as a reason. Furthermore, the idea that reasons are not 
always produced directly by motivations, but may lie at the end of a sound deliberative 
route which is long and complex and which itself involves the modification of the agent’s 
starting motivations, allows that agents may possess reasons which are obscure to them; 
indeed, most of us almost certainly do possess such reasons. Consequently, exhortations 
to agents to pay attention to reasons which they are apparently unaware of or indifferent 
to may often be more than just bluff or wishful thinking; they may be attempts to get 
agents to see reasons which they possess but which they nevertheless cannot grasp 
without help. As mentioned earlier, the more our account allows for the obscurity of 
reasons, the more it allows for the possibility that our judgements about an agent’s 
reasons may be correct, even though they disagree with that agent’s own judgements 
about his or her reasons. To take this thought further, we will develop Williams’ account 
in two directions. Firstly, we will show that the account allows for an even greater degree 
o f indeterminacy than we have acknowledged so far, by considering the implications of
45 See ‘Internal and external reasons’, page 102.
46 See ‘Internal and external reasons’, page 102.
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ideas presented in Williams’ recent book Truth and Truthfulness. Secondly, we will 
further consider the implications of the possibility that agents may find their deliberative 
routes obstructed, and what this means for their reasons.
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1.4 Steadying the Mind
Although the idea of a starting set of motivations figures formally in Williams’ 
account of internal reasons to the extent that it is given the label S, it would be a mistake 
to imagine this starting set of motivations as stable, well-defined and transparent. When 
we consider our experience of motivations, we realise that they are often highly unstable, 
and, furthermore, that we are often unsure or unaware of what our motivations are until 
we are called upon to deliberate in some way which engages them. Consider, for 
example, the percentage of ‘don’t knows’ in virtually any survey which is conducted. 
Some of these people undoubtedly say they don’t know which option they prefer because 
they don’t like any of them, but others genuinely don’t know what their motivations are, 
and could even be said to have no motivations relating to the question until after they 
have been asked. This seems to be the case whether the choice being offered is between 
politicians or bars of chocolate. The phenomenon of the contents of agents’ motivational 
sets being clarified in deliberation was discussed by Williams in his work on internal and 
external reasons. However, he also considered it much more recently in Truth and 
Truthfulness, in which he introduces the useful concept of steadying the mind.
Williams introduces this concept by considering two different but equally unlikely 
characters from 18th century French literature. These are both historical figures, although 
one is presented via autobiography and the other is presented as a fictionalised caricature. 
The autobiographical figure is Jean-Jacques Rousseau as he presents himself in The 
Confessions, and the caricature is Jean-Franqois Rameau as he is presented in Denis 
Diderot’s dialogue Rameau’s Nephew. Superficially, it is remarkable how much these 
two characters resemble each other, or at least how much Rameau resembles Rousseau as 
he presents himself in the earlier part of The Confessions. Both are moderately well 
educated but penniless, both depend on patronage for survival, and both attach 
themselves to households where they are found to be companionable and entertaining, but 
add little of any real substance. Inveterate hangers-on, both have earned their livings at 
one time or another as rather indifferent music teachers, and there is even an episode in 
The Confessions in which Rousseau could be following exactly the advice of Rameau on 
how to bluff a living out of teaching music without really understanding the subject at 
all.47 The main difference between the two characters is the apparent conception of the 
self under which they are operating.
At the outset of The Confessions Rousseau famously declares, ‘I desire to set
AO
before my fellows the likeness of a man in all the truth o f nature, and that man myself,’ 
and it is apparent from this declaration and much of the rest of the book that he believes 
that there is a core self, an essential Rousseau to present. Moreover, it also becomes 
apparent that, even though Rousseau claims to ‘have neither omitted anything bad, not 
interpolated anything good,’49 and some of what he refuses to omit includes venal, 
cowardly, selfish and lecherous acts, he does not present himself as essentially vicious. 
Williams points out that Rousseau has a tendency to report something terrible and then to 
find some means of, if not exactly forgiving himself, at least offering himself some form 
of release from responsibility. What is of most interest about such incidents is not
47 See The Confessions, pages 142-145 and Rameau’s Nephew, pages 58-60.
48 The Confessions, page 3.
49 The Confessions, page 3.
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whether Rousseau is truthful or sincere in his account of them, but that he does not treat 
them as revelations of his essential self, regarding them rather as unfortunate moments of 
weakness. As the catalogue of deceit, cowardice and betrayal grows, however, we may 
begin to suspect that, despite all his apparently sincere self-recrimination, Rousseau can 
only bring himself to recount such painful events because he does not take them so much 
to reveal his character, as to be occasions on which he acted out of character.
By contrast, the character of Rameau as portrayed by Diderot cheerfully 
represents himself as fickle and subject to vice. However, it would be too simple to write 
him off as a cynical egotist. There is an element of cynicism to Rameau, as revealed 
when he complains to his counterpart in the dialogue (whom we take to be Diderot 
himself) of the drudgery that flattery, the procurement of patronage, and promoting the 
interests of his patrons entails.50 However, he is most interesting because he is not 
straightforwardly cynical or hypocritical, but rather unsteady to an extreme in his beliefs, 
his feelings and even his personality. It does not seem to simply be the case that he wears 
the mask that pleases his patron of the moment, but rather that he fully inhabits whatever 
role he is playing at the time. Furthermore, he is conscious of his unsteadiness:
‘Devil take me if  I really know what I am. As a rule my mind is as true as a sphere 
and my character as honest as the day: never false if I have the slightest interest in 
being true, never true if I have the slightest interest in being false. I say things as they 
come to me; if sensible all to the good, but if outrageous, people don’t take any 
notice. I use freedom of speech for all it’s worth. I have never reflected in my life, 
either before speaking, during speech or after. And so I give no offence.’51
His protean nature is even exhibited in his physical appearance. Diderot says that, 
‘Nothing is less like him than himself. At times he is thin and gaunt like somebody in the 
last stages of consumption . . .  A month later he is sleek and plump as though he had 
never left some millionaire’s table or had been shut up in a Cistercian house.’ Such 
extraordinary changeability might lead us to wonder whether this character possesses any 
real identity at all; whether there is anything behind the facade. Yet Diderot presents 
Rameau as such a vivid character with such a palpable presence that the situation is 
evidently the other way around: what Rameau feels and believes at any time goes to his 
core; there is just no guarantee that he will believe or feel it a day or even a moment later. 
Nothing sticks.
Although we can recognise aspects of ourselves in Rousseau and Rameau, they 
are ultimately both implausible: the products of dramatic invention or self- 
deception. And it is what makes them implausible that helps us to understand to what 
degree we expect the contents of our minds to be settled, and what is going on as they 
become steadied. Rousseau is implausible because he asks us to believe that he possesses 
a fundamental character to which he is unswervingly true, even when he is behaving in
50 See Rameau’s Nephew, pages 87-88.
51 Rameau’s Nephew, page 79.
52 Rameau’s Nephew, page 34.
53 As Hume said o f Rousseau, ‘I believe that he intends seriously to draw his own picture in its true colours:
but I believe at the same time that nobody knows himself less.’ Quoted in Truth and Truthfulness, page 
177.
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what appears to be complete contradiction to this character. While we feel there are 
elements of our characters which are fundamental to us, we do not suppose that they are 
so extensive as to inform all of our behaviour and beliefs, or so robust that they can 
survive behaviour which is consistently at odds with them. By contrast, Rameau is 
implausible because he transforms himself so thoroughly to suit his circumstances. While 
we do not necessarily believe that our characters can be so firmly established and 
maintained as Rousseau believes his to be, we do believe that we have characters that 
possess a persistent identity and inertia, placing Rameau’s level of volatility beyond us. 
We are not like Rameau, because we need at least some stable parts of our characters to 
operate as agents at all, and we are not like Rousseau as he presents himself, because 
elements of our character are unstable, and are influenced by the roles we adopt and the 
acts we perform.
However, Williams evidently believes that we are rather more like the character 
of Rameau than we are like Rousseau as he believes himself to be. The idea that each of 
us possesses a thoroughly steady character which is transparent to us and to which it is 
incumbent upon us to be true is taken to be an illusion, at least partly an artefact of the 
artificial and rather romantic notion of authenticity: ‘So we must leave behind the 
assumption that we first and immediately have a transparent self-understanding and then 
go on either to give other people a sincere revelation of our belief from which they 
understand us (or, as Rousseau bitterly found out, misunderstand us), or else dissimulate 
in a way that will mislead them.’54 Rather, Williams maintains that, throughout our lives, 
whether through influences extended over time, such as upbringing or interaction with the 
society in which we live as mature adults, or through more acute turning points, such as 
direct engagement with individuals or particular instances of deliberation, we steady the 
contents of our minds, settling barely formed thoughts and feelings into the more 
determinate stuff of identity, knowledge and action. We are not as volatile as Rameau, 
but the difference is one of degree, rather than the difference in kind that stands between 
us and Rousseau as he believes himself to be. We do have characters which are steady to 
some degree and we do have some settled basis of motivation and belief on which to base 
practical decisions, but we should not imagine that these are fixed, and should also 
recognise that their possession is itself an attainment.
Williams goes on to explore what is happening when our minds become steadied; 
when we move from a position of uncertainty to the attainment of character or the 
establishment of a practical position. The resulting picture contains two main elements: 
those primitive contents of the mind which precede beliefs and desires; and what happens 
when they become beliefs and desires. We experience the contents of the mind that 
precede fully formed desires and beliefs whenever we embark on any instance of 
deliberation in which we are not entirely sure of our ground. Of course, this includes 
many, if not most, instances of deliberation, including those instances we might best 
describe as idle speculation or daydreaming, as well as those involving focussed, serious 
thought. Our experience is that, although such deliberation may include the consideration 
of recognisable and well understood desires and beliefs, we also find ourselves immersed 
in half-formed, unarticulated thoughts and wishes which are insufficiently defined to be 
regarded as beliefs and desires. These fragmentary and sometimes elusive elements do 
not comprise the sole raw material of deliberation, but they are sufficiently involved that
54 Truth and Truthfulness, page 193.
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any full picture of deliberation must take account of them. As Williams says, ‘the process 
of arriving at a practical conclusion typically involves a shifting and indeterminate set of 
wishes, hopes and fears, in addition to the more clearly defined architecture of desire and 
belief.’55 Williams sees the way in which these shifting and indeterminate contents of the 
mind become settled as one of commitment. That is, as these contents of the mind present 
themselves to us we find that we can more readily commit to some rather than others, and 
it is this commitment which establishes them as beliefs. Because Williams is concerned 
with the expression of the truth, he concentrates on the tendency of trustful conversation, 
in which we are often obliged to say what we believe, to produce such commitments: ‘At 
a more basic level, we are all together in the social activity of mutually stabilising our 
declarations and moods and impulses into becoming such things as beliefs and relatively 
steady attitudes.’56
There are two further aspects of Williams’ picture of steadying the mind which 
we should note, one of which he states explicitly, and the other of which is implied. 
Firstly, it is possible for steadying the mind to go wrong. Just because the primitive 
contents of the mind can become settled into beliefs and desires does not mean that they 
should become so settled. Williams distinguishes carefully between desires and wishes, 
characterising wishes as motivational states whose content it may or may not be possible 
to satisfy within a particular practical context, and further categorising mere wishes as 
those motivational states which we know cannot be satisfied within a particular practical 
context.57 Steadying the mind goes wrong when mere wishes become established as 
desires or, worse still, as beliefs, resulting in deliberation which is inevitably futile. As 
Williams says, this, ‘suggests that wishful thinking is not at all mysterious. It turns out, in 
fact, to be precisely well-named -  it is thinking which is full of wishes, and, since all 
practical thinking is full of wishes, in the most general sense of the term in which wishes 
can occur on the route both to belief and to desire, there is no mystery about the fact that 
(to put it crudely) an agent may easily find himself committed to their content in the 
wrong mode.’58 The second point to note about steadying the mind is that, although 
Williams does not say so explicitly, it is clear that he does not intend that it be understood 
as an activity which we undertake, either consciously or unconsciously. We do not set out 
to steady our minds; rather, we engage in deliberation, or attempt to express to somebody 
else what we want or what we believe, or get on with our practical lives in any of the 
innumerable ways which are available to us, and our minds become steadied as a by­
product.
The concept of steadying the mind has consequences for Williams’ argument in 
Truth and Truthfulness and for our discussion in three ways. Firstly, it represents a 
development in Williams’ construction of an imaginary genealogy. This method, which is 
more frequently encountered in political philosophy, although it is also used by Hume in 
his account of the virtues, involves speculation about the character traits we could expect 
to emerge in any group of human beings living in a primitive state labelled the State of 
Nature. The State of Nature and the people living in it are entirely fictional, hence 
imaginary genealogy, but considering how they would develop and interact given what
55 Truth and Truthfulness, page 198.
56 Truth and Truthfulness, page 193.
57 See Truth and Truthfulness, page 195-196.
58 Truth and Truthfulness, page 197-198.
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we know about actual human beings can tell us something about the basis of our own 
values and behaviour. The particular imaginary genealogy constructed by Williams in 
Truth and Truthfulness is not of great interest to us now, but we will find the method of 
use later in our discussion. The second consequence of the concept of steadying the mind 
concerns the development of character. As we have seen, the concept implies that our 
characters are developed as we become steadied through living our lives, and particularly 
through our engagement with others, and that consequently we should not conceive of 
ourselves, as Rousseau does, as possessing thoroughly settled characters which we reveal 
through our actions and utterances if we live authentically, but which persist even if we 
consistently betray them by living inauthentically. Rather, we construct our characters as 
well as revealing them through our actions and utterances.
The third consequence of the concept of steadying the mind is the most relevant to 
our discussion, and is that it modifies our understanding of what goes on in particular 
instances of deliberation. This is of obvious importance to our discussion of internal 
reasons, particularly when we consider how our desires become settled to the extent that 
they are capable of giving us reasons for action. Unfortunately this is not an area to which 
Williams gives a great deal of attention in his discussion of steadying the mind: all he 
does is to explore the distinction between desires and wishes59 and to point out that 
desires may become settled in a fashion similar to beliefs.60 Fortunately these thoughts, 
combined with the more general understanding of steadying the mind we can gain from 
the rest of Williams’ discussion, as well as the thought we have already encountered in 
Williams’ work on internal and external reasons that the contents of an agent’s subjective 
motivational set, S, may be modified by deliberation, together give us enough to 
construct a picture of steadying the mind as it relates to motivations and the reasons 
which depend on those motivations.
We take four essential elements from Williams’ general account of steadying the 
mind: the thought that the contents of our minds are neither entirely settled nor entirely 
transparent to us; the observation that when we deliberate we are often dealing with part- 
formed thoughts and feelings which are not sufficiently defined to be regarded as desires 
or beliefs; the distinction between these part-formed thoughts and feelings and firmer 
mental contents such as desires and beliefs not just through the degree to which they are 
understood and articulated, but also through the degree to which we are committed to 
them; and, finally, the way in which engagement with others acts as a catalyst for 
steadying the unsettled contents of the mind. When we consider these elements in the 
context of the discussion of internal and external reasons a picture emerges in which the 
subjective motivational set, S, is not only partly obscure to us but is, in its least well 
defined reaches, associated with mental contents which could not yet be properly 
considered as motivations, but which could potentially become motivations as the mind is 
steadied. These mental contents may become steadied into motivations when the agent is 
placed in a situation where it is imperative to decide what he or she really wants; to 
commit to desires in areas where commitment may never have been required before. This 
commitment may be required because of the need to engage practically with others but, 
importantly, it may be required even in instances of solitary practical deliberation where a 
lack of commitment would prevent the agent from reaching a practical conclusion.
59 Truth and Truthfulness, page 195-198.
60 Truth and Truthfulness, page 193.
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An illustration may be helpful here. Imagine a woman who is successful in 
business, who also has strong political views and who, as a consequence, has from time 
to time considered the possibility of running for political office. However, to date this has 
remained an idle speculation; her thoughts regarding a potential political career have 
remained firmly in the category of wishes. Now, though, she has been approached by a 
local constituency organisation to ask whether she will stand as a candidate. Furthermore, 
this unsolicited approach is a sign that her candidacy is sufficiently valued that she could 
anticipate a political career as successful as her business career. She is naturally going to 
deliberate about what she should do. Some of this deliberation will be fully articulated as 
an explicit argument. Much of it, however, will be imaginative, and will involve the 
‘shifting and indeterminate set of wishes, hopes and fears’ discussed by Williams. In a 
less extreme sense than that applicable to Rameau, the agent will determine how she 
defines herself and presents herself to others according to how she makes this decision; as 
a politician or as a business person. The situation demands a shift in the level of 
commitment made to previously vague wishes to pursue a political career: either they 
achieve the status of definite desires, with consequences for the agent’s practical reasons; 
or they are relegated to the status of mere wishes which, for the time being at least, have 
extremely limited implications for the agent’s reasons and actions. Furthermore, the 
process of deliberation may settle or modify other actual or potential elements of S which 
are more peripheral to the matter under consideration. In considering her options the 
agent may wonder whether she could tolerate the levels of sycophancy and dissembling 
which often seem linked to political success, and may find that, by imagining herself in 
situations where such behaviour is politically expedient, her attitude towards it changes 
and becomes more clearly defined: she may come to see it as a necessary part of 
achieving political goals; or she may see it as a compromise of her integrity that she 
could never accept. Whatever her decision, she may find her attitudes towards politicians 
and the political process become rather different and rather more definite than before.
So, it seems that the concept of steadying the mind can be applied to the 
development, definition and modification of the various elements of S through individual 
instances of deliberation as well as those areas which Williams explores more fully. We 
should note, however, a couple of places in which our brief discussion has a different 
emphasis from Williams’ account. Firstly, we are primarily concerned with desire rather 
than belief, and this leads us to observe that steadying the mind seems to produce a finer 
grained distinction within what Williams calls the ‘register of desire’ than within what he 
calls the ‘register of belief .61 When primitive contents of the mind becomes steadied into 
beliefs, it seems most natural to use this single term to label them. We may talk of strong 
beliefs or tentative beliefs or even passionate beliefs, but we are still talking about beliefs. 
By contrast, although in philosophy we may use some general term such as desires or 
motivations or even content of the subjective motivational set S to label mental contents 
with a predominantly motivational aspect, this is always an uneasy compromise; we are 
always aware that the term is standing in for a range of everyday terms, including desires 
and motivations, but also including wants, needs, dispositions, hopes, fears, inclinations, 
likes, loves and so on. This indicates to us that the process of steadying the mind does not 
necessarily stop when the contents of the mind which precede desires and beliefs have 
been settled into beliefs and the range of mental contents which we label desires.
61 Truth and Truthfulness, page 197.
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Steadying the mind may also involve shifts, whether radical or subtle, within the register 
of desire; wants may become needs that we are less capable of resisting, repeated 
instances of desire may become so common and familiar that they become further settled 
into more general dispositions and so on. This observation does not challenge or disrupt 
Williams’ account of steadying the mind, but does remind us that the contents o f S can 
remain shifting and indeterminate even after they have been established as contents of S.
The second difference in emphasis between our employment of the concept of 
steadying the mind and Williams’ account is that Williams is primarily concerned with 
our engagement with others, while we are primarily concerned with individual instances 
of deliberation, and, while deliberation can be conducted with others, we think of it first 
as a solitary activity. This does not mean that we cannot use the concept of steadying the 
mind within our account, though. I believe that much single person deliberation 
resembles a dialogue conducted with oneself to find out what one really thinks or wants, 
and that this dialogue is analogous to engagement with others. We must be careful here: 
Williams specifically warns against the Platonic conception of the mind as an assembly 
of competing voices62 and points out that such models soon run into trouble as we start to 
see the competing voices within the agent as potential personalities in their own right. But 
this model is not what I am proposing. Such an image is flawed because it supposes that 
we possess a determinate set of beliefs and desires which clamour for our attention. Our 
picture is of a much more tentative and exploratory process: we imagine our agent who, 
when confronted with the shifting set o f considerations which arise in deliberation, asks 
him or herself whether he or she believes or feels them, not in the sense of discovering 
the truth of a pre-existing fact, but in the sense of catalysing the process of settling what 
is going to be believed or felt. Indeed, I think that this picture, far from challenging 
Williams’ more socially grounded account, allows us to see how this account can be 
extended to instances of single person deliberation. Mature deliberating adults are 
engaged in a more or less constant dialogue with themselves which resembles their 
engagement with others, and which consequently demands that they settle their beliefs 
and desires in order to answer the practical questions by which they find themselves 
confronted.
Of course, although this may be a new way of articulating it, the picture we have 
drawn is not unfamiliar: it is the same as that in our account of internal reasons, in which 
deliberation may influence the contents of the starting motivational set. The only 
difference is that the starting point is rather more basic and the influence is rather more 
profound than we had originally imagined. So, Williams’ account of steadying the mind 
appears entirely compatible with our account of internal reasons, and as it accounts for an 
essential aspect of the relationship between deliberation and motivations, it should be 
incorporated within our account. As we have said, there is nothing in this account which 
presupposes a fixed starting point, although it may be easiest to imagine one. We can 
allow that the starting point of deliberation is unsteady to a degree, although it will be 
settled in deliberation. The main consequence of introducing the concept o f steadying the 
mind is that, as well as enriching our picture of motivations, deliberation and reasons, it 
increases the degree to which we understand reasons to be indeterminate. If the process of 
deliberation steadies the motivations on which reasons depend, and if this steadying is not 
itself fully determinate, then we cannot say ahead of the agent’s deliberation exactly what
62 Truth and Truthfulness, page 194-195.
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reasons he or she has. Of course, we can predict many of the agent’s reasons -  we are 
sufficiently alike for that -  but we cannot exhaust the agent’s reasons. So, the picture 
implied by our modified account of internal reasons allows that, as well as picking our 
way through a landscape of desire and belief of which we are relatively sure, we are also 
often dealing with contents of the mind which are rather less well-defined, and which will 
only become so through deliberation.
O f course, we must acknowledge that, by introducing the concept of steadying the 
mind, we have once again modified our account of internal reasons in a way which seems 
to satisfy the individualistic intuition about reasons but which also seems, at least 
superficially, to confound the universalistic intuition. Not only are we maintaining that 
reasons are dependent on factors such as motivations which are peculiar to individuals, 
we are saying that these factors may not even be settled within those individuals prior to 
deliberation. The hope of making judgements of reasons which can be applied to agents 
even if they do not acknowledge those reasons may seem to fade in the face of this 
thought. However, in our earlier discussions of Williams and Hume we have noted that 
allowance for the obscurity o f reasons creates room for at least one way of satisfying the 
universalistic intuition; by holding out the prospect of meaningful judgement and 
engagement concerning reasons, even with those people whose reasons seem at first sight 
to be at odds with ours. The idea that motivations are not settled entirely before 
deliberation further extends the possibility of engagement and persuasion. Agents may 
not just fail to apprehend reasons because their deliberation has gone wrong; their 
motivations may not even be settled to the extent that these reasons yet exist for them.
The implications of this are perhaps clearest when we consider people who could be 
described as shallow, or as lacking in seriousness about certain aspects of the world 
(accusations which I suspect could legitimately be levelled at all of us in some respect). 
For example, imagine those exasperating people who claim not to be interested in politics 
because, ‘politicians are all the same,’ or because, ‘they’re all in it for themselves.’ 
Sometimes such attitudes may well be thought out positions supported by stable 
underlying motivations, in which case we will probably want to find out exactly what 
those positions involve. More often, however, I think that we will find that the agent has 
no firmly settled motivations or beliefs in this area, and has never conducted the 
deliberation or developed the interest that would settle them; we are familiar with the 
thought that people who had never engaged with the political process may become 
surprisingly committed and radicalised by experience of conflict or crisis. This does not 
mean that it will be easy to satisfy the universalistic intuition in individual encounters 
with apathetic or shallow agents, but it does at least hold out the possibility. Of course, 
once more, we must acknowledge that this particular way of satisfying the universalistic 
intuition will not be enough for everybody.
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1.5 Obstacles to Deliberation
In our discussions of Hume and Williams we observed that the recognition of 
obstacles to deliberation may satisfy the universalistic intuition about reasons as well as 
the individualistic intuition, because it implies that judgements of reasons may be 
legitimate even if the agent does not apprehend those reasons; it leaves the possibility of 
engagement open, even with an apparently intransigent interlocutor. However, we must 
also acknowledge that the implications of this thought for our talk of reasons are far from 
obvious or clear. Although Hume and Williams did not express this thought explicitly, 
they did recognise the ambiguity it produces. So, Hume allows that passions are 
unreasonable when based on the existence of objects which do not exist or on the 
mistaken belief that certain means will produce certain ends, while Williams formally 
includes the consequence of false beliefs within his account:
‘(ii) A member of S, D, will not give A a reason for (|)-ing if either the existence of D 
is dependent on false belief, orA’s belief in the relevance of (|)-ing to the satisfaction 
of D  is false.’63
However, Hume goes on to say, with respect to passions based on false 
judgements that, ‘even then, ‘tis not the passion, properly speaking, which is 
unreasonable, but the judgment.’64 Similarly, Williams says, with respect to the man who 
wants a gin and tonic and is unaware that his gin bottle contains petrol, ‘On the one hand, 
it is just very odd to say that he has a reason to drink this stuff, and natural to say that he 
has no reason to drink it, although he thinks that he has. On the other hand, if  he does 
drink it, we not only have an explanation of his doing so (a reason why he did it), but we 
have an explanation which is of the reason-for-action form,’65 and later, after introducing 
element (ii) of his scheme which we saw earlier: ‘It will, all the same, be true that if  he 
does <|) in these circumstances, there was a reason why he (|)-ed, but also that displays him 
as, relative to his false belief, acting rationally.’66 It appears that there is something about 
deliberative obstacles such as ignorance which not only makes them loci of tension 
between the individualistic and universalistic intuitions about reasons, but also confounds 
our intuitions about what to say. Hume does not pursue this question further, and 
Williams attempts to close it off by saying that, with regard to the question of whether we 
should say that an ignorant agent has a reason to act as if he or she were not ignorant, or 
whether we should say that an ignorant agent would have such a reason if he or she was 
not ignorant, ‘I shall not pursue the question of the conditions for saying one thing or the 
other, but it must be closely connected with the question of when the ignorance forms
ft 7part of the explanation for what A actually does. ’ I think that we can and must be a little 
bolder than Hume or Williams; the question of whether to say one thing or the other, or 
rather the question of whether this is the right question at all, is one that we cannot afford 
to leave unexplored. In order to pursue it, and to establish whether our suspicion that
63 ‘Internal and external reasons’, page 103.
64 Treatise, Book II, Part III, Section III, page 463.
65 ‘Internal and external reasons’, page 102.
66 ‘Internal and external reasons’, page 103.
67 ‘Internal and external reasons’, page 103.
31
Be Reasonable -  David Knott
deliberative obstacles help rather than hinder the satisfaction of the universalistic intuition 
about reasons is correct, we must examine the concept of the deliberative obstacle a little 
more closely.
We shall start by considering the types of deliberative obstacles that exist in 
addition to straightforward ignorance. These obstacles fall into three categories: those 
associated with deliberative habits; those associated with deliberative capacities and 
capabilities; and those associated with irrationality. Each of these sets of obstacles causes 
us problems; even the last, as we must show that however we account for the other forms 
of deliberative obstacles, we still allow that sometimes we are irrational. That is, if we 
find grounds for excusing a failure to follow or avoid reasons due to the presence of 
deliberative obstacles, those grounds must not excuse the agent who is simply acting 
irrationally.
We can gain an understanding of the role played by habits in deliberation by 
imagining the nearly infinite variety of ways in which deliberation could go from any 
point where an agent has to make a practical decision. In the example of the twin brothers 
we used earlier on to illustrate the meaning of indeterminacy we considered only two 
possible courses of action: capitulation or resistance. However, there were many other 
actions available, some likely to occur to someone in a similar situation, but others 
• unlikely to occur to anybody. So, the brothers could have considered fleeing the country 
altogether, either to start a new life, or to join forces with the foreign enemies of the 
invader. The more unlikely courses of action include betraying their home country and 
joining the enemy, killing themselves to avoid their dilemma, throwing away their lives 
in a suicide mission, abandoning human company to live as a hermit, and, indeed, 
anything else physically possible in their circumstances. Of course, in our example they 
didn't think like this, and in our everyday lives we don’t think like this. Habits guide us 
down tested deliberative paths. The idea that we don’t consider every deliberative option 
available to us is illustrated by the apparent differences between the way in which expert 
human chess players make their decisions, and the way in which chess computers work.68 
While chess computers grind through every possibility, evaluating all potential outcomes, 
humans apparently only consider those sequences of moves which they know are 
worthwhile. Of course, this raises the possibility, however unlikely, that the process of 
considering every option will discover an unexpected move superior to that which can be 
produced by intuition guided by habit.
The most influential habits are those which are so ingrained in us that their 
operation is invisible. This includes the performance of trivial tasks such as making a cup 
of tea or tying a shoelace, in which we never stop to consider whether there might be a 
better way, but also includes more pervasive deliberative habits, such as our tendency to 
worry about our everyday problems without wondering whether we could so reorder our 
lives as to make these problems irrelevant. When beset with financial, family or work 
crises, the thought that they could all be escaped by adopting a simpler mode of life may 
occasionally cross our minds, but not to the extent that it could be considered a potential 
course of action that we actually deliberate about. And for most of us, most of the time, 
these constraints on our deliberation are entirely appropriate; our modes of life come with 
problems which can usually only be addressed by deliberation which takes place within
68 Or at least worked. A better understanding o f way in which humans play chess influences the 
development of computers.
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the boundaries of those modes of life. However, while they may be the most prevalent 
and powerful, invisible deliberative habits are the most difficult to analyse, precisely 
because they are invisible. If we do try to analyse them we may find ourselves guilty of 
invention rather than analysis. Consequently, we will look for more explicit examples of 
deliberation guided by habit. In particular, we will look at three types of habit: individual, 
institutional and cultural.
Individual habits are those in which an individual has established a deliberative 
route to a particular conclusion in response to a particular problem, and reuses that route 
whenever that problem or anything related to it arises, possibly to the extent that the 
problem is no longer perceived as a problem. For example, imagine a man who has 
moved to a new town to take up a job. One of the mundane problems which faces him is 
the best way to get to work every morning. When the town is new to him he may 
explicitly deliberate about this problem, consulting his colleagues, looking at maps, and 
trying out different routes. Eventually, though, he will settle into a routine, and the 
question of how to get to work no longer presents itself; he simply follows his habitual 
route. What makes this a deliberative habit as well as just a habit, is that when 
deliberation does take place it will do so in the context of the established solution. If he 
unexpectedly encounters roadworks one day he is likely to think of it as an 
inconvenience, even if  he is forced to take a route which actually turns out to be slightly 
better. The irritation of disruption to his habit obscures his perception of reasons.
Institutional habits are those in which an institution of which the agent is a 
member has reached a particular conclusion about how to tackle a particular problem, and 
embedded it in the way it works. Such habits may determine specific procedures, but may 
also include the ways in which the institution identifies problems, debates solutions and 
makes decisions. The persistence of institutional deliberative habits is illustrated by the 
story ‘Chromium’ in Primo Levi’s book The Periodic Table. In this autobiographical 
story Levi tells of the time when, while working as an industrial chemist in a paint 
factory, he was presented with the problem of why some batches of paint set like jelly; a 
phenomenon known as Tivering.’ He discovered that the problem was caused by errors in 
the quality control procedures used to check the raw ingredients, and returned the livered 
paint to its liquid form by adding ammonium chloride to the mixture. Years later he heard 
from a friend that the technicians at the factory were still following his instructions and 
adding ammonium chloride to the paint, even though the quality control procedures had 
been corrected and, far from being required any more, ammonium chloride was even 
harmful to the paint’s purpose as an anti-rust coating. The technicians following Levi’s 
instructions didn’t know the original reason for them; all they knew was that that was the 
way it had always been done. Although the technicians had reasons for acting as they did, 
they were prevented from deliberating to other reasons by the habit of following Levi’s 
instructions.
Cultural deliberative habits are those which are embedded in the culture in which 
the agent lives, and which are transmitted by cultural mechanisms such as education and 
socialisation. Cultural deliberative habits are distinguished from other cultural values and 
conventions because they concern ways of thinking about problems and reaching 
practical solutions. Such habits may be highly explicit and formalised, such as the laws 
and constitution of a republic, or they may be implicit and informal, such as the unspoken 
rules governing acceptable behaviour in certain social contexts. The important point is
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that they are typically not acquired by the agent consciously through rational means, yet 
constrain the practical options which an agent will consider.
So, whichever of these categories a deliberative habit belongs to, it has a similar 
effect on our practical reasoning. By keeping our deliberation running in a certain groove, 
it allows us to apprehend satisfactory reasons without having to consider every available 
option, but also prevents us from apprehending those reasons which would require a more 
unorthodox deliberative leap. However, while we can see how such habits might get in 
the way of sound deliberation, it may seem unlikely that are of genuine significance for 
our account of internal reasons. After all, such habits do not seem to present the same 
insurmountable obstacle to deliberation as that presented by ignorance. There is no 
amount of mere reasoning that will tell me that a gin bottle contains petrol; I have to open 
the bottle to find that out. By contrast, we can see how deliberative habits could be 
broken by reasoning alone, especially if we realise that an agent does not have to shed a 
habit entirely to break through it from time to time to reach a reason that would otherwise 
be obscured. However, we must not underestimate the power and ubiquity of deliberative 
habits. It is not only in such dramatic situations as that of the twin brothers in our 
example that we constrain our practical options to those which seem of particular 
relevance and importance. At every point of practical decision in our lives, we could 
conceivably consider an infinite range of options, but to do so would result in practical 
paralysis. This is not just a question of whether we have time to consider every option; it 
is rather that we are simply not capable of deliberating like that. Like the chess player, we 
see certain patterns in our practical options which are worth pursuing, and we do not even 
consider the others. We are operating in a rather more complex domain then the chess 
player, and the likelihood that we ignore options which could be better than those which 
we do consider is rather higher. So, deliberative habits are not merely exceptional 
considerations which occasionally interfere with the operation of our reasoning; they 
make it possible for us to reason about practical matters and to reach conclusions at all. 
Nevertheless, they can present genuine obstacles which are as hard for agents to 
overcome as ignorance.
However, if it is still difficult to accept that deliberative habits present such 
obstacles, it should be easier to accept that deliberative capacities and capabilities -  or a 
lack of them -  do present such obstacles. The presence of a habit implies that an agent 
deliberates in a particular way, but could conceivably deliberate in a different way. The 
lack of a capacity or a capability implies that the agent could not deliberate that way at 
all. However, although they have similar implications for reasons, capacities and 
capabilities are not quite the same as each other, and we must distinguish between them 
carefully. By capacities we mean aptitudes for deliberation which are innate, although 
they may be revealed and developed by experience. Examples may be as specific as a 
knack for solving crossword puzzles, or as general as the possession of an active 
imagination. When we think of capacities in the context of deliberative obstacles, we may 
most readily think of those capacities which most of us possess but which some people 
conspicuously lack, such as people whose brains have been damaged in some way. 
However, we must also recognise that some people have exceptional capacities which 
most of us lack. An extreme example of deliberative capacities which are beyond most of 
us can be found in James Gleick’s biography of the physicist Richard Feynman, Genius. 
Gleick quotes an interview in which Feynman tries to explain how he imagines the
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behaviour of the world at the sub-atomic level of quantum physics; behaviour which is 
nothing like that of the world at the level we are used to, and which even those people 
who can describe it in mathematical terms find unimaginable in physical terms. Feynman 
says, ‘What I am really trying to do is bring birth to clarity, which is really a half-assedly 
thought-out pictorial semi-vision thing. I would see the j iggle-j iggle-j iggle or the wiggle 
of the path. Even now when I talk about the influence functional, I see the coupling and I 
take this turn -  like as if there was a big bag of stuff -  and try to collect it away and to 
push it. It’s all visual. It’s hard to explain.’69 There is evidently some form of deliberation 
going on here, but it is a form which seems as hard for Feynman to describe as it is for 
the rest of us to follow. But we do not have to look for such exotic examples of 
deliberation to find that which is beyond us. The feeling that answers to practical 
questions are just out of our reach, but that we could reach them if we were only better 
deliberators is a common one in many areas of our lives.
Capabilities are rather different because they may be acquired or taught. There is 
an obvious relationship between capabilities and capacities: capacities are often necessary 
for the achievement of capabilities. With practice I can get better at crossword puzzles, 
but without the capacity to decode anagrams or spot tricks of language, I will never have 
exactly the same capability as someone who possesses this capacity. This relationship is 
not entirely straightforward, however. Deliberative capabilities may include tricks and 
techniques which compensate for a lack of capacity. The capability of mental arithmetic 
for example, may benefit from the capacity to carry out lightning calculations, but for 
most of us is just as likely to rest on multiplication tables learnt by rote. The important 
characteristic of deliberative capabilities is that, once acquired, they give us new ways of 
thinking about the world and our practical problems. Consider the process of learning to 
drive, for example. This is a largely mechanical skill, but in learning to drive we start to 
see the environment around us in different ways: a simple practical question such as,
‘How do I get there?’ has new answers and new ways of going about divining those 
answers.
The existence of deliberative capacities and capabilities, and the possibility that 
any individual agent may lack them, presents us with a similar situation to that presented 
the existence of deliberative habits. We may be able to see a sound deliberative route 
between an agent’s motivations and a particular practical conclusion, but because of the 
lack of a capacity or a capability, it is not possible for the agent to reach that conclusion, 
and no way in which action on the basis of that conclusion could be explained. We are 
left once again with conflicting intuitions: an intuition that a reason exists regardless of 
the impossibility of the agent deliberating to it; and an intuition that to ascribe this reason 
to the agent or to pass judgements of irrationality would be unjustified, just because of 
this impossibility.
The situation is further complicated by the possibility that the capacity lacked by 
the agent is the capacity for rationality, and that in that case judgements of irrationality 
would be justified. Irrationality is troublesome for our account, because deliberation 
which is obstructed by irrationality seems to possess many of the same characteristics as 
deliberation blocked by the other obstacles we have considered. However, while we want 
to allow that the existence of other types of obstacle complicates the question of whether 
particular reasons exist or not, we do not want to extend this same allowance to the case
69 Genius: Richard Feynman and Modern Physics, page 244.
35
Be Reasonable -  David Knott
of irrationality: we do not want the agent’s irrationality to determine the existence o f his 
or her reasons. In order to account for irrationality adequately it is important to be clear 
about what we are talking about. Part of the reason for our entire discussion is that the 
term is often used as a non-specific pejorative term: it may be part of a bluff, an insult or 
another judgement o f disapproval, rather than a judgement about whether the agent is 
acting in accordance with his or her reasons. I believe that, within the context of our 
account, we can most usefully define irrationality in terms of deliberation, and in 
particular as the pursuit o f deliberative paths in a fashion which cannot itself be justified 
by reference to reason. This may sound somewhat circular, but it captures the thought 
that deliberation is an action, albeit a predominantly mental one, and is subject to the 
same rational appraisal as other actions. In keeping with our account, and our 
understanding that reasons and deliberation are to a large degree indeterminate, it would 
not be possible to exhaustively describe or systematically circumscribe the appraisals of 
deliberation which constitute judgements of irrationality. However, we can identify those 
common circumstances in which we recognise irrationality.
Considered in this fashion we can identify three common categories of 
irrationality: simple error; disordered reasoning; and wilful disregard. Simple error occurs 
when we make a mistake in our reasoning, and most closely resembles the obstacles 
presented by lack of capacity or capability. Obviously, a lack of capacity or capability 
may also be instrumental in producing error. However, we must also acknowledge that 
whatever our capacities or capabilities, sometimes we just go wrong. For example, 
consider a man who has an unwelcome announcement to make to his family: his 
company is sending him abroad for the year. While considering how to break this news 
the man dwells on the positive aspects of the situation, until he becomes carried away. He 
decides that the best thing to do would be to present the news to his wife and children in a 
light-hearted, upbeat manner. But he has miscalculated terribly: his family are not only 
upset by the news, but find his flippant manner positively hurtful. He could and should 
have realised the consequences of his decision, but failed to think about it properly. He 
acted contrary to his reasons because he made an error in his deliberation.
If simple error seems on the border of irrationality, then disordered reasoning lies 
well within its territory; indeed, it could be regarded as the paradigm case of irrationality. 
By disordered reasoning we mean that the agent is prone to drawing connections and 
conclusions which have no rational basis. Such disorder may be caused in many ways,
'70from mental illness to momentary bursts of emotion. As an example, we may imagine a 
man in a stressful situation: he has just emerged from an interview with his boss in which 
he has been fired on what he believes are thoroughly unjustified grounds, and must now 
decide how to deal with the inevitably undignified task o f gathering his possessions and 
leaving the building. If he was mentally ill, his reasoning might be so disordered that he 
decided on an entirely inappropriate and ineffective course of action, such as marching to 
the police station and demanding the arrest of his boss. Even such disordered reasoning is 
not entirely inexplicable; we can see how someone could get from notions of being 
treated unjustly to the thought that the institutional agents of justice should avenge that
70 O f course, I am not saying that bursts of emotion are irrational in themselves, or that they necessarily 
give rise to irrational action. Rather, I am saying that they are capable of so gripping the agent’s mind 
that sound deliberation is not possible. This is captured in such common sayings as, ‘I was so angry 
that I couldn’t think straight,’ or simply, ‘I saw red.’
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treatment. But it can hardly be called rational. As it happens, he is not mentally ill, but is 
rather extremely upset and angry. As a consequence, he sees everyone associated with the 
company as implicated in his ill-treatment, and consequently not only rebuffs any offers 
of help, but is rather insulting to those who offer help. Later, when he has calmed down, 
he regrets his actions, and sees that, while he had every reason to be angry, he had no 
reason to treat his colleagues so badly.
We tend to feel that, to varying degrees, people carry little blame for disordered 
reasoning. We make allowances not just for those people who are mentally ill, but also 
those who are momentarily overwhelmed. In the situation we have just considered, we 
would expect that the man’s colleagues would not only readily forgive his behaviour, but 
would find it, if  not rational, entirely understandable. By contrast, we feel that people 
who exhibit the final species of irrationality we will consider -  wilful disregard -  
particularly culpable. Wilful disregard occurs when someone deliberately ignores a 
deliberative path or conclusion, even though he or she knows it to be sound. For example, 
imagine a woman who is a professional athlete, and who has injured herself the night 
before a major event. She knows that if  she competes she will not only lose, but will do 
herself permanent damage. However, she cannot bear to believe that her ambition will be 
thwarted and that her preparation will be wasted, so she competes anyway. We must be 
clear about her intent here: she is not competing as a futile or defiant gesture, but is 
competing as if she can win even though she knows that she can’t. She is wilfully 
disregarding her reasons and any other consequences of her deliberation.
So, now that we have a clearer idea of the main varieties of irrationality, we can 
return to the problem from which we started. Our primary argument against the existence 
of external reasons is that there is no way in which the agent could act for such reasons, 
and we maintain that this has normative as well as explanatory implications. Deliberative 
obstacles prevent the agent from following certain deliberative routes, and similarly 
negate the possibility of acting for the reasons which lie at the end of those deliberative 
routes. For some of these obstacles -  such as ignorance, habit and a lack of capacity or 
capability -  our informal intuitions about the existence of reasons conflict: we want to 
say that reasons exist, even when they lie on the other side of deliberative obstacles; yet 
we also want to allow that in some sense the agent does not have these reasons, and that if 
an agent acts as if  these reasons do not exist, he or she is nevertheless acting rationally. 
The vocabulary available to our account of internal reasons so far does not allow us to 
reflect this conflict: if the deliberative obstacles were constituted by possession of the 
appropriate type of false belief, the implication of both Hume’s and Williams’ arguments 
is that the agent nevertheless possesses the reason, and that we should judge his or her 
actions accordingly. For other obstacles -  such as those associated with irrationality -  our 
intuitions are clearer and in accordance with our account so far: we want to say that the 
agent has only those reasons which are not dependent on irrational beliefs or deliberation, 
and that the agent has those reasons regardless of whether irrationality prevents their 
perception. Our problem, then, is to extend our account to allow for the influence of 
deliberative obstacles on the existence of reasons in a way which satisfies our conflicted 
intuitions, but neither provides room for reasons to be based on irrationality, nor requires 
us to believe in external reasons.
Let us return to Williams’ example of the gin drinker to see if he helps us to find 
our way through this problem. Remember that the man in this example wants a gin and
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tonic, and believes that the bottle in front of him contains gin, whereas it actually contains 
petrol. We want to say that he has a reason to avoid drinking what is in the bottle, 
because it would obviously harm him, and if he has the normal human motivations 
concerning self-preservation, he has plenty of reasons to avoid harm. At the same time, if 
he cannot apprehend this reason due to ignorance (he doesn’t know what is in the bottle), 
deliberative habit (he normally trusts the labels on bottles), or a lack of capability (he has 
never learned to speculate suspiciously about the motives of people who offer him drinks) 
then we are also inclined to say that he has a reason to drink what is in the bottle. It is 
only when the obstacle is posed by irrationality that we are not inclined to do this. So, if 
the agent had committed a deliberative error (the smell of the petrol aroused his 
suspicions, but he reasoned that any bottle which is labelled ‘gin’ must necessarily 
contain gin), was suffering from disordered reasoning (he is an alcoholic whose cravings 
are so strong that he is prevented from contemplating any possibility that he is not going 
to get a drink soon), or was wilfully disregarding the conclusions of reason (the smell and 
the appearance of the liquid are unmistakably petrol, but he deliberately ignores this 
sensory evidence because he so strongly wants a drink), we would not be tempted to say 
that he had a reason to drink what was in the bottle: we would just say that he was 
irrational.
This example helps us to see that, in the cases of deliberative obstacles other than 
irrationality, although the conclusions reached by the agent about his reasons contradict 
those he would reach if he was better informed, they can nevertheless be reached through 
sound deliberation, exercised with all of the materials available to the agent. The 
obstacles represented by ignorance, habit and a lack of capacity or capability stand 
between the agent and his reasons precisely because they create deliberative routes 
which, although they do not lead to the best conclusions about action, are sound. We can 
say that such deliberative routes are sound because, although they lead to less than perfect 
conclusions, they depend on deliberation which, as deliberation, has nothing wrong with 
it. As we have noted, it is not possible for the deliberating agent to pursue every 
deliberative path which is conceivably available, so the paths chosen are necessarily 
constrained by knowledge, habits, capacities and capabilities. Indeed, in many cases, 
deliberation which surmounted such obstacles would have to do so by being unsound. By 
contrast, the deliberative obstacle of irrationality stands as an obstacle because it leads the 
agent down deliberative paths which are by definition unsound. And our account already 
rules out reasons which are produced through unsound deliberation.
So, deliberative obstacles both obscure reasons that could be reached if the 
obstacles did not exist, and can lead us to settle for reasons which we would not accept 
without the obstacles. As long as we retain the concept of the sound deliberative route as 
a pre-requisite for reasons in mind, then we can account for our troublesome intuitions 
concerning this particular case without endorsing either irrationality or external reasons. 
The intuition that the gin drinker had a reason to drink what is in the bottle concerns the 
reasons he is capable of reaching as an ordinary deliberator, subject as we all are to 
deliberative obstacles. The intuition that he had a reason not to drink what is in the bottle 
concerns the reasons he would be capable of reaching if he was not subject to such 
obstacles. We can satisfy these intuitions within our account and retain the central claim 
that the existence of reasons is dependent on the possibility of sound deliberation from an 
agent’s starting set of motivations: irrationality does not satisfy the condition of sound
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deliberation, and external reasons do not satisfy the condition of dependence on 
motivations.
Furthermore, this deeper understanding of deliberative obstacles, and the role 
played by sound deliberation in distinguishing between obscurity and irrationality 
confirms our suspicion that allowance for deliberative obstacles helps satisfy our 
universalistic intuition about reasons without confounding our individualistic intuition. It 
does so in two ways. Firstly, it allows for a wide variety of ways in which reasons can be 
possessed by an agent yet be obscure to that agent. The possession of such reasons may 
still be entirely dependent on the agent’s motivations, character and relationships as the 
individualistic intuition wants it to be, yet the existence of deliberative obstacles may 
mean that such reasons are only apparent from the perspective of an external observer. 
Someone who is apparently attempting to convince a recalcitrant agent that he or she 
possesses a reason may well be bluffing, but if the persuasion consists, as it often does, of 
attempts to dispel ignorance, or to establish a deliberative capability, or to compensate for 
a lack of deliberative capacity, or to break through ingrained deliberative habits which 
were not previously apparent then it is not bluff. The second way in which our 
understanding of deliberative obstacles is capable of satisfying the universalistic intuition 
lies in our continuing insistence on the existence of a sound deliberative route as a pre­
requisite for the existence of reasons. Even though we understand that what counts as 
sound deliberation is not fully determinate, it means that the part of our universalistic 
intuition which expects that it must be possible for reasoning to go wrong in ways which 
are identifiable as such independently of the deliberating agent can be satisfied. 
Furthermore, the existence of this independent standard does not contradict our 
individualistic intuition; wherever sound deliberative routes end up, we insist that they 
start with the motivations of the agent.
We are still left with the problem of what to say, though; we must decide how to 
talk about these different categories of reasons, those which we can actually reach 
through deliberation and those which we could reach if only we were not beset by 
obstacles. In everyday speech, of course, we just call them all reasons, and insofar as our 
meaning is made explicit, it is given by context. Because we have not yet identified more 
precise equivalents in everyday language, I shall draw a technical distinction between two 
types of reasons:
strongly internal reasons: those reasons which can be apprehended through sound
deliberation by the agent, and;
weakly internal reasons: those reasons which could be apprehended by the agent
if not for the existence of deliberative obstacles.
The most important implication of this categorisation is that judgements of 
reasons are even more contingent than we originally supposed. Our account has always 
implied that reasons were contingent on motivations and circumstances, as well as the 
different ways in which deliberation happens to go. We are now also saying that the 
reasons for which an agent can act are contingent on all these elements and also on the 
deliberative obstacles which the agent happens to face.
So, despite the initial awkwardness of our intuitions regarding situations in which
39
Be Reasonable -  David Knott
deliberation is blocked by obstacles, we have found that we can account for them by 
sticking closely to the core of our account. The implications of the existence of 
deliberative obstacles has led us to draw a distinction which, despite its unlovely 
terminology, supports the case for internal reasons, reconciles it with our intuitions, and 
reinforces the concepts of contingency and indeterminacy. However, we must recognise 
that this account is unlikely to satisfy everybody who attempts to understand practical 
reasons, and that consequently there are serious challenges which we must address.
40
Be Reasonable -  David Knott
1.6 Challenges
Let us review the picture of the agent, motivations, deliberation and reasons 
which we now have. We started with a fairly straightforward picture, in which we had a 
starting point, a set of possible routes from that starting point, and reasons at the end of 
those routes. Although we have not strayed far from Williams' account of internal reasons 
which gave us this picture, nor from its Humean origins, we have developed it in two 
important ways. Firstly, we have now complicated that picture by exploring and drawing 
together the implications of thoughts already present in Williams’ work: that the routes 
available from a starting point will vary from agent to agent depending on the 
deliberative obstacles they confront; and that the starting point for deliberation itself is 
often not settled. We still maintain that reasons are dependent on motivations and are 
subject to judgements of what counts as sound deliberation. However, we now also allow 
that reasons are even more contingent and less fully determinate than we originally 
supposed. They are dependent on the agent’s motivations, the agent’s circumstances, the 
degree to which the contents of the agent’s mind are settled and the processes by which 
they become settled, the deliberative obstacles which the agent happens to face, and the 
ways in which deliberation happens to go. Once again, this does not mean that reasons 
are entirely free; the criterion of sound deliberation continues to impose its constraints, 
and many of the new factors we have considered constrain reasons as well as producing 
difference. However, the range of possibilities within these constraints is much wider. 
Secondly, we have introduced the two differing intuitions about reasons, and have shown 
how, even though the internal reasons account naturally seems more friendly to our 
individualistic intuition about reasons, it is also capable of satisfying our universalistic 
intuition to some degree. We showed this by extending Hume's and Williams' somewhat 
abbreviated exploration of deliberative obstacles and argued that acknowledging such 
obstacles, despite their tendency to introduce further differences in the reasons o f agents, 
allows for the possibility that agents have the reasons that we want to ascribe to them 
from an external standpoint, even though those agents do not realise that those reasons 
exist. So, in attempting to persuade others of their reasons we may be doing more than 
just bluffing, even if the subject of our persuasion is not convinced.
Of course, this is only one way of satisfying the universalistic intuition about 
reasons, and we must admit that it is not likely to satisfy everybody. However much 
allowance our account makes for the agent who shares our reasons but does not realise it, 
it also allows that sometimes an agent apparently doesn't share our reasons because he or 
she actually doesn't share our reasons; he or she just doesn't have the requisite set of 
starting motivations, and no amount of persuasion or heavy lifting of deliberative 
obstacles is going to reveal an unsuspected deliberative route. Our account allows that 
sensible knaves sometimes exist, and this is something that some theorists simply cannot 
accept. The only way that the universalistic intuition can be satisfied for such theorists is 
by demonstration of the existence of truly universal reasons which no agent can escape 
merely through the happenstance of his or her existing motivations. For such theorists 
concepts such as indeterminacy, contingency and deliberative obstacles comprise just so 
much fog that not only gets in the way of the apprehension of the universal reasons an 
agent is subject to, but also gets in the way of understanding the true nature of reasons. 
Such theorists are, of course, external reasons theorists.
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There are many arguments for external reasons and we do not have time to pursue 
all of them here. Rather, I wish to concentrate on a particular style of argument which I 
believe presents the most serious challenge to our account, partly because of its 
dominance in ethics, and partly because it exposes a vulnerability in our account. We 
have insisted that although reasons may be contingent and indeterminate, they are not 
arbitrary; they are constrained by common standards of reason such as the principles of 
logic and by what counts as a sound deliberative route, even if this is itself indeterminate. 
Even our emphasis on deliberative obstacles implies the existence of common standards 
of reason; the categorisation of obstacles as obstacles implies that there are some criteria 
that make them so. The challenges I wish to consider are those which take such thoughts 
further, and include arguments that because standards of reason are independent o f our 
contingent motivations, they are capable of determining reasons which apply to us all 
regardless of our motivations. In other words, the theories which present the greatest 
challenge to our internal reasons account are those which find substantive reasons within 
the conditions of rationality. Needless to say, these theories have a rather different 
relationship to the individualistic and universalistic intuitions about reasons than our own 
internal reasons account. They take the universalistic intuition to have priority; indeed, 
they take it to be nothing more than an informal acknowledgement of the true nature of 
reasons. By contrast, they see the individualistic intuition as nothing more than a hope; a 
wish that we could come to internalise the universal reasons which apply to all o f us to 
the extent that they become our intimate possessions. To these theorists, o f course, it is 
regrettable if  this wish is not satisfied, but it does nothing to free agents from their 
obligations to abide by universal reasons.
There are plenty of variations within this style of argument and we could not 
possibly consider them all here, just as we could not possibly consider all other varieties 
of external reasons theory. Instead we will limit ourselves to representative arguments in 
three areas, each of which bears directly on a central element of our account of internal 
reasons. So, we will consider: arguments which derive reasons from the agent’s identity 
and his or her rational nature; arguments which derive reasons from the principles 
supposedly expressed in deliberation and action; and arguments which derive reasons 
from the rational ordering of motivations. Our initial aim in these discussions will be to 
identify and respond to the challenges presented in each area, and to determine whether 
our account of internal reasons survives the challenges. However, assuming that we are 
successful in this aim we will also pursue a further objective. Despite our opposition to 
their arguments, we may suppose that the external reasons theorists we will consider are 
by and large rational agents, and are, in making their arguments, acting for reasons 
derived from their motivations by deliberation. Their pursuit of these arguments indicates 
that we need to do rather more to satisfy the universalistic intuition than to consider the 
implications of deliberative obstacles. Once we have dealt with the challenge posed by 
their theories, we will therefore also enquire what motivations might drive them to 
develop such theories, whether they might be shared in some form by people who do not 
express them through philosophy, and whether an understanding of them and the 
behaviour they produce might allow us to show how our account of internal reasons can 
more fully satisfy the universalistic intuition.
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2. The Challenge from Reason
2.1 Identity
Arguments which attempt to derive external reasons from identity suppose that as 
human beings, or even just as rational beings, we possess inescapable aspects of our 
identities which are capable of providing us with reasons which are independent of our 
actual motivations. These reasons may either be provided as a direct consequence of 
possessing such an identity, or through the supposedly catastrophic consequences of 
denying that we possess such an identity. We shall consider two examples of this type of 
argument, one from Thomas Nagel and one from Christine Korsgaard. Before we 
consider these arguments, however, we should note two points about the way in which 
we shall proceed. Firstly, although both of these writers specifically criticise the claim 
that reasons can be derived from motivations, we shall not consider these criticisms here, 
even though I believe that we could provide at least an adequate response to them. The 
challenge constituted by these theories does not come from their negative arguments 
about why desires are incapable of providing reasons, but from the positive arguments 
which attempt to locate an alternative source of reasons. Secondly, I will not attempt to 
provide a point by point response to Nagel’s and Korsgaard’s arguments as we explore 
them, but will rather attempt to respond to their essential elements once we have laid the 
arguments out. In this fashion I hope to provide a general response to arguments which 
attempt to derive external reasons from identity, rather than responses which only deal 
with the particular arguments which we have chosen.
2.1.1 Nagel’s Argument from Identity
Thomas Nagel has developed his argument that objective reasons can be derived 
from human identity over several years in various books and papers. His position and its 
development are best expressed by the books The Possibility o f Altruism and The View
71from Nowhere and the differences between them. In these books it is clear that Nagel is 
implacably hostile to the suggestion that reasons are derived from desires, partly because 
he believes that desires cannot produce the particular varieties of reasons he wishes to 
argue for, and partly because he believes that desires are generally inadequate as sources 
of reasons. However, although Nagel is hostile to the idea that reasons are dependent on 
desires, he does not deny our experience that reasoned action is accompanied by desire: 
‘The fact that the presence of a desire is a logically necessary condition (because it is a 
logical consequence) of a reason’s motivating, does not entail that it is a necessary 
condition of the presence of the reasons; and if it is motivated by that reason it cannot be
77among the reason’s conditions.’ In other words, he denies that desires precede reasons 
and that reasons then produce action, but allows that, although reasons precede desires, 
desires always accompany action. We should be aware, though, that Nagel sets out with a 
preconception about what constitutes a reason. He says that, ‘Every reason can be 
formulated as a predicate. If the predicate applies to some act, event or circumstance
71 But also see: the essay ‘Subjective and Objective’ in the collection Mortal Questions; Equality and
Partiality, especially Chapter 2, ‘Two Standpoints’; and The Last Word, especially Chapter 6, ‘Ethics’.
72 The Possibility o f  Altruism, page 30.
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(possible or actual), then there is a reason for that act, event or circumstance to occur,’73 
and that, ‘It is assumed, then, that reasons are universal -  i.e. in some sense the same for 
all persons -  and that they transmit their influence to actions suitably related to the ends 
to which they apply.’74 This preconception that reasons are necessarily universal puts his 
theory at odds with an account such as ours, in which reasons are contingent on each 
agent’s psychology and deliberative circumstances. As we shall see, it is also a major 
flaw in his theory, and one that will be repeated in the other external reasons theories we 
will consider.
Nagel’s purpose in The Possibility o f Altruism is to show not only that we are 
capable of being altruistic, but also that we all have reasons to be altruistic, no matter 
how we may happen to be motivationally constituted. Although our interest is not in the 
specific ethical point which Nagel is trying to make about altruism, we may note in 
passing that his ambition is a particularly strong expression of the universalistic intuition. 
Nagel evidently feels that we should all be more altruistic than we are, but he is not 
content that this simply stands as a moral judgement: through his theory he wants to show 
that we are all rationally obliged to be altruistic and that we are offending against our 
reasons if we fail in this respect. However, for the purposes of our current discussion the 
route which Nagel takes to his argument for altruism, which starts with the argument for 
prudence, is at least as important as the argument for altruism itself, because we are more 
interested in arguments for the existence of external reasons than in arguments about 
specific ethical points. Indeed, Nagel’s argument for prudence may be of greater interest 
to us because, as we shall see, it is more plausible than his argument for altruism, and 
consequently presents the greatest challenge to our account.
The term prudence carries a variety of connotations in everyday language, mostly 
denoting caution and preparedness. The usual philosophical usage of the term is rather 
more precise, typically meaning an agent’s concern for his or her own well-being. Nagel 
uses the term even more narrowly, to mean an agent’s concern for his or her future well­
being. So, in looking for prudential reasons, Nagel is not just looking for the reasons an 
agent has to get out of the way of immediate harm, but for the reasons which agents have 
to avoid getting into harmful situations at all. The prudential agent in Nagel’s terms is not 
the man who buys a packet of cigarettes to satisfy his cravings, but the man who defies 
his cravings and gives up smoking altogether. And, on the face of it, this is an 
understanding of prudence which we can accept and sympathise with. Nagel claims that 
we all have prudential reasons. This is another claim which is extremely easy for us to 
accept, at least superficially, whether we are internal reasons theorists or external reasons 
theorists. Concern for the future is virtually ubiquitous in some form among reasoning 
adults, and those people who exhibit absolutely no concern for the future are often 
paradigm examples of irrationality. Even the person who commits suicide to avoid pain 
or degradation expresses a concern for the future; it is the man who risks his life for 
nothing who seems to lack such concern. However, while this ubiquity lends Nagel’s 
argument credence, his insistence on our possession of prudential reasons is not simply 
based on our concerns for the future: if it was, then he would be accepting the existence 
of reasons based purely on motivations, which isn’t what he is after at all. He must find 
something which gives us prudential reasons whether we care about the future or not. He
73 The Possibility o f  Altruism, page 47.
74 The Possibility o f  Altruism, page 90.
44
Be Reasonable -  David Knott
finds it in two rather more fundamental claims about the nature of practical reasons and 
the consequences of necessary aspects of human identity.
The first claim is an extension of Nagel’s understanding of reasons as universal, 
and can be summarised as the claim that when we have a reason to act in the interests of 
an entity, we have a reason to act in the interests of relevantly similar entities. Put even 
more basically, if one thing acts as a source of reasons, then other things which are 
identical in relevant respects must also act as sources of reasons. If the interests of an 
entity are sources of reasons, then the boundaries and differences between entities must 
be shown to be relevant considerations if the interests of all entities are not also to be 
considered as sources of reasons. In the case of prudence the relevantly similar entities 
are the agent’s future selves. So, Nagel is not going beyond self-interest here, but is 
maintaining that if the agent’s self-interest provides reasons to act in the interests of his or 
her current self, then it provides similar reasons to act in the interests of his or her future 
selves. This is formalised further by distinguishing between ‘tensed’ and ‘tenseless’
ne
reasons. These labels are not meant to imply that there are distinct categories of reasons, 
but that reasons can have different relationships to points in time. A tenseless reason 
applies at any time, whereas a tensed reason only applies at a particular point in time. So, 
assuming that I want to avoid malaria, I have a tenseless reason to start taking anti­
malaria tablets a week before a visit to India. This reason is tenseless because it applies 
whether I am going to India next week, next year or even if I have just come back. If I am 
planning a trip to India next week, however, then I have a tensed reason to start taking my 
anti-malaria tablets now. Nagel’s articulation of the relationship between tensed reasons 
and tenseless reasons shows the general structure of his argument: ‘Anyone who attempts 
a tensed practical judgement about what he has reason to do at a given time must accept 
(a) a tenseless practical judgement to the same effect about that time and (b) a belief 
about the relation between that time and the present which renders appropriate the 
particular tense employed.’76
It may seem that Nagel’s argument is about consistency; that it claims that 
imprudent acts are inconsistent because they treat my current interests differently from 
my future interests. And it may also seem that we can negate this charge of inconsistency 
by insisting that there is a difference between my current self and my future selves; I am 
here now and they won’t be here until the future. There is certainly some appeal to this 
thought, and the type of thinking it represents is familiar to us. We often weigh 
consequences for our future selves against immediate benefits and give more weight to 
the latter than the former, beyond that which could be justified solely by considerations of 
probability. Furthermore, it is far from clear that this type of thinking cannot be justified 
and regarded as rational. Thoughts such as, ‘I’ll regret this in the morning,’ reflect our 
attitudes that, simplistically, pleasure now can be more important than pain tomorrow, 
and that, what is more, as we are the ones who will bear the consequences we have the 
authority to make the decision. To think like this is to collide directly with the second 
fundamental claim Nagel makes in his argument about prudence.
This claim is that we cannot escape the charge of inconsistency incurred by 
treating our future selves differently from our current selves without supposing that we 
are somehow separate from our future selves, and that to suppose this is to deny a
75 The Possibility o f  Altruism, page 61.
76 The Possibility o f  Altruism, page 68.
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necessary aspect of our identities. This aspect is that we are ‘temporally extended’77 
creatures: we do not just exist in time as all creatures do, but we are conscious o f our 
existence in time. Nagel claims that, ‘Those practical intuitions which acknowledge 
prudential reasons, and the motives connected with them, reflect an individual’s 
conception of himself as a temporally persistent being: his ability to identify with past 
and future stages of himself and to regard them as forming a single life.’78 For Nagel, 
then, if we claim that the interests of our future selves do not have the same influence on 
our reasons as the interests of our current selves then we deny our temporally extended 
natures, and, furthermore, deny the reality of our future selves. According to Nagel, this 
is a cost that we simply cannot accept: ‘Any type of judgement which cannot be 
accommodated to that standpoint [of temporal neutrality] can be accepted only at the cost
n  q
of dissociation from one’s temporally extended self.’
O f course, it is important to realise that, for Nagel’s argument to be as free from 
dependence on subjective motivational states as he wants it to be, the cost of dissociation 
from one’s temporally extended self cannot be motivational: it cannot simply be the 
discomfort we feel at the prospect. Rather, it must be a rational cost: temporal 
dissociation must be a violation of reason which is universally applicable to humans and 
sufficient to negate any apparent reasons which lead to it. The argument from the claims 
we have considered to such a violation of reason seems to proceed in six steps. First, 
reasons must be universal. Second, I seek a reason for action. Third, it is a given that my 
current interests are a source of reasons. Fourth, I am a temporally extended being. Fifth, 
my future interests are therefore as much a source of reasons as my current interests. 
Finally, whatever my reason for action is, it must take my future interests into 
consideration as well as my current interests. The fourth step is the crucial one as, 
according to Nagel, it represents a truth which we cannot ignore. We simply are 
temporally extended beings, and are aware of this, and to deny either is to lie about 
ourselves or to wilfully adopt a false belief. For Nagel, then, regardless of its motivational 
roots or consequences, reasoning which ignores our temporally extended nature or its 
implications is simply reasoning which has gone wrong. Consequently, Nagel’s argument 
about prudential reasons is clearly an external reasons theory, as the reasons he identifies 
are dependent on something as apparently necessary as recognition of our temporally 
extended nature, and on nothing so contingent as an agent’s subjective motivational 
states.
Nagel’s argument for altruism has a similar structure to his argument for 
prudence. In this case, the relevantly similar entities which provide us with reasons are 
other human beings, the necessary aspect of our identity that we would be denying if  we 
claimed that others were not relevantly similar entities is our perception of ourselves as 
one being among many others, and the cost of this denial is solipsism, or the denial o f the 
reality of others. Just as with prudence, Nagel identifies two types o f reasons, 
distinguishing those which are ‘subjective’ and contain a ‘free agent variable’ from those
on
which are ‘objective’ and do not. A free agent variable is a reference to an agent within 
a statement about reasons, where the value of this variable depends on who is making the
77 The Possibility o f  Altruism, page 58.
78 The Possibility o f  Altruism, page 58.
79 The Possibility o f  Altruism, page 69.
80 See The Possibility o f  Altruism, page 90.
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statement. The most easily understandable examples of free agent variables are first- 
person pronouns. In the statement, 7  have a reason to (j),’ then the agent to whom /  refers 
depends on who is making the statement: it is a free agent variable. This does not mean 
that objective reasons do not refer to agents at all. Rather, it means that when they do so 
they identify agents explicitly. In the statement, ‘Agent A has a reason to (j),’ the reference 
to agent A is fixed. If the statement is true then it remains both true and concerned only 
with the reasons of agent A, whoever is making the statement. However, although 
objective reasons identify the agents to whom they apply, this does not mean that they 
can only ever refer to specific agents. Indeed, it is apparent that the sorts of reasons that 
Nagel is looking for are those which take the form, ‘Everyone has a reason to (j).’ Again, 
if this statement is true it remains true and concerned with the reasons of everyone, 
regardless of who is making the statement. This means that, unsurprisingly, subjective 
and objective reasons bear the same relation to each other within Nagel’s argument for 
altruism as tensed and tenseless reasons bear to each other within his argument for 
prudence. That is, Nagel is not denying that subjective reasons exist, or, indeed, that they 
are somehow inferior to objective reasons. Instead, he is arguing that in order to qualify 
as reasons, subjective reasons must effectively be localised versions of objective reasons.
It is this understanding of reasons as fundamentally objective, though permitting 
local, subjective manifestations, that allows Nagel to claim that, just as in his argument 
for prudence, the denial that others are relevantly similar entities to ourselves and are 
therefore sources of reasons has a cost, and the cost is solipsism. Without this 
understanding of reasons as necessarily objective, it would seem rather extravagant to 
claim that a denial or even just a lack of recognition of others as sources of reasons could 
be regarded as solipsism. After all, solipsism as we generally understand it seems to be a 
consciously adopted attitude to the world, rather than a mere implication of thoughtless 
actions. We can understand temporal dissociation as the result of a mere denial, but 
solipsism seems to requires us to consciously take at least one step further. However, if 
we understand reasons as necessarily objective, then by denying that other human beings 
are sources of reasons for us, we are also denying that they are sources of reasons at all. 
And by allowing that we are sources of reasons for ourselves, we are allowing that we are 
sources of objective reasons for everybody. Consequently, on Nagel’s account, denying 
the reasons of others and acting for our own reasons is effectively to maintain that we are 
the only sources of reasons in the universe, and it is therefore legitimate to label us 
solipsists. While allowing that if  we accept all of Nagel’s claims this seems a justified 
conclusion to his argument, we should also note that the idea that solipsism is a result of 
denying the reasons of others is not as intuitively compelling as the equivalent argument 
that temporal dissociation is the result of denying prudential reasons; certainly it does not 
seem to offer the same intuitive threat to our identities. I believe that Nagel’s argument 
for prudence provides a useful introduction to his argument for altruism not only because 
it is more straightforward, but also because it is a stronger argument, and sits more 
closely to our intuitions about the reasons that might be provided by our identities. 
However, we are less concerned with the success of Nagel’s attempt to show the 
possibility and necessity of altruism specifically than with his success in showing the 
existence of external reasons generally, and his argument from identity to prudential 
reasons provides us with a real challenge, regardless of the problems inherent in using a 
similar argument to establish the existence of reasons for altruism.
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In summary, then, for Nagel our identities as temporally extended inhabitants of a 
world which contains others like us have implications which provide us with reasons, the 
denial of which would violate our identities and therefore constitute errors in reasoning. 
There are aspects of this argument which are immediately unattractive: it lays the weight 
of the world on the agent’s shoulders, and only makes incidental allowance for action on 
his or her own behalf. This burden can be alleviated by practical considerations, such as 
the claim that each agent is best placed to satisfy only a subset of the interests of the 
world, and that if  every agent attempted to act on every reason created by every interest, 
such action would actually be counter-productive. However, the implication remains that 
all of us have reasons for action which go far beyond those which we acknowledge today, 
or even those which those of us living comfortable lives in wealthy industrialised nations 
already guiltily suspect that we have and are shirking. In later writing Nagel attempted to 
alleviate this unattractive aspect of his argument. In a note added to the beginning of The 
Possibility o f Altruism he signals a shift in his views: ‘This book defends the claim that 
only objective reasons are acceptable, and that subjective reasons are legitimate only if 
they'can be derived from objective ones. I now think that the argument establishes a 
different conclusion: That there are objective reasons corresponding to all subjective ones 
. . .  It remains possible that the original subjective reasons from which the others are 
generated retain some independent force and are not subsumed under them.’81 Nagel’s 
modified view is set out in his later book, The View from Nowhere.
In this book Nagel argues that although one of the distinctive things about human 
beings is that we can take up an objective standpoint, it is a standpoint that we have to 
take up: it is not the only or even the usual position from which we see the world. We 
also occupy a subjective standpoint, and some of our judgements, deliberation and 
reasons only make sense when we acknowledge the existence of this standpoint. The 
most obvious examples include those reasons and actions concerning people with which 
we have particular relationships, such as family and friends. As we saw, in The 
Possibility o f Altruism, Nagel favoured the objective standpoint to the extent that he 
presented subjective reasons as mere local manifestations of objective reasons, and 
relegated the subjective standpoint to such a subservient position that he could make such 
claims as that, ‘The only personal residue, therefore, which is not included in the system 
of impersonal beliefs to which I am committed by a personal judgement, is the basic 
personal premise itself, the premise which locates me in the world which has been 
impersonally described.’ In The View from Nowhere Nagel admits that he ‘no longer 
thinks the argument works’83 and this is borne out by his exploration of the two 
standpoints and his attempts to understand the tensions and relations between them. He 
also considers how the two standpoints can be reconciled, and what part attempts to 
reconcile them play in our lives. For example, in his discussion of freedom he considers 
the tension between our ability to regard the universe as a mechanism comprising an 
immutable series of causes and effects with no room for personal freedom, and our 
inescapable experience of just that freedom.84
However, allowing that the personal perspective plays a role in the explanation
81 The Possibility o f  Altruism, page vi.
82 The Possibility o f  Altruism, page 103.
83 The View from Nowhere, page 159.
84 See The View from Nowhere, section VII, ‘Freedom’.
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and justification of reasons does not make Nagel an internal reasons theorist: it just 
makes his external reasons theory more resilient. That he still believes that reasons exist 
independently of motivations is indicated when he says, ‘The claim is that there are 
reasons for action, that we have to discover them instead of deriving them from our 
preexisting motivations -  and that in this way we can acquire new motivations superior to
o c
the old.’ Indeed, although Nagel acknowledges the validity of the personal perspective 
in The View from Nowhere, his argument in this book can be regarded overall as 
strengthening his commitment to the preconception that reasons are universal. The 
influence exerted by the two perspectives could flow two ways: subjectivity could be 
taken to make objectivity into consensus rather than transcendence; or objectivity could 
be taken to provide a way of obligating agents who act on the whole for subjective 
reasons. It is evident that Nagel tends towards the latter, as indicated when he says, ‘One 
translates one’s own reasons into a form that can be accepted by people with different 
preferences, so that it can be used by anyone to account generally for his own reasons and
o z ;
those of others.’ So, although Nagel considers a broad range of topics in The View from  
Nowhere, the point that is of interest to us remains the same: that necessary aspects of 
human identity provide reasons independently of our subjective motivational states. In 
The Possibility o f Altruism these aspects of identity are temporal extension and awareness 
of oneself as one among many similar others, while in The View from Nowhere they are 
our tendencies and capacities to adopt an objective standpoint.
2.1.2 Korsgaard*s Argument from Identity
Before considering our response to the challenge posed by Nagel’s arguments 
from identity to external reasons, we will consider another representative of this type of 
argument: that of Christine Korsgaard as presented in her book, The Sources o f  
Normativity. Although Korsgaard’s argument resembles Nagel’s in some respects, in that 
it is an argument from identity, it differs because she approaches reasons from the 
opposite direction. As we have seen, Nagel takes as one of his starting points the 
principle that at least some reasons must be objective, and uses necessary aspects of 
human identity to determine what those reasons are. By contrast, Korsgaard uses 
conceptions of identity to argue that reasons are objective. We will not explore all of 
Korsgaard’s argument here, as much of that argument is a distinctive interpretation of 
Kant’s theories, and we will see much more of Kant in the next chapter when we discuss 
the derivation of external reasons from constraints imposed on principles of action.
Rather, we will concentrate here on Korsgaard’s arguments about identity, particularly 
those expressed in the third lecture in The Sources o f Normativity, ‘The authority of 
reflection.’
Korsgaard begins her argument with a claim which we can accept without 
difficulty: that human beings are self-conscious creatures. However, Korsgaard has a 
particular understanding of human self-consciousness as rational self-consciousness: that 
is, she takes our self-consciousness and capacity for reason to mean that we necessarily 
interpret the world and our place in it rationally. As long as we do not make too much of 
it, we could say that this argument presents us as standing one step away from the world,
85 The View from Nowhere, page 139.
86 The View from Nowhere, page 150.
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with the distance between us and the world filled by reason. The importance of this 
rational remove for our discussion is that it means that for Korsgaard reasons do not only 
justify or explain action, but are required for rational creatures such as ourselves to be 
capable of action at all. So, Korsgaard claims that, ‘If you had no normative conception 
of your identity, you could have no reasons for action, and because your consciousness is
07
reflective, you could not then act at all,’ and that, ‘The reflective mind cannot settle for 
perception and desire, not just as such. It needs a reason. Otherwise, at least as long as it
00
reflects, it cannot commit itself or go forward.’
Korsgaard’s next step is to argue that operating as we do at this self-conscious, 
rational remove means that we must have conceptions of our identities. In other words, 
existence as a rational being means that I am not just somebody, but am a person with a 
conception of myself as a particular somebody. Initially, it seems that Korsgaard is 
concerned with more personal aspects of identity than the highly general aspects such as 
temporal extension and recognition of oneself as one among others which Nagel 
concentrated on. So, Korsgaard says that, ‘The conception of one’s identity in question 
here is not a theoretical one,’ and that, ‘It is better understood as a description under 
which you value yourself, a description under which you find your life to be worth living 
and your actions to be worth undertaking.’89 She gives this conception the helpful label of 
practical identity and goes on to say that it, ‘is a complex matter and for the average 
person there will be a jumble of such conceptions. You are a human being, a woman or a 
man, an adherent of a certain religion, a member of an ethnic group, a member of a 
certain profession, someone’s lover or friend, and so on.’90 Korsgaard claims that 
identities impose obligation and furthermore, that the primary source of obligation is the 
potential violation of identity: ‘An obligation always takes the form of a reaction against 
the threat of a loss of identity.’91 And just as we recognised the plausibility of the threats 
. against identity introduced by Nagel, at least in the case of prudence, we can recognise 
the plausibility of the claim that identities impose obligations. The idea that there are 
things we just cannot do because of who we are is a familiar one; part of the reason that 
torturing someone into betraying friends and family is so terrible is that the forced 
betrayal is, among other things, a violation of identity. If the victim survives the torture 
he or she may never be quite the same person again, and not just because of the torture 
itself. The superficial plausibility of Korsgaard’s account is also enhanced, especially 
from the standpoint of our account of internal reasons and of the individualistic intuition, 
by her apparent allowance that identity is personal and contingent, varying enormously 
between agents but nevertheless remaining of the utmost importance to those agents.
However, the very contingency of our various practical identities means that for 
Korsgaard they cannot be the ultimate sources of reasons. As she says, ‘Because these 
conceptions are contingent, one or another of them may be shed. You may cease to think 
of yourself as a mother or a citizen or a Quaker, or, where the facts make that impossible, 
the conception may cease to have practical force: you may stop caring whether you live
87 The Sources ofNormativity, page 123.
88 The Sources ofNormativity, page 93.
89 The Sources ofNormativity, page 101.
90 The Sources ofNormativity, page 101.
91 The Sources o f  Normativity, page 102.
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92up to the demands of a particular role.’ Just like Nagel, Korsgaard is looking for those 
aspects o f identity which are general and inescapable; a practical identity which we must 
all necessarily possess. And, in true Kantian fashion, she argues in a reflexive move that 
the practical identity which is not contingent is our identity as beings who have a 
practical identity: ‘What is not contingent is that you must be governed by some 
conception of your practical identity. For unless you are committed to some conception 
of your practical identity, you will lose your grip on yourself as having any reason to do 
one thing rather than another -  and with it, your grip on yourself as having any reason to 
live and act at all.’93 Korsgaard goes on to argue that this necessary commitment gives us 
a foundational practical identity as human beings, and furthermore, that it is this 
foundational practical identity which gives us the moral obligations that human beings 
are subject to: ‘our identity as moral beings -  as people who value themselves as human 
beings -  stands behind our more particular practical identities. It is because we are human 
beings that we must act in the light of practical conceptions of our identity, and this 
means that their importance is partly derived from the importance of being human.’94
It is a long route from the necessary conception of practical identity and the 
foundational practical identity o f human beings to individual, substantive reasons for 
action. But, if Korsgaard is correct in her argument, what she has done is show us how 
our identities as self-conscious, rational human beings place us on what we shall come to 
know as the Kantian conveyor belt. When we discuss Kant’s theories in more detail in the 
next chapter, I will explain what I mean by the Kantian conveyor belt. Suffice it to say for 
the time being that it is the chain of reasoning that starts with the proposition that reasons 
require ultimate vindication and ends up with the Categorical Imperative. Korsgaard gets 
started on this chain of reasoning by, as we have seen, insisting that we must possess a 
fundamental practical identity and then asking what could possibly justify the nature of 
something so fundamental. This is enough to underpin external reasons and to present a 
challenge to our account o f internal reasons. It is now time to attempt to meet that 
challenge.
2.1.3 Responding to the Challenge from Identity
The first thing that we must do when attempting to respond to the challenge 
presented by Nagel, Korsgaard and anyone adopting a similar line of argument is to avoid 
falling into a trap: we must resist the temptation to criticise their argument solely on the 
grounds of psychological plausibility. It is tempting to point out that no-one thinks in a 
way which explicitly articulates the considerations central to Nagel’s and Korsgaard’s 
theories. No-one stops to check whether the reality of other or future selves is being 
denied, or whether his or her foundational practical identity is being compromised before 
acting. However, although writers such as Nagel may make claims such as, ‘I conceive 
ethics as a branch of psychology,’95 it is evident that anyone adopting his argument or 
anything like it also conceives of psychology as subordinate to logical and metaphysical 
considerations. Neither Nagel’s nor Korsgaard’s theories require that the aspects of
92 The Sources ofNormativity, page 120.
93 The Sources o f  Normativity, page 120-121.
94 The Sources o f  Normativity, page 121.
95 The Possibility o f  Altruism, page 3.
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human identity they see as inescapable are acknowledged as such within the psychology 
of agents; they are only dependent on the existence and inescapability of these aspects, 
and their implications for the rationality of action. However, while this means that neither 
argument can be challenged on purely psychological grounds, it also means that they are 
limited in the appeal that they can make to psychological plausibility. While they do not 
depend on psychology, it would strengthen their case if they fitted our informal 
understanding and experience of human psychology. And there is an undoubted 
psychological appeal to the thought that assaults on identity provide us with reasons for 
action. However, if  we examine it more closely we realise that much of this appeal has 
motivational roots on which writers such as Nagel and Korsgaard cannot rely for reasons. 
When we think of assaults on identity we think of those things which strike to our cores, 
such as being asked to betray loved ones, to deny fundamental beliefs or to compromise a 
trust. We imagine these assaults happening under extreme duress, such as torture, threats 
or the type of moral dilemma in which all courses of action seem as bad as one another. 
All of the passion and drama of such examples is of relevance only to arguments such as 
our account of internal reasons, which deal in individual psychology and motivations. 
None of it is available to those theories which deal only in the logical and metaphysical 
implications of identity. Of course, neither Nagel nor Korsgaard attempt to gain any 
spurious credibility by appealing to such psychological considerations, but we must be 
aware that simply citing the prospect of assaults on identity raises such considerations.
Once we set questions of psychology aside, we can see that what is essential to 
arguments from identity to external reasons is the relationship between the implications 
o f the supposedly inescapable aspects of human identity and the implications of actions. 
Nagel, Korsgaard and anyone adopting a similar line of argument effectively claim that 
anyone who believes that he or she has a reason to perform an action whose implications 
contradict the implications of identity has simply made an error of reasoning. For Nagel, 
it is a fact that we have identities as temporally extended beings, and any action which 
treats our future selves as if  they are not sources of reasons equivalent to our current 
selves is based on a factual error, just as any action would be if based on some other 
fundamentally erroneous assumption, such as that time sometimes runs backwards, or 
that the world came to an end yesterday. This pared down understanding of the argument 
provides us with our first response to this type of argument: in order to determine 
practical reasons, human identity would have to have a limited, determinate set of 
implications, and our experience is that this is not the case.
If we allow that human identity has implications pertinent to action, we must also 
allow that it has rather more than those identified by Korsgaard and Nagel. We cannot 
exhaust all of the implications of identity here, but we can note that there are implications 
which contradict those identified by Nagel and Korsgaard and which, more generally, 
contradict any attempts to derive universal reasons. The strongest of these is that each of 
us has an identity as an individual with our own interests, and that the influence of these 
interests on us is not just because we are the people who happen to be best placed to 
satisfy them, but because they are ours. Giving up this relationship to our interests and 
regarding ourselves as agents acting on behalf of all of the interests in this world is at 
least as much an assault on a fundamental and inescapable aspect of our identities as 
denying that we are temporally extended. It is rare for anybody to genuinely attempt to 
adopt the viewpoint in which their interests count no more than anybody else’s, and even
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rarer for anyone to achieve it.96 We would most naturally describe such a person as self- 
denying, not just in the sense that that person is denying his or her interests, but also in 
the sense that that person is denying his or her identity. This recognition that our 
identities necessarily contain acknowledgement of our own existence and a unique 
relationship with our own interests may carry connotations of selfishness or egoism. 
However, I hope that we have seen enough in earlier discussions of motivations to realise 
that such thoughts do not have to lead in this direction: the interests and motivations of 
individuals can lead to behaviour which is self-sacrificing as well as self-serving.
The potentially contradictory implications of identity are even more apparent 
when we consider that the identities of individual agents do not simply comprise the 
common aspects we have considered, such as the recognition of ourselves as entities with 
our own interests, but also include elements peculiar to the individual. As we have been 
concentrating on the common aspects of human identity we have not considered these 
elements in any detail, but once we do consider them we realise that they are a 
fundamental part of our understanding of identity. When we think of an individual we 
think of his or her identity as that individual first, rather than his or her identity as a 
member of the human race. These individual aspects of identity vary enormously between 
individuals and naturally carry their own implications, at least some of which are likely to 
contradict the implications of those common aspects of identity we have considered so 
far. As we have seen, Korsgaard claims that as these individual elements of identity are 
contingent and could be theoretically discarded, what really matters are those remaining 
elements which could not be discarded: our identities as agents who need to operate 
under some form of practical identity. We can respond to the claim by pointing out that 
even while these individual elements could theoretically be discarded, in the sense that 
we can imagine an agent who no longer possessed them but still possessed an identity as 
a rational, human agent, to discard many of these elements would in itself constitute a 
devastating assault on the agent’s identity. Indeed, an assault which left nothing but the 
common aspects of rational, human identity would be so devastating that it would not 
make sense to say that individual elements of identity have been discarded: we would 
instead say that the agent had lost his or her identity. Although they are contingent and 
vary between individuals, agents possess elements of identity which are as fundamental 
to them and whose implications are as inescapable as those elements of identity which are 
common to all humans. If we acknowledge the presence and influence of these additional, 
contingent aspects of identity, it no longer seems likely that any common human 
elements of identity and their implications will produce substantive, determinate 
conclusions about action which are not contradicted by other aspects of our identities. 
What seems more appropriate, given the more complex picture of identity which appears
96 O f course, there are some religions in which the loss of personal interests is a definite goal, most notably 
some forms of Buddhism. However, it is worth noting that, at least in the case o f Buddhism, the goal is 
not just to lose awareness of one’s own interests, but of all interests: the person aspiring to 
enlightenment does not seek to fully recognise the reality of others, but to deny the reality of everybody, 
including him or herself, thereby extinguishing his or her existence. It is also worth noting that the 
popular forms of such religion contain all the usual manifestations of followers seeking supernatural 
assistance in achieving material goals, and that spiritual tourists from other cultures are often pursuing 
distinctly personal aims such as self-awareness and self-actualisation. For a brief discussion of the 
development of Buddhism from a quest for self-extinction to a more popularly palatable vehicle for 
salvation see Edward Conze, A Short History o f  Buddhism.
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to be natural, is a model such as our account of internal reasons, in which practical 
conclusions are drawn out by deliberation from a mass o f potentially contradictory 
considerations, and where essential aspects of human identity constitute, at most, some of 
these considerations.
We may wonder why, if this picture of human identity as complex and 
indeterminate seems so natural to us, Nagel and Korsgaard have ended with competing 
pictures which diverge from it so strongly, and an understanding of reasons which is 
apparently derived from these pictures. I believe that the answer is that their positions 
have actually developed in the opposite direction: they have started with the assumption 
that reasons must be universal and have developed their conceptions of identity from that 
assumption. This is most apparent in Nagel. As we have seen, he derives implications of 
identity from our temporal extension and status as individuals among similar others. And 
we certainly cannot deny that we are temporally extended or that we are individuals 
among other individuals: to do so would be to go wrong in reasoning. However, it is not 
the same thing to recognise the existence of these other entities as it is to recognise them 
as sources of reasons, let alone to recognise them as sources o f reasons for an agent 
which are equivalent to that agent’s own interests. The only basis which Nagel has for 
supposing that it is the same thing is the conception of reasons he starts out with; that 
reasons are necessarily objective, general and universal, and that the only relevance of 
individual, local circumstances is that they determine how these general reasons must be
97applied. But we have been given no justification, other than Nagel’s assertion, for 
understanding reasons on this basis. Our own exploration of reasons has given us a 
plausible model of reasons and actions, in which reasons are rather less universal and 
more indeterminate and contingent than would be allowed by Nagel. Even if this model 
was shown to be wrong, its plausibility at least means that alternative models such as 
Nagel’s require justification. So, it appears that Nagel has not discovered aspects of 
identity whose implications are that there are necessarily reasons independent of 
motivations, but that he has rather discovered aspects of identity which tell us what those 
reasons might be if his conception of reasons was right. We can make this into a more 
general point by observing that this flaw in Nagel’s argument indicates that the 
implications of identity are limited to just that: what identity can imply. Taken alone, 
these implications cannot give us independent general criteria for what counts as a reason 
or as sound deliberation; we must discover that through the consideration o f reasons 
rather than identity.
Korsgaard might seem to be in a better position because she supposedly argues for 
the universal nature of reasons rather than assuming it at the outset. However,
Korsgaard’s conception of identity still seems alien to us, and this is because it is 
inexorably foundational; it depends on the assertion that much of what informs our 
practical lives, and what we would normally regard as part of our identities, can be 
discarded or disregarded as we seek the ultimate practical identity which is the source of 
reasons. The provisional identities which Korsgaard claims that we can discard seem 
much closer to our understanding of identity than the abstract conception o f ourselves as 
beings who require practical identities. The description of an agent as a lawyer or a 
doctor or a parent seems much more plausible and accurate than the description of an 
agent as a being-who-must-possess-a-practical-identity who is acting as a lawyer, as a
97 For example, see references 79 and 80 above.
54
Be Reasonable -  David Knott
doctor and so on. This becomes even more apparent when we realise that what we 
consider to be our most fundamental identities are even deeper and more personal than 
these generic roles. What lies beneath the role of doctor or lawyer is the identity of the 
agent as him or herself, even though this identity remains contingent on the agent’s 
individual make-up and circumstances. Indeed, the conception of the underlying 
fundamental practical identity reveals that Korsgaard’s basic assumption about the nature 
of identity depends on a preconception about the nature of reasons just as strong as 
Nagel’s. She is supposing that our identities must be underpinned in some fashion; that 
they must have some sort of general conceptual backing. But our understanding of 
identity does not require this backing unless we are starting from the assumption that we 
are seeking the basis of universal reasons. If we do not start from this assumption then, 
while we may still talk of our fundamental identities we will mean those things we could 
not abandon without losing ourselves, and will suppose that these are peculiar to 
individuals rather than anything so abstract as the identity of a being who must adopt a 
practical identity.
So, while we can acknowledge that our identities are powerful influences on our 
reasons and our actions, neither considerations of necessary, common aspects of human 
identity, nor the implications of action seem enough to provide us with substantive, 
determinate reasons which apply to agents regardless of their motivations, unless we 
bring with us question-begging conceptions of the nature of reasons. The argument from 
identity is not a challenge to our account of internal reasons as long as it depends on the 
logical and metaphysical implications of identity. These implications are simply further 
facts about us, some of which will figure in deliberation and some of which won’t. These 
facts are not of the sort which can be contradicted by action or deliberation which does 
not directly imply such contradiction, or pass very close to it. In the absence of 
motivations these further facts will come up against the same objection that they will 
always face from Humean theories: we fail to see how they can explain action on their 
own. Furthermore, we have no reason to believe that the implications of common aspects 
of identity should necessarily be more influential than the implications of the aspects of 
identity which vary from individual to individual but which are nevertheless fundamental 
to those individuals. The real plausibility of the claim that aspects of identity produce 
reasons comes when we allow motivations to play their part. We can then adopt an 
understanding of identity in which a starting set of motivations, along with those which 
are settled by experience and deliberation, give us a powerful explanation of why some 
reasons have the hold over us that they do. And this is, of course, a conception of identity 
which is entirely compatible with the internal reasons account.
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2.2 Principles
The best representative of the argument that universal reasons can be discerned 
through the principles on which we act can be found in the work of Immanuel Kant, 
particularly in the Groundwork o f the Metaphysics ofMorals and the Critique o f  
Practical Reason. In considering Kant’s arguments we must be aware of the relationship 
they have with earlier empiricist arguments to which they provide a response and a 
challenge. Although Kant arrives at conclusions which are far removed from empiricism, 
one of his starting points is that the empiricists who came before him, and particularly 
Hume, have set him a problem: they have identified the ravenous demands that rational 
enquiry makes on beliefs and evidence, and have argued that these demands can never be 
met. In the Critique o f Pure Reason Kant lamented that John Locke, ‘opened a wide door 
to extravagance (for if reason is once allowed right on its side, it will not allow itself to be 
confined, by vague recommendations of moderation)’ while David Hume, ‘gave himself 
up entirely to scepticism having, as he believed, discovered that what passes for reason is 
nothing but a pervasive illusion of our knowledge faculty,’ and proposed to, ‘make a trial 
whether it be not possible safely to conduct reason between these two rocks, to assign her 
determinate limits, and yet leave open for her the entire sphere of legitimate activity.’98 
Furthermore, Kant was not amenable to what Hume saw as the only sensible reaction to 
his apparently sceptical conclusions: to accept that despite a lack of foundations which 
can withstand the insatiable demands of rational justification, we are nevertheless capable 
of going on living, knowing, judging and acting. For Kant, those unassailable foundations 
are not only desirable but necessary.
Kant’s attempt to find vindication in such foundations results in the construction 
of what I have flippantly referred to as the Kantian conveyor belt; that is, a line of 
reasoning which, if we can find a point of entry to it, leads us inexorably to the 
conclusion that we are governed by Kant’s famous Categorical Imperative. The 
Categorical Imperative appears in Kant’s work in several forms, but the one which is best 
known and which provides us with the clearest basis for discussion is that known as the 
Formula of Universal Law: ‘act only in accordance with that maxim which you can at the 
same time will that it becomes a universal law.’99 The conveyor belt proceeds in four 
stages. The first stage is to suppose that actions are expressions of principles. At this 
stage Kant does not need us to suppose that these are general principles, or even that they 
can be justified, but he does require us to acknowledge that, because we are rational 
beings, when we act there is something in addition to the act itself; there is the principle 
upon which we act. So, on this account, any act committed by a rational agent, no matter 
how thoughtless or casual, is an act on a principle, even if that principle is selfish or 
venal. The second stage of the Kantian conveyor belt is to suppose that, even though 
many of the principles on which we act could not be justified, as principles they stand in 
need of rational justification. The third stage is to recognise that, as discussed by the 
empiricists, we cannot appeal to anything in the world that can provide this justification; 
there is nothing that reason will accept as a foundation. Or almost nothing. In the fourth 
stage of the Kantian conveyor belt we make what Kant refers to as the ‘Copemican
98 Critique o f  Pure Reason, page 97.
99 Groundwork, 4:421.
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shift’100 and radically change our perspective. If there is nothing external which can be 
appealed to to provide rational justification, then we must look for it within the 
requirement for justification itself. In other words, the way in which we find principles 
which stand up to the insatiable demands of reason is not by continuously looking for 
foundations which will inevitably be undermined, but by looking directly for those 
principles which meet the demands of reason. In Kant’s scheme, such principles have the 
status of universal law because they can always be justified for all agents, and they 
acquire this status just because they can be conceived as universal law. We have reached 
Kant’s famous Categorical Imperative in the form of the Formula of Universal Law: ‘act 
only in accordance with that maxim which you can at the same time will that it becomes a 
universal law.’101 This argument can be a little dizzying: Kant is accepting the Humean 
conclusion that reason sweeps away the ground under our feet by denying the solidity of 
any empirical foundations, but stops us from falling by finding justification within reason 
itself. However, although this argument can be bewildering and difficult to grasp, once it 
is grasped it is curiously compelling. I have adopted the metaphor of the Kantian 
conveyor belt because once we enter Kant’s chain of reasoning it propels us inexorably 
towards the Categorical Imperative.
And, of course, if we allow ourselves to be conveyed to this conclusion regarding 
reasons for action, then we must abandon our account of internal reasons. Kant’s 
argument implies not only that reasons exist independently of motivations, but that all 
reasons must be independent of motivations. Motivations are precisely the form of 
empirical consideration that Kant rules out as capable of providing justification. So, if we 
wish to retain our attractive, plausible position, we must respond to the challenge set by 
Kant. There are many possible ways to make such a response, some of which are purely 
based on the superficial unattractiveness of Kant’s austere and demanding account. 
However, such responses do not engage with the heart of Kant’s theory, and to rely on 
them would be to fall into a similar trap as those external reasons theorists who attack 
positions resembling the sub-Humean model, without acknowledging the breadth and 
complexity of the actual Humean position and its derivatives. I believe that to respond 
adequately to Kant we must not just show that the Categorical Imperative produces 
unattractive or counter-intuitive conclusions, but rather that we do not need to get on the 
Kantian conveyor belt in the first place. We will be helped in this attempt by a modem 
interpreter of Kant: Onora O’Neill, particularly her collection of essays Constructions o f  
Reason.
O’Neill is not only a well-known and lucid interpreter of Kant’s sometimes 
impenetrable work, but is also a perceptive critic of those supposed Kantians who 
discard, contradict or ignore the less palatable aspects of his theories, without which his 
arguments lose much of their elegant and compelling nature.102 By modifying his 
theories, these supposed Kantians make him less interesting to us; by accepting 
something like the Humean theory of motivation they make him into an internal reasons 
theorist. Within O’Neill’s interpretation we get a comprehensible version of Kant’s 
unyielding focus on principles and reason; we get the external reasons theorist who
100 See Critique o f  Pure Reason, page 17.
101 Groundwork, 4:421.
102 For example, see ‘Autonomy: The Emperor’s New Clothes,’ the inaugural address to the joint session o f  
the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association, 2003.
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presents a real and serious challenge to our account. O ’Neill also extensively discusses a 
concept which she takes to be central to Kant’s practical philosophy, and which I believe 
represents both the entry point to the Kantian conveyor belt and the most promising point 
for us to challenge: the concept of the underlying principle of action, or the maxim.
It is easy to overlook that the Categorical Imperative, when expressed as the 
Formula of Universal Law, refers not only to action, will and law, but that it uses the 
concept of the maxim to link them together. This concept may seem rather mundane and 
workmanlike, particularly in the company of lofty notions found within Kant’s theory 
such as the supreme principle of practical reason, rational autonomy and universal law, 
but, as O’Neill says, ‘contrary to appearances, this is not a trivial part of his criterion of
1 AO
morally acceptable action.’ I also believe that it is the point at which, at least in the 
context of our discussion, Kant’s theory should be challenged. Maxims stand as 
intermediaries between our individual, specific actions, and the obligations Kant 
supposes to arise from our rational natures. They serve three purposes within his scheme. 
The first o f these seems relatively innocuous. As we have seen, Kant supposes that all 
action by rational beings is action on some principle, and maxims capture the underlying 
principle of actions. As we have mentioned, at this stage we need not suppose that these 
principles could quality as universal law, or even that they are general; they could be 
entirely subjective. However, as we have also seen, acknowledging that all action is 
action on a principle has significant implications; that principle, and by extension that 
action, becomes subject to the demand for justification. So, the second role of maxims is 
as the vehicle between individual actions and the Categorical Imperative; capturing the 
principle of action is necessary to submit that action to the test of the Categorical 
Imperative; and it is also what makes these actions subject to this test in the first place. 
However, we do not have to wait for the occasion of a particular action to test the maxim 
of that action. The third role of maxims in Kant’s scheme is that they provide a means of 
testing whether certain general types of action can be justified, and thereby a means of 
deriving general rules about whether those types o f action are permissible, required or 
forbidden. Thinking of such maxims outside the context of particular actions is not 
something that Kant’s scheme demands or expects that we do; but it is an activity for 
moral philosophers, and is the source of Kant’s more hotly contested examples of what is 
and is not morally permissible,104 as well as the perception of the Kantian scheme as 
tightly bound by rules. So, given these different roles which maxims play in Kant’s 
scheme, when discussing maxims we must always remember that they fall into three 
nested categories which correspond to these roles: the category of untested maxims, 
which will have varying levels of subjectivity and objectivity, and which may or may not 
be capable o f passing the test of the Categorical Imperative; the smaller category o f those 
maxims which pass that test, and which therefore constitute moral obligations; and the 
even smaller category of maxims which have been tested by theorists such as Kant 
outside the context of individual actions, and which have been discovered to constitute 
general moral rules.
The different levels at which maxims operate and the purposes they serve in 
Kant’s scheme become clearer when illustrated with an example. Imagine that a couple I
103 ‘Consistency in Action’ in Constructions o f  Reason, page 83.
104 Perhaps the most notorious example is Kant’s insistence that the truth should be told even if  a lie could 
save someone from being murdered. See On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy, 8:247.
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meet on holiday ask me to dinner once we have returned, but I realise that I don’t really 
want to keep up the relationship. At the same time I don’t want to hurt their feelings, so I 
make various excuses about my busy schedule and prior commitments in the hope that 
they will gradually lose interest without feeling slighted. These excuses are not based in 
truth, so I am lying. There are many possible maxims which could be used to capture the 
principle of my action (although we will also ask later whether it is possible that I am not 
acting on a principle at all) but let us suppose that my actual maxim is, ‘I shall lie 
whenever I need to get out o f a socially awkward situation.’ This maxim cannot but start 
by belonging to the category o f untested maxims. However, it is rather less certain that it 
belongs to the category of maxims which pass the test of the Categorical Imperative. It 
can be difficult to determine whether a maxim passes this test, as it is not always 
immediately obvious which maxims could be willed as universal law. There are two 
standard ways in which the test can be failed: because willing the maxim as universal law 
involves a conceptual contradiction, as would be the case if we willed the maxim that we 
could break promises whenever convenient, as such a maxim would contradict the 
meaning of promises; or because willing the maxim as universal law involves a practical 
contradiction, as would be the case if, through selfishness, we willed maxims of neglect 
or inaction, which would serve to frustrate the fulfilment of our own selfish ends if 
established as universal law. Kant claims that any maxim involving lying fails the test in 
the first way; it involves a conceptual contradiction, because the practice o f truth-telling, 
on which lying depends, would be rendered meaningless by the universal permissibility 
of lying.105 This means that, while the proposed maxim may be the genuine principle of 
my action, my action would not be permissible under Kant’s scheme, as it fails the test of 
the Categorical Imperative. This is all that is needed within Kant’s scheme to deliver 
substantive moral conclusions regarding particular instances of action. However, the 
scheme does not need to stop there; hence the third category of maxims. It is possible to 
generalise the maxim further, and by considering whether this maxim is capable of 
passing the test of the Categorical Imperative, to produce general moral rules governing a 
broad range of situations and maxims. The more general maxim which can be derived 
from the specific maxim we have been considering is, ‘I shall lie when I can gain some 
advantage by doing so,’ and is a maxim to which Kant considered directly and found to 
be impermissible.106
Outlining these categories of maxims, from those which capture the subjective 
principles of action to those which constitute general moral guidelines, helps us to 
remember which sort of maxim we are dealing with at each part of our discussion. 
According to Kant’s scheme, we always act on maxims, we should always act on maxims 
which have been subjected to the test of the Categorical Imperative and which have 
passed that test, and we have a better chance o f acting correctly if we follow those 
general rules which can be derived by submitting highly general principles to the test. 
However, we can challenge the progression through these categories of maxims, and up
105 The conclusion may seem counter-intuitive, as it superficially seems neither harmful nor logically 
incoherent to allow that people may tell white lies from time to time, especially to protect the feelings o f 
others. However, because we are forced under Kant’s scheme to consider maxims as possible universal 
laws, we put in the position where the most innocuous and well-meaning lie is an assault on our 
commitment to truth and the practice of speaking truthfully. For a useful discussion of this point see 
Roger J. Sullivan’s Immanuel K ant’s Moral Theory, pages 170-173.
106 See The Metaphysics o f  Morals, 6:481.
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the Kantian conveyor belt, by questioning whether the assumption at its very beginning is 
true; by asking whether we always act on maxims.
2.2.1 Challenging Maxims
We will challenge the concept of maxims by attempting to show that there are at 
least some rational actions which cannot be made sense of as the embodiment of a 
principle, and that therefore the criteria of justification applied to principles do not 
necessarily have to be applied to all rational actions. In accordance with our discussion of 
the different categories of maxims, we should note that what we are challenging here is 
the claim that we always act on maxims, whether those maxims are capable of passing 
the test o f the Categorical Imperative or not. In arguing for this case we will make life 
easy on ourselves by considering a category of action which is least amenable to 
interpretation as acting on a principle: action which I shall label ‘trivial’. This label is 
only a tool, and I do not wish to make too much of it, as I hope that it is obvious what it 
means: it refers to those actions which could as readily be performed as not performed, 
without making much difference to the agent. A paradigm example of trivial action 
would be that o f taking a break from writing this passage to go and get a cup of coffee, 
when I am not particularly hungry, thirsty or in need of stimulation. The thought simply 
occurs to me that a cup of coffee might be nice about now, and if I have one it is quite 
nice, but if  I don’t then I carry on working without it. Insipid adjectives such as ‘nice’ and 
the thought that my action might be habit as much as desire are indicators of trivial 
action.
We can begin our challenge by making the informal observation that it simply 
seems absurd to say that trivial action is action on a principle; our ordinary intuitive 
understanding of our behaviour is that we sometimes act with little or no thought about 
what we are doing, and still less about any possible principle on which we could be 
acting. To insist that such action is action on a maxim seems to attempt to force part of 
our common experience of action into a preconceived theoretical understanding of what 
action should be. Yet just such insistence is made by Kant and his followers; Onora 
O’Neill claims that, ‘Even routine or thoughtless action is action on some maxim.’ 107 To 
deal with such insistence we must attempt to articulate our intuition about the absurdity 
of trivial action being action on a maxim by considering what such a maxim would have 
to be like to satisfy both Kant’s scheme and the nature of the action itself.
The requirement imposed by Kant’s scheme is that maxims must be of a form 
which is capable of being submitted to the test of the Categorical Imperative. Once again, 
this does not mean that they must be capable of passing this test, even though Kant 
maintains that these are the only maxims we should act on; all that is required at this 
stage is that the test can be attempted. This means that the maxim of any action must have 
at least two characteristics. Firstly, it must be capable of being formulated as a principle. 
This means that we cannot simply determine that an action appears to express some sort 
of vague, hazy attitude or belief; it must be conceivable that some fully articulated 
principle could be wrung from the agent’s action, even if this is very hard in practice. The 
second characteristic derived from the Categorical Imperative is that whatever principle is 
finally extracted from the action, that principle must be capable of being willed by the
107 ‘Consistency in Action’, page 84.
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agent; that is, it must be possible for the agent to recognise the maxim as correctly 
describing his or her action, to rationally endorse it, and to adopt it as the principle of his 
or her action. The test of the Categorical Imperative requires, of course, that it must be 
capable of being willed as universal law but, yet again, we are concerned for the time 
being with what is necessary to submit the maxim to this test, not what is needed to pass 
it. The important point here is that, to qualify as a maxim, the principle underlying the 
agent’s action cannot stand apart from the agent’s will; to be the principle of the agent’s 
action it must be willed, or at least willable. It is the willing of maxims, as well as their 
status as principles, which makes them subject to the demand for rational justification; on 
Kant’s understanding, by willing maxims, we assert at least, ‘This action is allowed,’ and 
such assertions demand justification. To act on a maxim cannot be merely to behave 
consistently with the description of one’s action under a principle; it must be to will that 
principle.
It is slightly more difficult to identify the characteristics which the maxim of a 
trivial action such as going for a coffee break must have from the nature of that action, 
because the boundaries and definition of the action itself are hazily defined, as they often 
are for trivial actions. However, I think that we can discern two such characteristics. 
Firstly, my maxim is not psychologically articulated. It would be surprising if, in taking a 
coffee break, I consciously formed a principle concerning the taking of coffee breaks. It 
is most likely that I will barely deliberate at all before taking such action; indeed, if I am 
particularly distracted, or particularly deep in thought, I may glance at my empty mug 
and find myself in the kitchen with the kettle on before I properly realise what I am 
doing. So, for such trivial actions, the maxim of my action must be such that it does not 
need to consciously register in my mind at all. The second characteristic of the maxim of 
trivial action which we can derive from the nature and circumstances of that action is that 
the adoption of such maxims must be amenable to a cheerful inconsistency. Actions 
which are trivial do not matter to me very much, and acting in the same way in 
comparable circumstances matters barely at all. So if I take a break to get a cup o f coffee 
now, it does not imply that I will do the same thing tomorrow when I am in relevantly 
similar circumstances. Such inconsistency does not bother me at all, and we would 
consider someone very strange who challenged me to explain myself with respect to it.
So, now we must ask whether these sets of characteristics are compatible with 
each other. That is, is it possible to construct a maxim which is compatible with the 
Kant’s theory and which is compatible with the nature and circumstances of trivial 
action? A case could be made for saying that the two sets of characteristics are 
compatible, at least superficially. Kant’s theory does not require that maxims are 
consciously articulated if they are to figure in the agent’s psychology. One of Kant’s 
gloomier conclusions about human behaviour is that we can never be certain which 
maxims we are acting on, even if we believe ourselves to have consciously chosen our
1 ORmaxims. The person who is apparently acting on maxims of charity may actually be 
acting on maxims of pure self-interest, and may have deceived him or herself as well as 
any observer. Similarly, actions which are characterised by cheerful inconsistency could 
be seen as compatible with Kant’s theory due to the agent’s inconsistent adoption of 
maxims. Kant need not suppose that agents always act on the same maxims, even when 
they are performing actions which are outwardly similar: all that is claimed is that agents
108 Groundwork, 4:407-8.
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always act on some maxim. The interpretation even allows that agents could act on 
different maxims in equivalent circumstances yet still be judged rational and moral as 
long as those different maxims pass the test of the Categorical Imperative.
However, despite this superficial compatibility, problems arise as soon as we look 
deeper, particularly when we consider how Kant’s theory must deal with the thought that 
maxims must be willable’, as mentioned earlier, the agent must be able to recognise, 
endorse and adopt the maxim as a principle of action. The requirement that a maxim is 
willable does not just mean that maxims must be of a form which could be willed, but 
that they can actually be willed by the agent who possesses them. In other words, for a 
maxim to qualify as an agent’s maxim of action, the agent must have a psychological 
commitment to that maxim at some level. It cannot simply be a principle which gives a 
convincing or plausible description of the action; it must be the maxim of that agent and 
of that action. Furthermore, this commitment cannot be to the execution o f a particular 
action, or even to the ends that action will produce, but to the principle o f that action. 
And, because maxims are ubiquitous, the principles to which agents have some form of 
commitment must include the principles concerning trivial action. We could come up 
with many principles which were superficially compatible with a specific instance of 
trivial action, but it is extremely difficult to imagine psychologically plausible principles 
which agents would recognise, endorse and adopt as the actual basis for those actions. 
Remember that we are not talking about commitment to an action, or even the ends of 
that action, but to the principle under which the action is conducted. It is not impossible 
that when I go and get a cup of coffee my mind contains a commitment to a principle of 
action governing going to get cups of coffee, but it is implausible; for such trivial, 
habitual actions we are stretching our terms if we say that we are even committed to the 
action, let alone the principle of the action.
So, if we want to apply the concept of maxims to cases of trivial action, it appears 
that we not only have to accept the plausible claim that principles of action are not always 
fully articulated, but that we also have to accept the rather less plausible claim that 
principles which we cannot imagine as commitments nevertheless exist as commitments 
within our psychologies in a form which we cannot discern. We can neither afford nor 
need to be so generous, and can conclude that, on the basis of our discussions so far, 
trivial action is not action on a maxim. There are, of course, ways in which Kantians 
could defend the concept o f maxims from this challenge. Three obvious defences present 
themselves. Firstly, it could be claimed that we have made life rather too easy for 
ourselves by dealing only with trivial actions, and that actions which are more significant 
fit the concept of maxims rather better. So, if I am considering jumping off a bridge, then 
the principle of my action may be rather more clear and rather more prominent in my 
psychology than if I am considering getting a cup of coffee. Although this objection does 
force us to acknowledge that there are situations in which we do seem to be deliberating 
and acting in accordance with maxims, it has problems of its own. To start with, it is not 
enough to show that some actions are conducted on the basis of articulated principles.
The point of the ubiquity o f maxims is that they apply to all of our actions, meaning that 
we can never avoid getting on the Kantian conveyor belt. As we have seen, O’Neill 
insists that, ‘Even routine or thoughtless or indecisive action is action on some 
maxim.’109 So, we may have made life easy for ourselves by picking the category of
109 ‘Consistency in Action’, page 84.
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action least suitable to maxims, but we can do this because the theory requires that 
maxims are ubiquitous.
Furthermore, part of the reason that we chose to talk about trivial actions is that, 
as well as testing the concept o f maxims, we can discuss them without introducing 
additional considerations, such as those concerning morality and relationships, which 
complicate the argument. However, when we do consider more significant actions, we 
find that they are not so different from trivial actions. Consider an example used by 
Bernard Williams in his paper ‘Persons, Character and Morality.’110 In this paper, 
Williams imagines a situation in which a man has the opportunity to save several people 
from drowning, one o f whom is his wife and the rest of whom are strangers. 
Unsurprisingly, he saves his wife; and there are few of us who would challenge him for 
doing so. The point of Williams’ example is that it seems odd to say that the man ought 
to deliberate to the conclusion that he is justified in saving his wife before actually saving 
her; and just as odd to say that if he does not do so his action is somehow less than 
rational.111 We can use this example in our current argument by considering whether we 
should understand the man’s action as being governed by a maxim which figures 
somewhere in his psychology. If so, the maxim is certainly not consciously articulated; 
the deliberation that Williams plausibly claims is unnecessary would be needed to 
identify and articulate that maxim. However, as well as being unarticulated we can also 
see a maxim in this situation as unnecessary and inappropriate: we can better understand 
the agent as committed to the ends of his action, or simply as committed to his wife than 
as committed to a principle. In at least this case of significant action it seems a poor fit to 
attempt to describe this action in terms of maxims at all.
The second defence of the claim that even trivial action is action on a maxim is 
that we have made a mistake which O ’Neill warns against: we have conceived maxims as 
precise algorithms governing a specific action rather than as broader principles governing 
a range of action. So, on this defence, the details of trivial action may not be specified in 
a particular, detailed maxim but rather covered in the broader terms of a more general 
maxim. I think that we have avoided this mistake as we have not attempted to formulate 
maxims of specific trivial actions but have rather considered what characteristics such 
maxims must have. However, it may be that maxims are so general that the 
characteristics we derived from the nature of such trivial actions, particularly that they are 
compatible with cheerful inconsistency, are not actually necessary characteristics at all: 
trivial actions are so far beneath their attention that they are not influenced by them. 
However, conceiving of maxims in such a way would leave us with a problem. If the 
intention is to avoid the conclusion that some actions should not be regarded as actions on 
maxims then the maxim would have to be sufficiently general to avoid acquiring 
characteristics determined by the nature of the actions with which it is concerned, yet 
sufficiently related to such action to be considered the maxim of the action.
Such maxims are not inconceivable. For example, the action of going to get a cup 
of coffee while writing a thesis may be action on the maxim, ‘Keep yourself refreshed 
when engaged in intellectual activity,’ or, ‘Don’t work so hard that you forget your 
bodily needs,’ or, ‘Give yourself time to reflect on your arguments,’ or even, ‘Make sure
110 See ‘Persons, Character and Morality’ in Moral Luck..
111 We should also note that the question here is not whether he has time in this crisis situation to conduct 
such deliberation, but whether it is necessary or appropriate for him to conduct such deliberation at all.
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that you use up all the groceries you have bought before their expiry dates.’ Indeed, the 
problem here is not that we cannot conceive of one, two or a multitude of maxims under 
which the action could be adequately described, but that we have difficulty in supposing 
that any or all o f these should be understood as expressing a commitment of the agent to a 
principle. For, even though maxims are supposed to be sufficiently general that they do 
not specify detailed actions, they are also supposed to be maxims o f  those actions. And, 
even if we are able to find some agents some of whose trivial actions do express 
allegiance to general principles of the type we have just considered, it does not seem 
plausible to suppose that all such actions express a similar allegiance. This becomes 
apparent when we realise that, unfettered by considerations such as the actual beliefs and 
attitudes of the agent we could come up with a potentially infinite range of maxims which 
are apparently compatible with trivial action, especially when we consider the negative 
implications of the agent’s action. So, we could imagine maxims such as, ‘When thirsty, 
drink in preference to working,’ or, ‘When thirsty, drink in preference to phoning your 
mother,’ or, ‘When thirsty, drink in preference to doing charity work.’ Yet we have no 
grounds for supposing that such principles which the action conceivably could express 
are the principles which the action does express, or, as we are arguing, that the action 
expresses any principles at all. Ensuring that we conceive of maxims as broad principles 
rather than as detailed algorithms does not seem to make the fit between the concept of 
maxims and our experience o f trivial actions any better.
The third defence of the concept o f maxims is to argue that we have used an 
understanding of maxims which places too great an emphasis on their presence in the 
agent’s psychology. The idea behind this defence is most clearly expressed by O ’Neill in
119the postscript to her paper ‘Kant After Virtue.’ In this paper O ’Neill originally offered 
the corrective to criticisms of Kant which we have already seen: she responded to 
Alasdair MacIntyre’s claims in After Virtue that Kant presents an unrecognisable and 
unliveable picture of moral life by treating morality as the prescription of narrow rules113 
by arguing that this understanding of Kant is mistaken because maxims are general 
principles of action rather than detailed algorithms. She even goes so far as to suggest 
that a sufficiently general understanding of maxims allows us to understand them as 
something akin to the virtues; an understanding that obviously has implications for the 
status o f maxims as psychological contents of the agent. In the postscript, however, added 
when the paper was published in the collection Constructions o f  Reason, O’Neill disowns 
this conclusion and its implications. Here she says, ‘The point about moral principles on 
Kant’s account is not that they are psychologically inward -  to think of it in that way, 
even if one allows for the opacity o f maxims, is to adopt a “Cartesian” view of maxims as 
agents’ mental states. Maxims may be inferences from action; they may be imputed to 
practices or to institutions rather than to individuals . . . The sense in which maxims are 
inward is only that they are not outward -  they are not inscribed on the surface o f action.
It would be better to describe them as underlying rather than as psychologically inward 
principles.’114
This argument may offer a defence against our challenge to maxims because that 
challenge relied in part on the implausibility of any agent holding a commitment to the
112 See ‘Kant After Virtue’ in Constructions o f  Reason.
113 After Virtue, pages 43-47.
114 ‘Kant After Virtue’, pages 161-162.
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maxim of a trivial action, assuming that such a maxim could be formulated in the first 
place. On O’Neill’s interpretation it seems that we need not suppose that the agent holds 
this commitment, making the existence of maxims of trivial action rather more plausible. 
However, this defence has problems of its own. Firstly, even though it may remove the 
need for agents to commit psychologically to the maxim of a trivial action, it still requires 
that the maxims of such actions can be formulated, and this seems as difficult as ever: 
even if we can come up with countless maxims which could fit the agent’s action, it is 
rather harder to find the actual maxim on which the agent did act, if he or she acted on a 
maxim at all. Underlying intentions may be obscure to agents themselves, let alone 
others, and circumstances may prevent us from ever knowing what these intentions were. 
Psychotherapy notoriously takes years to uncover the roots of behaviour, and even then it 
may be uncertain that this is really what has been done. In a starker and regrettably 
topical example, we are unlikely to ever know the underlying principles o f the actions of 
a suicide bomber. However, there is a deeper problem, which is that trivial actions seem 
to have either no particular rational implications, or an infinity of rational implications. In 
other words, the problem of locating a principle does not go away just because we do not 
demand that that principle is part of the agent’s psychology.
The second problem with the argument that maxims need not be psychologically 
manifested is even more serious. As we have noted, part of the importance of maxims is 
that they get us onto the Kantian conveyor belt: actions are actions on maxims; maxims 
are principles; principles require rational vindication and so on. However, if we are no 
longer saying that the maxim is something which the agent actively espouses, or which 
even figures in the agent’s psychology at all, then the role of maxims in getting us onto 
the Kantian conveyor belt is undermined. If maxims are merely potential descriptions of 
action whose relevance is external to the agent’s psychology, we can no longer see why 
the agent should be bound by any demand for their justification. This is especially the 
case when we consider that it is altogether uncertain what the maxim of certain actions 
could be, or whether such actions could be described as action on maxims at all. The 
impetus driving the Kantian conveyor belt is the demand for justification, and the reason 
that we get on it at all is that we have some proposition which requires justification. Yet, 
if we are accepting O ’Neill’s interpretation of Kant’s theory then it is no longer clear that 
we have a proposition which requires justification. Although this interpretation still 
describes us as acting on a principle, what it means to act on a principle is considerably 
removed from our normal understanding of the phrase: all it can mean is that an act with 
certain underlying intentions has certain implications. But while it is possible to see how 
espousal of a principle, whether conscious or unconscious, incurs a demand and an 
obligation for some form of justification, it is rather harder to see that such demands and 
obligations are incurred by the implications of action. This does not mean that we escape 
responsibility for our actions and reasons. Those principles which we do consciously 
espouse, as well as those intentions we hold and those consequences we produce all invite 
demands for justification, but not necessarily the justification that Kant is after. A 
Kantian could respond to this argument by insisting that despite the lack of conscious 
psychological allegiance, to act in a way which has certain rational implications simply is 
to embody those implications, and to incur the obligation of justifying them. However, I 
think that at this point we are entitled to ask a question which is not just relevant to Kant, 
but to any argument which attempts to derive reasons from the supposed implications of
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the very idea of action: why should we suppose that actions which carry no intention to 
embody principles should be treated as if they do embody principles?
So, it appears that there is at least one category of action which cannot be 
understood as action on a maxim, and which therefore escapes getting on the Kantian 
conveyor belt at all. It may seem that this is not enough to defend our account from the 
challenge presented by Kant’s theory; after all, the internal reasons account is intended to 
account for all reasons; we do not argue that there are some actions which are not subject 
to external reasons, but that there are no external reasons. It may seem that we have left 
open the possibility that other categories of action are subject to external reasons. I agree 
that we have not shown categorically that all actions are capable of escaping the demand 
for justification associated with principles and their expression through action. However,
I also think that we have shifted the burden of argument back to Kant and his defenders. 
Their starting position was that all actions were such that they were subject to the 
escalating need for justification represented by the Kantian conveyor belt, and we have 
shown that this is not the case. It remains for the Kantians to show that we should hold 
any actions to this standard of judgement. For, remember, the category of trivial actions 
was only selected as a test case because it was easiest to show that actions in this category 
could not be understood as actions on general principles. As we have seen in our 
discussion of Williams’ example of the man who saves his wife from drowning, it is not 
hard to find situations which are practically and morally significant, yet in which it seems 
that to describe action as action on a principle is not only inappropriate but thoroughly 
misunderstands the situation. Furthermore, our reaction to such examples shows that 
actions which we do not think of as action on a principle are nevertheless subject to our 
judgement; that most of us immediately know what we think of the man saving his wife 
indicates that there are other dimensions of justification than rational justification of 
underlying principles, and that they often matter rather more to us. Sometimes action is 
just action, and we do not need to discover, or even look for, an underlying principle in 
order to judge whether the action is justified.
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2.3 Motivations
All of the proponents of the types of theories we have considered so far 
strenuously deny or limit the role of motivations in producing reasons and action. Even 
Nagel who, as we saw, allowed that desires may always accompany action, saw those 
desires as a side-effect of deliberation, rather than as a determinant of reasons. By 
contrast, the final type of external reasons theory we will consider starts out by seeming 
friendly to the claim that motivations are necessary for the explanation of action and the 
existence of reasons, but goes on to argue for external reasons by supposing that our 
reasons depend on the motivations which we should have rather than the motivations 
which we do have, and furthermore, that the motivations we should have are fully 
determined by reason. In considering this type of theory we will concentrate on the work 
of its main current proponent, Michael Smith, and will be guided primarily by his recent 
book, The Moral Problem as well as some of the debate following its publication.115 
Smith is of particular interest to us because he articulates feelings and assumptions which 
I believe are shared by many philosophers but which are not often expressed explicitly. 
These intuitions are that the Humean account of motivational psychology is the only 
plausible one, but that at the same time there must be more room for objective 
normativity than Hume’s account seems to allow; an apparent unease which corresponds 
to the tension between the individualistic and universalistic intuitions about reasons.
2.3.1 Smith ys Argument fo r  Ordered Motivations
We will have to go some way into Smith’s theory to see the challenge it presents 
to our account of internal reasons. Our starting point is the clash which Smith sees as 
central to his argument: indeed, it is what he regards as the moral problem which gives 
his book its title. This clash occurs when we consider three propositions which express 
our intuitions about moral reasons, each of which may seem superficially plausible but 
which, when taken together, appear contradictory. Smith expresses these propositions 
thus:
1. Moral judgements of the form ‘It is right that I (|)’ express a belief about an 
objective matter of fact, a fact about what it is right for me to do.
2. If someone judges that it is right that she § then she is, ceteris paribus, 
motivated to (|).
3. An agent is motivated to act in a certain way just in case she has an 
appropriate desire and a means-end belief, where belief and desire are, in 
Hume’s terms, distinct existences.116
In his response to The Moral Problem, ‘The Metaethical Problem’, Geoffrey 
Sayre-McCord helpfully identifies the first proposition as ‘cognitivism,’ the second
115 In particular, see David O. Brink, ‘Moral Motivation’, David Copp, ‘Belief, Reason and Motivation: 
Michael Smith’s The Moral Problem’, Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, ‘The Metaethical Problem’, and 
Smith’s reply to all these papers, ‘In Defense o f The Moral Problem: A Reply to Brink, Copp, and 
Sayre-McCord’.
116 The Moral Problem, page 12
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proposition as ‘intemalism’ and the third proposition as ‘Humean psychology.’117 
According to Smith, the apparent problem with these propositions is that the third appears 
to be at odds with the other two. The third proposition makes motivation to act dependent 
on the existence of a desire, whereas the other two propositions imply that the judgement 
that an action is right can lead to motivation to perform that action without the 
involvement of any desires.
Smith attempts to resolve this apparent contradiction by following a line of
thought which we have already considered; but he takes it further than we have been
willing to take it. He acknowledges that there is an explanatory dimension to our talk of
reasons as well as a normative dimension. However, he argues that the reason for our
perception of these two different dimensions and the contradictions we encounter when
we talk of them is that there are two distinct categories of reasons: motivating reasons and
normative reasons. According to Smith, ‘The distinctive feature of having a motivating
reason to 4> is that, in virtue of having such a reason, an agent is in a state that is
118explanatory of her 4>-ing.’ By contrast, ‘To say that someone has a normative reason to 
<|> is to say that there is some normative requirement that she 4>’s, and is thus to say that 
her (|)-ing is justified from the perspective of the normative system that generates that 
requirement.’119 Smith stresses that when talking of normative reasons and motivating 
reasons he is not talking about different aspect of the same entities, but about entities of 
their own distinct kinds: ‘whereas motivating reasons are psychological states, normative 
reasons are propositions of the general form, “A ’s (|)-ing is desirable or required.’” 120 
Furthermore, he insists that there is no direct connection between normative reasons and 
motivating reasons: ‘an agent may therefore have a motivating reason to (j) without having 
any normative reason to cj>, and she may have a normative reason to ([> without having any
191motivating reason to <(>.’ It is important to realise just how different Smith’s 
understanding of reasons is from ours. Just as he does, we talk of reasons as possessing 
explanatory and justificatory dimensions, and, o f course, we distinguish between different 
types of reasons; most notably between internal reasons and external reasons. However, 
we deny that external reasons exist, and insist that internal reasons carry the entire weight 
of explanation and justification, while Smith, in his division between motivating and 
normative reasons, has separated these aspects entirely. On his account, not only do 
internal and external reasons both exist, but they exist because they have different jobs to 
do.
Smith takes it that this separation of reasons into distinct categories solves the 
moral problem, because, if he is correct, the three propositions which stand in for our 
moral intuitions refer to different sorts of reasons, and therefore do not come into 
conflict. The intuition that reasons are objective refers to normative reasons. The intuition 
that desires are required to motivate action deals with motivating reasons. And the 
intuition that believed moral propositions motivate concerns the connection between the 
two. If we believe Smith, then it seems that the moral problem wasn’t a problem after all. 
By making this distinction between normative and motivating reasons, Smith removes
117 The Metaethical Problem in Ethics (October 1997), page 56
118 The Moral Problem , page 96
119 The Moral Problem , page 95
120 The Moral Problem , page 96
121 The Moral Problem , page 95
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psychology from questions of justification and limits it to the realm of explanation. So, 
although we must address both types of reason in considering his theory, it is the 
possibility of normative reasons which are not dependent on psychology which presents 
the greatest challenge to our account; these are, of course, external reasons. We must 
explore Smith’s theory a little further to see how he justifies the division of reasons into 
two categories, and how he accounts for normative reasons.
We will consider two of Smith’s arguments for the distinction between normative 
reasons and motivating reasons, one o f which draws on the familiar phenomenon of 
deliberative obstacles, and one of which depends on the claim that values and desires can 
come apart from one another. We have already acknowledged within our own account 
that deliberative obstacles present a difficulty to any straightforward account of practical 
reason, because they create an apparently contradictory situation in which we want to say 
that the agent has a reason to do something, but also that, because the reason is obscured 
by a deliberative obstacle, the agent may fail to take this reason into account but still be 
acting in an entirely rational and justified manner. Smith uses three examples to illustrate 
his understanding of this apparent problem. The first two of these examples are very 
similar to those we used in our own discussion: an agent wishes to buy a Picasso, but 
does not believe that the painting for sale is a Picasso, whereas it actually is; an agent
wants a gin and tonic and believes that the gin bottle contains gin, whereas it actually
122contains petrol. The man who wants a gin and tonic comes, of course, from
1 9TWilliams. ' The third obstacle is rather different, as it implies a moral failing rather than 
a deliberative failing: an agent is standing on my foot but lacks any concern for my well­
being and hence any inclination to get off.124 In each of these cases Smith claims that our 
intuitions tell us that the agent has a reason to act one way (to buy the painting, to avoid 
drinking the petrol, and to get off my foot) but that we could not provide a rational 
explanation if they acted in accordance with those reasons. Despite our intuitions, their 
actions would be unintelligible. Smith’s solution to the problem created by deliberative 
obstacles is to employ his two different categories of reasons. So, the agents in the 
examples have normative reasons to buy the painting, to avoid drinking the gin and to get 
off my foot. At the same time they have motivating reasons for turning down the
1 9Spainting, drinking the petrol and ignoring my suffering.
The second argument of Smith’s which we shall consider attempts to determine 
the nature of normative reasons. However, it resembles the first argument in that it deals 
with a phenomenon which seems to demand some sort of division within reasons if we 
are to account for it, and it explores this phenomenon and its implications through the use 
of examples. This argument attempts to draw a distinction between values and desires. 
Smith justifies this distinction by pointing to our common experience of akrasia 
(weakness of the will, or doing what we want to do rather than what we ought to do) and 
offers four examples borrowed from other writers: a kleptomaniac who steals even 
though he knows that it is wrong, a drug addict who hates his addiction but is enslaved by
122 The Moral Problem , page 94.
123 See ‘Internal and external reasons’, page 102.
1-4 The Moral Problem , page 94.
{2~ O f course, we have our own answer to this problem. In our account all reasons are of the same type, but 
some are obscured from agents by deliberative obstacles, while others are created by the existence of 
those same obstacles.
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it, a woman who is seized by an urge to drown her baby, and a losing sportsman who is 
overwhelmed by a desire to attack his opponent.126 These are all supposedly examples in 
which the agent desires that which he or she does not value. Smith also identifies the 
supposedly opposite phenomenon of valuing without desiring by citing the state of 
‘depression’ in which, ‘the depressive may know full well that the rational thing for to do 
is, for example, to get up and get on with her life: to go to work, to visit a friend, to read a
1 ryrj
book, to cook a meal or whatever,’ but is not motivated to do these things.
Smith draws three conclusions from the phenomena exhibited in these examples. 
First, he claims that values and desires are distinct. Secondly, he claims that values 
inform our normative reasons while desires inform our motivating reasons. And finally, 
and most surprisingly, he claims that values should not be regarded as motivational states 
at all, but rather as beliefs. This final conclusion is surprising because in our everyday 
talk valuing something seems to necessarily involve having a favourable disposition 
towards it: indeed, to deny that values have any motivational content seems at odds with 
our ordinary understanding of the term. However, Smith insists that the examples we 
have just considered, along with many others from our experience, show that desiring and 
valuing cannot be the same thing. Furthermore, if we accept the Humean account of 
motivation then we must also accept that the only entities which figure in motivated 
action are beliefs and desires, and therefore, if  values are not desires then they must be 
beliefs. Smith acknowledges that there is a connection between value and desire, and
claims that this connection is a rational one, saying that, ‘Other things being equal, we
128rationally should desire what we value.’ In other words, if we intuitively feel that value 
has something to do with desire then we are right, because the possession of a value 
demands the possession of a desire. However, because this connection is a rational 
requirement it does not mean that a value is identical to a desire, or that a desire always 
accompanies a value. After all, any account of practical reason must allow that sometimes 
we are not rational.
So far this could be just another argument which attempts to show that external 
reasons exist by deriving such reasons from sources which are disconnected from 
motivations; and it would suffer from the same problems as those arguments because it 
would lack the explanatory dimension needed to connect it to the actual actions o f agents. 
But, of course, this is exactly the sort o f gap which Smith is concerned to bridge, and he 
attempts to do so in the next stage o f his theory, in which he argues that normative 
reasons determine motivating reasons, and that values determine desires. This argument 
has six steps. We have already seen the first o f these: the argument that values are beliefs 
rather than desires. And we have seen hints of the second step, which is to claim that, ‘it 
is a platitude to say that what it is desirable to do is what we would desire to do if we
129were fully rational.’ The third step is to argue that, ‘deliberation can produce new and
1 TOdestroy old underived desires.’ ' The fourth step is to claim that, ‘by far the most 
important way in which we create new and destroy old underived desires is by trying to
126 The Moral Problem , pages 133-134.
127 The Moral Problem , page 135.
128 The Moral Problem , page 148.
129 The Moral Problem , page 150.
130 The Moral Problem , page 95.
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find out whether our desires are systematically justifiable.,131 The fifth step is to argue 
that sets of desires are more systematically justified and rational to the degree to which
1 T?they exhibit unity and coherence. The sixth and final step is to argue that the unity of 
desires is a characteristic of full rationality and that a belief that a desire contributes to the 
unity and therefore rationality of the agent’s set o f desires is capable o f producing that 
desire: ‘For, if the analysis is right -  an evaluative belief is simply a belief about what 
would be desired if we were fully rational, and the new desire is acquired precisely 
because it is believed to be required for us to be rational.’133 So, in even more extreme 
summary, the argument seems to be that full rationality involves having a maximally 
unified and coherent set o f desires, and that the ability of deliberation to both decide what 
this set of desires consists of, and to produce those desires in us, bridges the gap between 
the normative reasons provided by full rationality and the motivating reasons which 
produce action. As far as Smith is concerned, he has not only solved the moral problem 
by showing that the apparent contradiction in our intuitions is produced by confusion 
between normative and motivating reasons, he has also solved the problem of explanation 
by showing how we can act on normative reasons.
There are some aspects of Smith’s argument which seem familiar both from 
ordinary experience and from our own account of internal reasons. We undoubtedly do 
critically assess our desires, and often wish that we desired differently from the way we 
do: the existence of self-help manuals, appetite suppressants and nicotine patches all 
attest to this phenomenon. Similarly, we acknowledge that our desires can be changed by 
deliberation, both through rational means (as when I discover my desire to be based on a 
false belief) and through less rational means (as when I realise that a proposed course of 
action resembles that taken by an admired figure, and this fires my enthusiasm for taking 
it). However, Smith’s argument goes far beyond these familiar experiences and what can 
be allowed within our account. In some respects, Smith presents an argument which 
resembles that of the Kantian conveyor belt: if  we allow that it is better to have some 
desires rather than others, we are immediately challenged to justify our preference for 
those desires, and then our preference for that preference, and so on, until we end up at 
the maximally coherent set of desires possessed by the fully rational agent. Unlike Kant, 
Smith does not offer a formula such as the Categorical Imperative which is capable of 
delivering substantive moral conclusions, but it is clear that his argument would not be 
unfriendly to such a concept. This possibility is further borne out, and the distance of 
Smith’s argument from our everyday experience and our account of internal reasons 
further emphasised, when we realise that he is not talking about a maximally coherent set 
of desires peculiar to a particular agent, but is rather talking about a single coherent set of 
desires which should be possessed by all rational agents: ‘we presuppose that fully 
rational agents would all have the same desires about what is to be done and desired in
, 1 3 4various circumstances.
It is at this point, where it is claimed that rational agents do not just have well 
ordered desires but that they have a common set of desires that it becomes most clear 
that, despite his apparent friendliness to the Humean account of motivation and action,
131 The Moral Problem , page 95.
132 See The Moral Problem , page 159.
133 The Moral Problem , page 160.
134 The Moral Problem, page 175.
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Smith is an external reasons theorist. According to him, the normative reasons possessed 
by an agent are entirely independent of the agent’s actual desires: ‘the claim that an agent 
has a normative reason to <|> is not a claim about her actual desires, but rather a claim
i
about her hypothetical desires.’ It is, of course, possible within our account of internal 
reasons that an agent could achieve these hypothetical desires through sound deliberation 
from his or her starting motivations. But Smith goes further than this: he supposes that 
the agent possesses the normative reasons associated with the common set of desires, 
even if the agent could never apprehend those reasons or acquire those desires, no matter 
how soundly he or she deliberated. In Williams’ terms, Smith insists that there are true 
statements about the existence of reasons for an agent which cannot be falsified by the 
presence or absence of elements of the agent’s subjective motivational set.
The concept of the fully rational agent with the maximally coherent set of desires 
is particularly important because it is required not just by Smith’s argument, but by any 
argument which attempts to derive external reasons from the rational ordering of 
motivations. We may, and shall, dispute some of the detailed steps which Smith takes 
towards this concept, but even if we show his argument to be flawed, the thought may 
remain that motivations should be ordered in some way which is not itself dependent on 
motivations. If such ordering truly is independent of the contingent motivations of 
individual agents then it will inevitably converge on some form of ideal which, if  it 
recognises variations between individuals at all, at most does so on the basis of 
circumstances. The fully rational agent with maximally coherent desires may live on, 
even if not in the context of Smith’s argument.
Like all of the arguments we have discussed so far, Smith’s argument, and the 
more general position which it exemplifies, presents a serious challenge to our account of 
internal reasons because, if correct, such arguments overcome the problem of explanation 
and the disconnection between reasons, motivations and action which trouble other 
external reasons theories. However, I believe that Smith’s argument is not only flawed in 
its own right but also that it reveals general problems with arguments of this type, and our 
response will consequently start by challenging two key distinctions within Smith’s 
argument, before moving on to consider what is wrong with the more general idea that 
our motivations could or should be fully determined by reason.
2.3.2 Challenging the Division Between Value and Desire; Between Normativity and
Motivation
As we have seen, Smith divides value from desire, by arguing that values are
135 The Moral Problem , page 165. We may note with surprise that Smith presents this principle as one 
implied by Williams in ‘Internal and external reasons’, albeit at a point when he is taking issue with 
Williams’ argument. However, I believe that Smith has misinterpreted Williams here. He has taken 
Williams’ allowance that deliberation may produce changes in the agent’s motivational set, and 
therefore that reasons are not derived directly from desires, to be compatible with his view that agents 
can reach a maximally coherent set of desires and full rationality through deliberation. This 
understanding goes wrong in two ways: it fails to acknowledge that, for Williams, the changes produced 
in the agent’s motivational set are still a function of starting motivations; and, more importantly, that 
Williams’ emphasis on indeterminacy means that he would be unlikely to accept the concept o f full 
rationality as a determinate state, and certainly not one that involved the possession of a uniform set o f 
desires.
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beliefs, and divides normativity from explanation, by arguing that there are two distinct 
categories of reasons. These divisions are important to us because they challenge the 
central claim of the internal reasons account: that there are no external reasons. We 
naturally suppose that our values are sources of reasons, and if values are beliefs with no 
necessary connection to the contents of our subjective motivational sets, then reasons 
may exist which are not dependent on those contents. And the point of Smith’s 
distinction between normative reasons and motivating reasons is to show that reasons can 
exist independently of our motivations. However, we can show that we do not need either 
of these divisions.
Smith’s argument for the existence of two distinct categories of reason on the 
revolved around three examples in which agents were separated from reasons which we 
would intuitively ascribe to them in ways resembling the deliberative obstacles we 
discussed earlier at some length: the art buyer, the gin drinker, and the inconsiderate 
person who won’t get off my foot. This argument also depended on the apparent 
confusion in our intuitions about the reasons of the agents in these examples. However, as 
we have already seen through the concept of weakly internal and strongly internal 
reasons, we can explain why apparently contradictory reasons exist while preserving the 
connection between explanation and normativity, without needing to invoke distinct 
categories of reasons. It is important to remember that we are not just arguing about 
terminology here: strongly internal reasons do not equate to motivating reasons as Smith 
understands them, nor do weakly internal reasons equate to normative reasons. The point 
about the distinction we have made is that both types of reasons have both an explanatory 
and a normative dimension, but are distinguished by their degree of accessibility to the 
agent. The difference between our distinction and Smith’s distinction shows that Smith 
misses the significance of the confusion caused by his examples. The confusion we 
experience when we confront these examples does not arise because we find an 
explanation or a justification which are at odds with one another: if that was the case then 
we might not be confused at all. We are confused because we find reasons which have 
both explanatory and normative aspects, yet which clash, and we do not suppose that we 
can resolve this confusion simply by pulling explanation and justification apart. If Smith 
is to be believed then there is no normative dimension to the reasons o f the art buyer who 
walks away from a painting which he does not believe to be a Picasso; all we can offer is 
an explanation. But from the perspective of his ignorance the art buyer’s action is 
perfectly justifiable: he chooses not to buy a painting which he does not want. To say that 
the art buyer’s reason not to buy the painting is not at all normative is to omit an essential 
part of our understanding of the reason, and consequently our intuitions about it.
The person who won’t get off my foot is rather more persistently troublesome, as 
he is evidently not subject to any deliberative obstacle. If he cared about my pain then he 
would have no difficulty in working out that he ought to get off my foot. The problem is, 
of course, that he doesn’t care. So, we cannot account for his actions or our confusion 
about the reasons he has in terms of strongly and weakly internal reasons. However, this 
does not mean that we cannot account for him at all. Indeed, we have two ways o f doing 
so. Firstly, if we allow that reasons are dependent on motivations, and therefore that not 
everyone has the same reasons, we can see that our intuitions about what people have 
reason to do are most likely based on our common experience of what people commonly 
have reason to do, on the basis of a common, but not inevitable, set of human
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motivations. So, most people do care about the pain of others, at least to the extent of not 
causing it obviously and gratuitously, so would have reason to get off my foot. Even 
those few who didn’t care about my pain would care about the disapproval causing pain 
invites, so would still have a reason to get off my foot. So, if we find our intuitions about 
the reasons possessed by the agent confusing in this case, it may simply be that our 
intuitions don’t work in the case of such an odd agent: someone who neither cares about 
the pain of others nor about the approval of society largely escapes our intuitions (but, we 
hope, not our institutions). The second way of dealing with this unusual agent is to point 
out that even though our intuitions may be misleading about what he has reason to do, our 
intuition may be entirely sound in leading us to say that he ought to get off my foot, but 
that this intuition does not have to be expressed in terms of reasons. In other words, we 
do not have to say that the agent is failing to follow a valid reason to say that there is 
something wrong with his failure to get off my foot. We are not limited to judgements of 
reasons, but can say that he is callous, selfish, or even cruel. Taken together, these ways 
o f accounting for our judgements about the man who won’t get off my foot mean that we 
cannot straightforwardly suppose that the specific intuition that he has a reason to get off 
my foot is a reliable indicator that such a reason actually exists; there are other 
possibilities which might confound our intuitions.
So, it seems that, while we can acknowledge that we have some puzzling 
intuitions when presented with examples such as those considered by Smith, we can solve 
these puzzles perfectly well using the existing materials of our account of internal 
reasons: we do not have to do anything so extravagant as to invent separate categories of 
reasons. Our challenge to Smith’s second division, between desires and values, takes a 
similar approach; we can ask whether Smith’s examples of valuing without desiring and 
desiring without valuing really have the consequences he supposes them to. That is, we 
can see whether we can account for the examples he uses without having to suppose that 
values and desires are entirely different orders of entity. The obvious alternative to 
Smith’s argument is to suppose that values are a more settled form of desires, and that we 
are better off describing them both as species of motivation rather than using the 
language of desire. After all, we pointed out right at the beginning of our discussion that 
it is more useful to speak of motivations than of desires. However sincere we are in 
attempting to use ‘desire’ as a general, technical term to distinguish a dispositional set of 
mental entities from propositional entities such as beliefs, it still carries connotations of 
urgency, immediacy and even weakness, to the extent that it can lead us to conclude that 
any mental entity which does not share these characteristics must be a belief. Once we 
see values and desires as differing patterns of motivation then we are able to deal with 
Smith’s examples quite easily. In those cases where we desire something we do not 
value, it simply means that we have an immediate urge which lacks support from any 
more settled or persistent disposition. Sometimes this may be regrettable, especially when 
the urge conflicts with our more settled dispositions, but this does not mean that values 
and desires come apart to the extent that we must suppose that they are different entities.
However, just as with the man who wouldn’t get off my foot, there is a rather 
more persistently troubling case: that o f the state of depression, in which we apparently 
value without desiring. It is tempting to say that sometimes our more settled dispositions 
simply do not manifest themselves as immediate desires, but that would be too glib. If 
someone supposedly possessed a persistent value which never manifested itself in any
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immediate impetus to action, even when the circumstances so coincided with the value as 
to appear to warrant that action, we would rightly wonder whether the agent actually held 
the value at all. However, this very thought indicates the way in which we should deal 
with this example: we should ask whether it represents a conceivable situation at all. 
Remember, Smith is attempting to show that values and desires come apart to the extent 
that we can only make sense of them as distinct types of entities. This means that, for the 
depressive to genuinely hold the value in the absence of desire, he or she must do so 
without that value producing any trace of motivation. As we have seen, Smith imagines 
that, ‘The depressive may know full well what the rational thing for her to do is, for 
example, to get up and get on with her life: to go to work, to visit a friend, to read a book, 
to cook a meal, or whatever. But the effect o f her depression may be precisely to remove 
any desire at all that she has to do any of those things.’136 Smith needs that ‘at all’ to 
close down the question of whether values could be a form of desires, but it is that ‘at all’ 
which renders his argument implausible. For we are not just being asked to imagine a 
depressive state in which the agent is experiencing some sort of affective cloud which 
masks her desires, or even that her desires are weakened beyond the point where they can 
overcome the most basic level of inertia. We are being asked to imagine that the agent 
has no desires at all which could be satisfied by going to work, cooking a meal and so on. 
Indeed, rather than constituting a recognisable situation which any theory of motivation 
and reason must account for, this example seems to constitute a bizarre artefact of 
Smith’s theory. It seems far more plausible to say that the agent is in an unfortunate 
motivational state in which the affective impact of depression puts the more immediate 
desires that would move her to action out of joint with the more settled motivations that 
constitute her values.
In passing, we should also note that Smith’s attempt to split values from desires 
and normativity from motivation undermines his original intention to reconcile the 
Humean account of motivation and action with an account of objective reasons. Although 
Smith claims to have achieved this, I do not think that he acknowledges quite how far he 
has departed from Hume’s theory. The Humean aspect of his theory has been reduced to 
a mechanistic explanation of how desires produce action, with this mechanism being 
dominated by a rational ordering of desires. O f course, it is not a legitimate criticism on 
its own to say that Smith has departed from the work of a writer he claims to endorse, and 
which we happen to endorse as well. We should be guided by the truth rather than by 
blind faithfulness to a particular writer or a particular theory. However, in departing from 
Hume, Smith has abandoned some of the most attractive aspects of his theories, including 
the possibility of explanation which drew him to Hume in the first place. In particular, 
Smith has accepted the thoroughly anti-Humean claim that beliefs alone can produce 
desires. It may seem odd to describe this claim as anti-Humean; after all, Hume’s account 
allows that passions can be destroyed by reason, when reason detects that those passions 
are founded on false beliefs, and our own Humean account o f internal reasons allows that 
motivations can be modified by deliberation. However, neither we nor Hume allow that 
such effects can be produced by reason alone; within our account, the impact of 
deliberation on motivations occurs because it transmits the influence of motivations 
which already exist. So, if I follow food fads in the popular press, I may change my 
attitude towards drinking a glass of wine a day from approval to disapproval, but this is
136 The Moral Problem , page 135.
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only because I care about my health, or losing weight, or whatever effect drinking or 
abstaining is supposed to produce. If I don’t care about these things then my attitude is 
not affected. By adopting a position in which desires are produced by deliberation purely 
on the basis of values, where values are understood to be beliefs without any motivational 
content, Smith simply moves the mystery of explanation one step further out. We may be 
able to explain actions by reference to desires, but we are still puzzled about how the 
beliefs which Smith supposes to constitute values could bring these desires about.
2.3.3 Challenging the Demand fo r  Motivations to be Rationally Ordered
It is important to show that the distinctions between normative and motivating 
reasons and between values and desires on which Smith builds much of his argument are 
mistaken as, if  they were correct, they would have serious consequences for our account 
of internal reasons. However, we cannot take ourselves to have disposed of Smith’s 
argument and arguments of its type simply by dealing with those distinctions; the main 
challenge to our account of internal reasons arising from such arguments is the claim that 
motivations can and should be ordered by reason, and this claim could be made on 
grounds other than those used by Smith. We shall deal with this challenge by pointing out 
the consequences of supposing that our motivations are as subject to rational ordering as 
Smith, or anyone who wishes to derive external reasons from rational constraints on 
motivations, must suppose them to be, and by showing that these consequences are at 
odds with our understanding and experience of our reasons, our motivations and even our 
identities. For it is important to realise how strong the implications of the position which 
Smith represents are; such positions do not simply allow, as Hume does, that under 
certain restricted circumstances our motivations may be unreasonable, or, as allowed by 
Williams and our internal reasons account, that deliberation may influence and direct 
motivations. Rather, they imply that motivations should be fully determined by reason. 
The extremity of such positions is illustrated by the figure of the fully rational agent with 
the maximally ordered set of motivations. The significance of this figure is that, if we 
were fully rational, we would have motivations like those of the fully rational agent; that 
is, we would all have the same set of desires. And, as well as clashing with our earlier 
thought that the contingency and indeterminacy of our reasons is, in large part, 
constitutive of our freedom, this idea contradicts our experience and understanding of 
motivations and reasons in three main ways.
Firstly, it implies that irrationality is endemic. According to Smith we are rational 
insofar as we possess and act on a set of desires which can be systematically justified; the 
same set of desires as that possessed by the fully rational agent. According to Smith’s 
account, fully rational agents are those agents which have maximally coherent desires 
and, as we have seen, he argues that there is only one such set of desires. Fully rational 
agents will therefore all have the same desires. Yet the diversity of human desires is a 
familiar feature of everyday life; although we expect that many desires are shared, and 
that many objects of judgement will generate motivational consensus, we also expect 
that, at least in matters of detail, desires will differ from agent to agent. I do not expect, 
for example, that anyone should feel the same way about my family as I do, not just 
because they are not in the same circumstances as me, but because they are unique 
individuals who would feel differently even in the same circumstances. More to the point,
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because they are unique individuals, I do not even expect that they will feel the same way 
about their family as I do about my family. This means that, on Smith’s account, we are 
less than fully rational; and, considering the wide variations in desires which exist, a very 
long way from fully rational. This is not logically impossible: we could theoretically all 
be irrational, just as we could all theoretically be moral failures. Indeed, it would not be 
implausible to claim that we all routinely exhibit some symptoms of irrationality to 
greater or lesser degrees some of the time. However, I think that our common 
understanding of rationality is that most of us are mostly rational most of the time, and, 
indeed, that the complex and ordered societies in which we live would not exist as they
1 37do if this were not the case. Smith’s theory does not imply that we experience 
occasional lapses o f rationality but rather that, if  we persist in desiring in all our various 
and chaotic ways, we are constitutionally irrational. Furthermore, we not only expect that 
people have different desires, but regard it as a positive aspect of human existence; for 
many of us, the idea that we desire differently is an expression of the values of diversity 
and individuality, and the idea that we should not desire differently stands in opposition 
to these values. We may express these values in many different ways, including 
passionate defences o f individualism, lofty ambitions for tolerance, or even through 
cliched sayings such as, ‘It takes all sorts to make a world.’ The point is that we value 
difference as well as expecting it, to the extent that the prospect of a world in which 
everyone shared the same set of desires sounds more like satire or bad science fiction 
than an image of rational harmony.
The value that we place on the difference between individuals brings us to the 
second problem with Smith’s claim that we should all be like the fully rational agent with 
the maximally coherent set o f desires: as well as contradicting our experience and values 
concerning others, it violates our understanding of our own identities. Smith argues that 
the contingent desires which we happen to have are incidental to the desires which we 
ought to have, and that those contingent desires should therefore be considered part of our 
circumstances rather than part of us: he says that, ‘what we have reason to do is relevant 
to our circumstances, where our circumstances may include aspects of our own
138psychology.’ In an example considering why one agent might have reason to visit a 
wine bar rather than a pub, he also says that, ‘the crucial point in this case is that a 
relevant feature of your circumstances is your preference for wine, whereas a relevant 
feature of my circumstances is my preference for beer. That this is a relevant feature of 
our circumstances is manifest from the fact that I can quite happily agree with you that if 
I were in your circumstances -  if I preferred wine to beer -  then the fact that the local 
wine bar sells very good wine would constitute a reason for me to go there as well, just as 
it constitutes a reason for you.’1'19 Of course, it is possible to play the game of pretending 
to have the desires of others; but only up to a point. For those desires which do not matter 
very much to me, it is indeed possible for me to imagine what I would be like if those 
desires were different, or if I did not possess them at all. But we do not have to go very
137 O f course, this qualification that our complex, ordered societies would not exist as they do is an
important one. Complex and ordered social entities can exist without rationality: beehives and ant-hills
provide two obvious examples. But these societies do not exist as human societies do: the members of 
such entities are closer to mechanical components than active, rational participants.
138 The Moral Problem , pages 170.
139 The Moral Problem , pages 170-171.
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far to discover those desires which matter a very great deal to me, and which, if  I lost or 
modified them, would constitute a significant upheaval in my identity. If someone else 
imagines what it would be like to possess those desires, it seems most natural to say that 
he or she is not imagining what it would be like to be in my circumstances, but is rather 
imagining what it would be like to be me. It is worth noting in passing that this tendency 
to regard our desires as somehow incidental to our identities is common to the external 
reasons theorists we have considered, from Kant’s treatment of desires as ‘alien 
causes’140to Korsgaard’s claim that, ‘Hume has no resources for distinguishing the 
activity of the person herself from the operation of belief, desires, and other forces in 
herd141 In Hume’s account and in our account of internal reasons we do not make this 
distinction because we recognise, in accordance with our everyday experience, that 
desires constitute part o f the agent’s identity.
The final problem with the argument that we should all possess the maximally 
coherent and systematically justified set of desires to be considered rational, is that we 
routinely judge ourselves and others to be rational while accepting the existence of 
desires within an agent which contradict one another, and which would therefore be 
considered less than fully coherent or systematically justified on Smith’s account. In our 
ordinary use of the term, the mere possession of contradictory desires by an agent is not 
enough to justify a judgement that the agent is irrational. Indeed, we may consider that it 
is an essential part of deliberation to find a way to the practical conclusions which are 
best capable o f satisfying a contradictory set of desires. For example, consider the 
prudent saver who wishes to ensure that he has enough money for his retirement and who 
finds the prospect o f investments which combine a high rate of risk with a high rate of 
return both frightening and attractive. Or consider the writer who yearns to see the piece 
that she is working on finally finished, yet hates the process of writing and is continually 
tempted by distractions. Or, finally, simply consider the mixture of fear and delight with 
which someone contemplates a rollercoaster ride. The point of these examples is not just 
that the agents experience a mix o f contrasting desires; it is that there is no obvious way 
in which deliberation could reach a conclusion which could quell one or the other o f these 
desires, and, furthermore, we do not typically demand or expect such a conclusion from 
deliberation. The saver cannot eliminate the risk associated with his investment, so must 
take a judgement which accommodates his conflicting desires as much as it anticipates 
the future. The writer knows that she has to overcome her temptation to procrastinate and 
get on with her work, but this does not mean that the temptation is irrational or that it 
goes away. And to suggest that the rollercoaster rider should reach a choice between fear 
and anticipation is to miss the point of rollercoasters. It could be claimed that Smith’s 
argument could accommodate such examples. After all, it concerns the requirement for 
coherence rather than examples of what counts as coherence. So, it might be that the fear 
and anticipation felt in the queue for a rollercoaster are part of a maximally coherent set 
of desires, which includes the desire for having the best possible time on a rollercoaster. 
However, it is difficult to see that this allowance could be pushed too far before the 
requirement for maximal coherence becomes meaningless. One suspects that Smith’s 
fully rational agent would not find him or herself in the queue for a rollercoaster at all.
At this point we should note that, in the course of defending his position from a
140 Groundwork, 4:446.
141 ‘The Normativity of Instrumental Reason’ in Ethics and Practical Reason, page 233.
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variety of challenges, Smith has claimed that the degree of uniformity in the desires of 
fully rational agents demanded by his theory is not as great as it might initially appear. He 
says that, ‘the convergence required is very circumscribed. There is no suggestion that 
fully rational people will all have the same tastes in food, and clothes and basketball 
teams. On the contrary, they will presumably be at least as culturally and individually 
diverse as human beings throughout history have been.’142 It is not clear whether Smith 
has modified his view of the desires of the fully rational agent in response to challenges, 
or whether he is simply making explicit claims which were implicit in the earlier 
argument. However, whatever the reason for these further claims, I do not think that they 
make the claim that we should be like the fully rational agent with the maximally unified 
and coherent set of desires any more plausible, attractive or recognisable. Smith, of 
course, cannot allow that we have just any variations in our desires; to do so would be to 
undermine his entire argument. So, he allows that fully rational agents can possess 
varying desires, ‘only if fully rational creatures regard it as permissible for people to have 
and to act on such desires, that is, only if they are at least indifferent to people having 
such desires, and in favour of their acting on them once they have them.’143 In other 
words, within the desires of the fully rational agent there are some which must be 
common to all such agents, but there are others which can be allowed to vary without 
disrupting full rationality.
The problem with this view is that it attempts to deal with the inescapable fact that 
agents which we would normally judge rational nevertheless exhibit wide variations in 
their desires by marginalizing those desires; variant but rational desires are placed in a 
category which is not significant to the overall unity and coherence of the agent’s desires 
and which therefore, it is implied, can safely be considered part of the agent’s 
circumstances rather than part of his or her identity. Smith says, ‘Characterise a choice 
situation in its entirety - ‘What would we desire ourselves to do in a situation in which the 
external circumstances are thus and such (list them completely) and we have these and 
those desires and beliefs and other mental states (list them completely)?’ -  and, I say, 
fully rational creatures will all converge on a desire that the very same course of action be 
pursued.’144 However, those desires in which we most conspicuously vary are not 
equivalent to our tastes in food, clothes and basketball teams, and cannot be so easily 
marginalized or treated as part of our circumstances. Those desires which most 
characterise us as individuals are those manifested in our relationships with other people; 
not just our likes, but our loves and loyalties. Such strong desires and the undeniable 
variations in their manifestation in different agents do not fit Smith’s model in either its 
original or its revised version; Smith seems committed to either denying that such desires 
matter, when they plainly do, or insisting that they must be uniform in all rational agents, 
when they plainly aren’t. And it seems inevitable that anyone who follows Smith by 
arguing that our desires should be fully determined by reason will end up in such a 
position; at some point any such theory must attempt to mark out and defend a set of 
motivations which we must all possess to be considered rational, and such an assumption 
of uniformity will always be subject to the charge that it is not what we demand or expect 
of rational agents, unless the set of motivations upon which they insist is so minimal as to
142 ‘In Defense of The Moral Problem’, page 89.
143 ‘In Defense o f The Moral Problem’, page 89.
144 ‘In Defense of The Moral Problem’, page 89.
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2.4 Summary: Answering the Challenge from Reason
As we said at the outset o f this part of our discussion, we have not considered all 
possible external reasons theories. However, I hope that we have not only shown that our 
internal reasons account can resist challenges from a particularly important set o f external 
reasons theories, but have also indicated some general problems with this group of 
theories. Two general problems correspond to the common intuitions about reasons we 
introduced at the beginning of our discussion: the individualistic intuition and the 
universalistic intuition.
The first general problem within the theories we have discussed is that they seem 
to have no prospect of satisfying the individualistic intuition. As we have seen, at some 
point each of these theories supposes that the same reasons apply to all o f us, and that the 
possession of particular reasons by particular agents is determined by the circumstances 
in which they find themselves rather than who they are. Furthermore, in order to deal 
with the unavoidable variation we experience in the reasons which we ascribe to 
ourselves and to others, they tend to treat aspects of our personalities and lives which we 
regard as fundamental to our identities as part of our circumstances, thus contradicting 
not only our individualistic intuition about reasons, but also our informal intuitions about 
the nature of human identity. The implication of such theories is not only that external 
reasons exist in the sense that they are defined in our internal reasons account, but that all 
reasons are to some extent external to us, in the sense that they are determined 
independently of who we are, and that it is our duty to find out which of them apply to us 
and to act accordingly. If these theories are correct then agents are not unique individuals 
with reasons which reflect that uniqueness but interchangeable units who could be slotted 
into the circumstances of one another’s lives without noticing. The individualistic 
intuition about reasons indicates that we think we are more than that, and that anyone 
who insists we are not would need to offer rather more justification than we have seen in 
the work of our external reasons theorists.
The second general problem is that the external reasons theorists we have 
considered seem to be subject to a particularly strong version of the universalistic 
intuition; much stronger than we find in our everyday experience of reasons, to the extent 
that their theories all come to rest on a particular unsubstantiated assumption: that reasons 
must be universal. This assumption leads to theories such as those we have seen, in which 
it is supposed that the way to find out how we should act is to find the foundations which 
underpin universal reasons, whether those are inescapable aspects of identity, our 
autonomous rational natures, or maximally coherent set of motivations, and to proceed to 
discover or test individual reasons for actions in the context of these foundations. Yet, 
despite our universalistic intuition about reasons, we have been given no justification for 
supposing that reason must be universal to this degree, or that our actions require such 
foundations. We must remember that the universalistic intuition is only an intuition that 
our reasons, despite their proximity to our individual nature and circumstances, are 
nevertheless subject to some form of external judgement. The assumption that all reasons 
must be universal to the extent that they rest on foundations which transcend our 
individual nature goes so far beyond this intuition that the reasons it leads to and the 
various means by which those reasons are discovered and justified are barely 
recognisable from the perspective of our ordinary understanding of reasons.
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However, we must also remember that the universalistic intuition still remains 
only partially satisfied by our account of internal reasons. Fortunately, although we have 
rejected each of the external reasons theories we have considered, they are still of some 
value to us in solving this problem. They remain eloquent, if extreme, expressions of the 
universalistic intuition, and I believe that an attempt to diagnose why people hold 
external reasons theories and go to so much trouble to defend them, as well as why 
people make what sound like external reason statements in everyday talk, will help us to 
understand the common motivations underlying the universalistic intuition, and to see 
how they could be satisfied within the terms of our account.
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3. Being Reasonable
3.1 What We Want from Reasons
So, we will now attempt to diagnose the motivations, attitudes and assumptions 
which underlie the universalistic intuition, both as it is expressed in the work of external 
reasons theorists, and as it is expressed in everyday talk of reasons. In doing so we are, of 
course, operating entirely within the bounds of our account of internal reasons. That 
account insists that reasons are dependent on the contents of our subjective motivational 
sets, so an understanding of the motivations of those people who argue for external 
reasons theories or who make apparent external reasons statements should help us to 
understand their reasons for doing what they do; assuming, of course, that they are acting 
for reasons. I also hope that this understanding of what we want out o f reasons when we 
give voice to the universalistic intuition will give us some idea of how to better satisfy 
this intuition within out internal reasons account.
3.1.1 What External Reasons Theorists Want from Reasons
The most obvious attitude towards reasons within the work of our external 
reasons theorists is an aversion to contingency and arbitrariness. It is present throughout 
their theories as they quest for objectivity and the universal foundations of reasons, and is 
explicitly expressed by Kant when he says that, ‘Everyone must grant that a law, if it is to 
hold morally, that is, as a ground of obligation, must carry with it absolute necessity,’145 
Korsgaard expresses a similar thought when she argues from the claim that ‘Unless 
something attaches normativity to our ends, there can be no requirement to take the 
means to them,’146 to the conclusion that ‘There must be unconditional reasons for having 
certain ends, and, it seems, unconditional principles from which those ends are 
derived.’147 Smith explicitly identifies arbitrariness as anathema to normativity: ‘the only 
decisive point we can make about normativity is that arbitrariness, as such, always
148undermines normativity.’ In comparing his own position to that of Kant at the start of 
The Possibility o f  Altruism , Nagel notes that although his theory and Kant’s theory 
contain different claims about the self-conceptions which we necessarily hold, they are 
united by the idea that these self-conceptions are necessary. He goes on to say that, 
‘different as they are, both are thought to be conceptions which we cannot escape and are 
thought to provide that basis for ethical motivation which in other internalist theories is 
provided by various motives and desires. Because of the alleged inescapability of these 
conceptions, a view of the Kantian type entails that we are not really free to be amoral, or 
insusceptible to moral claims. That is what makes us men.’149 As we have seen, the 
aversion to contingency and arbitrariness underlies the work of external reasons theorists 
to the extent that they do not set out in their enquiries to discover the nature of reasons 
and their origins whatever they may be; they set out with the hope and expectation that
145 Groundwork, 4:389.
146 ‘The Normativity of Instrumental Reason’, page 251.
147 ‘The Normativity of Instrumental Reason’, page 252.
148 ‘In Defense of The Moral Problem’, page 90.
149 The Possibility o f  Altruism, page 14.
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reasons must be objective and universal, and that therefore their origins must lie in the 
unconditioned and the inescapable. Where our writers look for the basis of reasons tells 
us as much about their underlying motivations as the ways in which they look. Once 
again, this is evident from Nagel: ‘It will in any case not do to rest the motivational 
influence of ethical considerations on fortuitous or escapable inclinations. Their hold on 
us must be deep, and it must be essentially tied to the ethical principles themselves, and 
to the conditions of their truth. The alternative is to abandon the objectivity of ethics.’150
That somewhat unfortunately phrased claim in one of our quotations from Nagel 
(‘That is what makes us men.’) also expresses the second desire concerning reasons 
which we can detect within the work of external reasons theorists. It is strongly related to 
the aversion to contingency, but is rather directed towards one of the sources of 
contingency within Humean theories o f action, and within our account o f internal 
reasons: motivations. There has long been a tension within philosophy between theories 
which give primacy to motivations and those which give primacy to reason,151 with 
proponents of the latter type of theory, including, of course, our external reasons 
theorists, evidently fearful that giving any ground to motivations other than that required 
for the mechanical explanation of action is to surrender our rational nature at best to 
grubby selfishness, and at worst to mere animalistic reflex: these seem to be the 
alternatives if we do not heed the call o f ‘what makes us men.’ In our discussion of their 
theories we concentrated on the positive arguments of our theorists for sources of reasons 
which are independent of desires, but they often spend nearly as much time attempting to 
show that desires could not only never be adequate sources o f reasons, but that they get in 
the way of the reasons which we do have. We have already seen an example o f this in 
Smith’s argument for the ways in which values and beliefs come apart, and can see it 
again in examples of obstructive desires used by Korsgaard: ‘You want to see the movie 
but you are too idle to go into town; you want to go out with him but you are too shy to 
call and ask him for a date; you want to work but depression holds you in its smothering 
embrace.’ While we can see that idleness, shyness and depression are all regrettable, 
Korsgaard wants to go further than this: she wants to show that these particular 
motivations fail to give us reasons, that they obstruct legitimate reasons and, furthermore, 
that they show us how unsuitable motivations are for determining reasons at all. The 
desire for reasons to rise above the supposedly tawdry concerns of motivation is further 
shown by Nagel who, when arguing for altruism, takes his opponent to be egoism, which 
apparently, ‘holds that each individual’s reasons for acting and possible motivations for 
acting, must arise from his own interests and desires, however those interests may be 
defined.’15 If those interests are understood broadly enough then this is a crude 
description of our own position, as it is of anybody whose argument is roughly Humean: 
but few of these positions could be properly described as egoistical. For Nagel, it seems 
that egoism is all that you can end up with once you allow that desires can produce 
reasons.
The third motivation which we can detect in the work of external reasons theorists
150 The Possibility o f  Altruism, page 6.
151 For a lively and recent discussion of this conflict, see the section ‘Dionysus and Apollo’ in Simon 
Blackburn’s Ruling Passions, especially pages 88-89.
152 ‘The Normativity of Instrumental Reason’, page 229.
153 The Possibility o f  Altruism, page 84.
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is the hope that, as reasons are not contingent or dependent on anything as base as 
motivations, they constitute inescapable moral obligations. This hope is most clearly 
expressed by Korsgaard when she says that, ‘Reason has the power to compel obedience, 
and to punish us for disobedience. It in turn is bound to govern us by laws that are good. 
Together these facts yield the conclusion that the relation of the thinking self to the acting 
self is the relation of legitimate authority.’154 This hope also has a counterpart: the fear 
that if reasons are not obligations then anything goes. We are all somehow free from 
moral and rational judgements, or worse, we are left without any direction whatsoever. 
Korsgaard again expresses this fear when she considers whether someone who did not 
accept any rational normative authority would therefore be obliged by consistency to 
commit suicide, and concludes that, ‘There is nothing the normative sceptic has to do.
But it is worth remembering what an extreme position practical normative scepticism is. 
The normative sceptic has no reason for doing anything.’155 It is dangerous to ascribe 
specific desires on the evidence of theory, and the external reasons theorists could claim 
that in discovering the obligations imposed by reasons they are simply following the 
course of their enquiries. But there is an evident relief in their writing, especially that o f 
Korsgaard, when they reach the conclusion that our lives are governed by reasons which 
have the force of law; not only are we unable to escape our obligations, but we can go on 
living after all.
The fourth set o f motivations apparent in the work of external reasons theorists 
could be described as a desire for intelligibility, but a special sort of intelligibility that 
goes beyond our normal understanding of the word. We might normally expect that 
reasons are intelligible when we can understand them though a sufficient acquaintance 
with the nature and circumstances of the agent. However, external reasons theorists want 
an intelligibility that does not rest on such contingent aspects of the world. This is most 
clearly expressed in the work of Kant. It is no accident that, when making his case for the 
autonomy of rational beings, he claims that each agent, ‘has two standpoints from which 
he can regard himself and cognise laws for the use of his powers and consequently for all 
his actions; first, insofar as he belongs to the world of sense, under laws of nature 
(heteronomy); second, as belonging to the intelligible world, under laws which, being 
independent of nature, are not empirical but grounded merely in reason.’156 In other 
words, for Kant, if reasons rest on those aspects of the world to which we would normally 
look for explanation but which have no further rational justification, then they are not, in 
his terms, intelligible. We can always ask why a contingent aspect of the world provides a 
reason, and will never find an answer that satisfies Kant. Of course, we have shown that 
we do not need to even begin to ask Kant’s question, and that we can ordinarily consider 
reasons to be justified and intelligible on the basis of considerations for which we neither 
have nor require further justification. However, this observation is likely to do little to 
quell the desire for a particularly uncompromising form of intelligibility within Kant and 
his followers.
The final set of motivations found within the work of our external reasons 
theorists may seem rather less transcendent and rather more pragmatic; it is the hope that 
reflection can come to an end and issue in conclusions. However, just as with the desire
154 The Sources o f  Normativity, page 165.
155 The Sources o f  Normativity, page 163.
156 Groundwork, 4:454.
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for intelligibility, this hope seems to take a particular form for external reasons theorists; 
they do not want deliberation to reach conclusions which are merely satisfactory, they 
want deliberation to reach conclusions which are perfect, in the sense that they are the 
only possible conclusions which could be reached if  the agent was deliberating correctly. 
The expression of this hope sometimes seems to be tinged with a little desperation; some 
of the external reasons theories we have considered allow reason to operate unchecked in 
its most destructive mode. The hope for conclusions is the hope that once unfettered 
reason has swept away all other possible foundations, there will be something left. The 
tension between the consequences of radical reflection and the need for conclusions is 
expressed by Korsgaard when she says:
I desire and I find myself with a powerful impulse to act. But I back up and bring that 
impulse into view and then I have a certain distance. Now the impulse doesn’t 
dominate me and I have a problem. Shall I act? Is this desire really a reason to act? 
The reflective mind cannot settle for perception and desire, not just as such. It needs 
a reason. Otherwise, as long as it reflects, it cannot commit itself or go forward.157
In other words, we must reflect, otherwise we do not have a reason, but that 
reflection must reach a conclusion, otherwise we do not have a reason either. This need to 
find some basis for action in the face of radical reflection is further expressed by 
Korsgaard when she says that moral scepticism, ‘is the view that the problems which 
reflection sets for us are insoluble, that the questions to which it gives rise have no 
answers. It is the worry that nothing will count as reflective success, and so the work of 
reflection will never be done. It is the fear that we cannot find what Kant called “the 
unconditioned.”158 Korsgaard here takes herself to be diagnosing the condition of the 
sceptic about practical reason, but I think that she is also coming as close as anybody 
does to explicitly expressing one of the powerful combinations of belief and desires 
which drives external reasons theorists: the thought that reason can undermine all those 
things we ordinarily think of as justifications for action, and the hope that we can 
nevertheless find foundations somewhere.
Furthermore, the writers we have considered seem to want not only that 
deliberation can come to a conclusion, but that the process of coming to this conclusion 
can produce agreement among agents. This hope is most explicitly articulated by Michael 
Smith when he sets out what he takes to be the platitudes of objectivity:
‘When A says that 4>-ing is right, and B says that 4»-ing is not right, then at most one 
of A and B is correct’; ‘Whether or not c|)-ing is right can be discovered by engaging 
in rational argument’; ‘Provided A and B are open-minded and thinking clearly, an 
argument between A and B about the rightness or wrongness of (|)-ing should result in 
A and B coming to some agreement on the matter’; ‘The rightness of someone’s (()- 
ing is determined by the circumstances in which that person acts, circumstances that 
might be faced by another. ’159
157 The Sources o f  Normativity, page 93.
158 The Sources o f  Normativity, page 94.
159 The Moral Problem, page 39-40.
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Smith’s concern in The Moral Problem is to reconcile the apparent contradictions 
in our common intuitions about morality, and by the end of the book he takes himself to 
have achieved this: ‘in conjunction with some plausible assumptions about the potential 
that moral argument has to bring about agreement, the analysis also allows us to think 
that our moral talk is in fact legitimate. For it is plausible to suppose that through moral 
argument we can in fact discover what the reasons that we all share really are.’160 There is 
evidently a desire here for moral talk to be legitimate, and for this legitimacy to be 
expressed by the potential for deliberation, in this case public argument, to produce 
agreement. Of course, for external reasons theorists the agreement produced by shared 
deliberation should be a particular type of agreement: not arbitrary consensus but the joint 
recognition of reasons that exist independently of agents and their deliberations.
Kant expresses a similar desire when he claims that, ‘There is no one -  not even 
the most hardened scoundrel, if only he is otherwise accustomed to use reason -  who, 
when one sets before him examples of honesty of purpose, of steadfastness in following 
good maxims, o f sympathy and general benevolence (even combined with great sacrifices 
of advantage and comfort), does not wish that he might also be so disposed,’161 We must 
remind ourselves once again that we are not directly concerned with the truth of Kant’s 
claims but with his underlying motivations. However, we should note that this is one of 
Kant’s claims which is most clearly false: even if we had not argued for the existence of 
the sensible knave it is simply implausible that examples of honesty, steadfastness, 
sympathy and benevolence will produce yearnings in the heart of every hardened 
scoundrel. His espousal of this obviously false claim is therefore a powerful illustration 
of his hope for the transforming power of reason. We should also note that Kant’s theory 
does not even rely on reason having this power; it would be entirely compatible with his 
theory for all o f us to be scoundrels who ignore the call o f reason. Yet he continues to 
hope; a hope that reaches its culmination in the ideal image of a Kingdom of Ends which 
is far from any kingdom we are likely to encounter in this world.
In some ways, the motivations, attitudes and assumptions regarding reasons we 
have found within the work of external reasons theorists resemble those which we might 
find in anybody concerned with finding reasons for action: an aversion to arbitrariness; a 
hope that reasoning will produce conclusions and agreement; and a desire for reasons and 
deliberation which are intelligible. However, as we have seen, what is given voice in the 
arguments of external reason theorists is rather different from that which we might expect 
to find in our everyday talk of reasons. We can characterise this difference by observing 
that all o f the attitudes, assumptions and motivations concerning reasons displayed by 
external reasons theorists shows that they want above all out of reasons is that they are 
absolute; at the risk of overstating the case, they want reasons which are immune to 
historical contingency, which are inscribed on eternity, in much the same way that some 
religious people believe that the words of holy books such as the Qu’ran and the Torah 
existed before they were transcribed by humans: prior, unchanging and inescapable. They 
want to be assured that in any given situation for any agent there is a correct course of 
action, that the agent cannot avoid the reason to pursue this course of action, and that if 
the agent could only apprehend and follow this reason then he or she would be 
guaranteed of acting correctly and with justification. Such certainty dispels arbitrariness
160 The Moral Problem , page 202.
161 Groundwork, 4:454.
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because it ensures that reasons are only derived from those considerations capable of 
providing absolute justification; it guarantees intelligibility not necessarily because 
individual agents can follow deliberative paths to the correct reasons, but because correct 
deliberation necessarily leads to these reasons, even if it is beyond the power of a 
particular agent to follow; and it produces conclusions and agreement because, once the 
correct reasons have been apprehended and accepted, there is nothing more to say 
without courting irrationality. But, despite our universalistic intuition, I do not believe 
that the rest of us want or seek this level of certainty from our reasons. To see this, let us 
explore the motivations, assumptions and attitudes we express in our everyday talk of 
reasons, particularly when we say things that sound like external reasons statements.
3.1.2 What We Usually Want from Reasons
In our everyday talk of reasons we say things such as, ‘Of course you’ve got a 
reason to do it,’ or, ‘This is the only rational thing to do,’ or, ‘Don’t be stupid, you’ve got 
no reason to act like that.’ Even though in making such statements we do not make any 
formal claims about the dependence of reasons on motivations, we often pay little 
attention to the agent’s motivations in making them; our talk often implies that assertion 
of the existence of a reason should persuade agents and silence objections.162 We are 
making statements that sound like external reasons statements. Of course, within our 
account of internal reasons we allow both that such statements may be bluff and that 
agents often should be persuaded by assertions and demonstrations o f reasons because 
those assertions and demonstrations clear away deliberative obstacles to reveal reasons 
that were previously obscure. However, we must also acknowledge that people making 
such statement often want more out of them than the elimination of deliberative 
obstacles: they want, in accordance with the universalistic intuition, that the subjects of 
their statements should fall in line with their judgements about reasons. We must attempt 
to determine whether the universalistic intuition has the same force in people making 
such statements as it apparently does in external reasons theories by asking whether they 
are underpinned by the same motivations, attitudes and assumptions.
It may seem difficult to find motivations such as an aversion to contingency and 
arbitrariness within everyday talk of reasons, as the nature of reasons is not a topic which 
we discuss every day. However, such evidence can be found, especially if we make life 
easy for ourselves by considering exceptional cases such as novel moral dilemmas. Novel 
moral dilemmas are those which we have not encountered before, and in which, although 
we feel that we ought to have strong, definite views, we are left somewhat at sea. 
Examples include questions such as how the reservations of wealthy citizens of the 
industrialised world regarding genetically modified crops should influence the potential 
use of this technology to feed millions of people in absolute poverty. It is in grappling 
with this sort of question that we feel the desire for a secure basis for reasons most
162 O f course, these are not the only things we say about reasons. In accordance with the individualistic 
intuition we expect that the right reasons for an agent will be specific to him or her. When asked to offer 
advice about reasons, we often try to find out what it is that the agent wants. However, we are primarily 
concerned here with the everyday statements we make that approximate to external reasons statements 
and which express the universalistic intuition, not those that approximate to internal reasons statements 
and express the individualistic intuition.
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strongly: our thoughts and feelings regarding such matters are often barely formed, to the 
extent that we are not quite sure what we think, or whether the various arguments that we 
tentatively offer are really engaging with the problem at all. So, I may be confident in my 
views about the ownership of genetic patents and the exploitation of farmers, while still 
being entirely uncertain of how to compare the risks of genetic modification against the 
lives of those who could be helped; or even how to regard the whole practice o f genetic 
modification. In such circumstances I may desire a secure basis for reasons not just to 
settle the question but to ease my embarrassment in not even knowing what my view is. I 
certainly do not feel that such questions can be settled by invoking arbitrary 
considerations: any considerations that I bring to bear in deliberating about such 
questions need to be justified themselves. Consequently, at least in such circumstances, I 
exhibit an aversion to arbitrariness.
However, this aversion is not quite the same as that which we found within the 
work of external reasons theorists. That aversion led to the pursuit of that which is not 
only not arbitrary, but also that which is not contingent in any way: the unconditioned.
By contrast, our everyday aversion to arbitrariness in deliberation and the discovery of 
reasons is simply that: a rejection of those considerations which appear to have no 
bearing on the matter at hand. This rejection of what is purely arbitrary does not prevent 
us from accepting that which is merely contingent, such as the influence o f motivations. 
Indeed, if we consider novel moral dilemmas once again, we can see that part of the 
problem they present, and of the source of our unease when we face them, is that we don't 
know what we feel about them as well as not knowing what we believe about them. Even 
in more mundane situations we can readily see how we not only allow but expect that 
factors peculiar to individuals determine reasons. If someone asks our advice on 
questions such as where to go on holiday, or what sort of job to look for, or where to buy 
a house, we are likely to ask questions about his or her preferences and circumstances, 
and to tailor our advice about what to do - the statements we make about the reasons we 
think he or she has for action - accordingly. Few, if any, of us would feel the temptation 
to over-ride such contingent considerations by seeking the unconditioned. We would not 
attempt to identify the perfect holiday or the perfect house for all agents in those 
circumstances, or consider whether going on holiday or buying a house was the best 
course of action for the agent at all: we would advise that agent on the basis of our 
understanding of him or her.
We find a similar situation when we consider our attitudes towards the 
relationship between motivations and reasons. Within the work of our external reasons 
theorists we found a suspicion of motivations, to the extent that if allowed a role at all 
this was restricted to an instrumental function in the production of action. It may appear 
that we can find a similar suspicion of motivations within our everyday talk of reasons. 
We may think that somebody who claims to be acting charitably is actually acting out o f 
self-interest, or we may think that strong motivations such as anger or hatred inhibit 
someone's ability to think coherently. However, these suspicions are, of course, different 
from those entertained by external reasons theorists. These suspicions do not imply that 
reasons cannot be rooted in motivations, but rather that reasons, deliberation and 
statements about reasons may be obscured or distorted by motivations. We will typically 
allow that the agent who claims to be charitable but is actually being selfish has reasons 
to be selfish; what we are suspicious of is what the agent says about his or her reasons.
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The same motivations that give the agent reasons to act selfishly give the agent reasons to 
lie about his or her reasons. Similarly, we do not suspect that the agent's anger is not a 
source of reasons, but rather that the experience of anger may be so strong that it prevents 
the agent from deliberating soundly to his or her best reasons for action, even in respect 
o f that anger. So, we have cause to be suspicious of motivations within our everyday 
understanding of reasons, but this does not stop us from acknowledging those 
motivations as sources of reasons.
The pattern we have found so far is repeated when we consider the desire for 
intelligibility, in that we find just such a desire expressed within our everyday talk of 
reasons, but one that has a significantly different emphasis from that found within the 
work of our external reasons theorists. The desire for intelligibility is clearly apparent 
within our everyday talk of reasons, as much of this talk is expended tying to gain an 
understanding of the deliberations and reasons of others. Oft-repeated questions such as, 
‘Why did you do that?’ or, ‘Why do you think you should do that?’ are typically intended 
to draw out the lines of deliberation that led to a particular conclusion about action, in the 
hope that this will make the agent's supposed reasons intelligible to us.163 Furthermore, 
such attempts to achieve intelligibility are not confined to our judgements of the reasons 
of others; we often question our own half-formed and unarticulated deliberation and 
reasons to make them more explicit to ourselves. However, in attempting to find 
intelligible reasons, we do not suppose that these reasons will only be intelligible if 
everything concerned with their production is itself governed by reason. Rather, we find 
reasons that come to an end in contingent aspects of the world such as motivations 
entirely intelligible. Indeed, it is the identification of just such a basis in motivations that 
we need to make the actions and reasons of others intelligible to us; the question, 'Why 
did you do that?' is typically intended to discover what the agent wanted as much as how 
the agent deliberated. The chances of understanding reasons and actions are particularly 
improved if we share or even just sympathise with the motivations of another agent. 
However, we can find reasons intelligible even if we cannot achieve such sympathy. We 
can see how the motivations of mass murderers and terrorists lead to their terrible 
conclusions about how they should act, even if  those motivations and the deliberation 
which follows from them horrify us. Such difficult cases also remind us that although we 
desire intelligibility, we do not expect the reasons of others to be transparently intelligible 
to us at first sight. On the contrary, we expect that sometimes intelligibility may only be 
achieved through discussion and debate, particularly when we are dealing with unfamiliar 
circumstances and cultures. We only really fail to find intelligibility when deliberation 
has gone dramatically wrong, or when motivations lie so far outside our sympathies that 
we cannot grasp them at all; and in this latter case, we may acknowledge that it is the 
agent's motivations that are unintelligible rather than the reasons that follow from those 
motivations, and even then that their apparent unintelligibility may be due to our failure 
to understand rather than because they could not be understood by anyone. So, while we 
want intelligibility out of reasons, it is the intelligibility provided by the ability of agents 
to understand one another and themselves, rather than the intelligibility supposedly
1630 f  course, we should note that such questioning often not only fails to render action intelligible, but also 
fails to draw out the line of deliberation actually followed by the agent; challenges to actions and 
reasons often produce post-hoc rationalisations which bear little resemblance to why the agent actually 
acted.
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provided by transcendental rational principles.
The pattern continues when we consider the hope that reasoning can issue in 
conclusions and that reasoned conclusions can produce agreement. This hope is explicitly 
manifested in our everyday talk of reasons. Even though we occasionally engage in 
debate for the pleasure of the argument, and even though such knowingly fruitless debate 
can sometimes be the most passionate, most of the time our public and private 
deliberation would simply make no sense if we did not hope and expect that it would 
issue in conclusions. The difference between the hopes and expectations o f everyday talk 
and those expressed in external reasons theories is that for external reasons theorists the 
conclusion of deliberation and agreement on action is a product of discovering the only 
right reasons to follow in the situation, while on our everyday understanding of action 
agreement is reached and deliberation concluded simply because we have found reasons 
which those people participating in deliberation can accept as good enough, even if there 
are other potential conclusions which could be reached, and which could also be accepted 
as good enough. This does not mean that our reasons are not serious or that they are 
compromised in some sense; the questions that prompt our deliberation may be very 
serious indeed, and we may steadfastly defend those reasons on which we have settled. 
The essential point is that even the most passionate conviction about our reasons will not 
be held because it is supported by the sort of theoretical justification demanded by our 
external reasons theorists; such passionate convictions will be held partly because of the 
agent’s confidence in the deliberation which produced them, and partly because they 
concern things that the agent cares about.
So, it appears that, although in our everyday talk of reasons we express 
motivations, attitudes and assumptions which resemble those expressed in the work of 
external reasons theorists, we give them a significantly different emphasis: we have an 
aversion to arbitrariness, but we are comfortable with difference and contingency; we are 
suspicious of motivations when they are not sincerely expressed or when they disrupt 
reasoning, but we are not suspicious of them simply because they are motivations; we 
want reasons to be intelligible, but find that an understanding of character, situation and 
motivations makes reasons more intelligible than the application of transcendental 
rational principles; and we want deliberation to reach conclusions and we want those 
conclusions to be right, but we can be confident in those conclusions without needing to 
show that they are necessarily true for all people at all times. In short, the motivations, 
attitudes and assumptions we express in our everyday talk of reasons seem to afford 
reason something resembling the instrumental role allowed by Hume. Above all, we want 
reason to be practically effective, and our motivations seem to express an awareness, 
conscious or unconscious, that the burden we place on reasons must be delicately judged; 
we must demand of our reasons that they are sufficiently robust to fit the situation, but 
must not demand so much that we undermine our confidence without warrant.
I believe that we can best characterise the motivations, attitudes and assumptions 
regarding reasons which are expressed in everyday talk, by saying that what we 
ordinarily want out of reasons is that they are sustainable, and that this sustainability 
stands in contrast to the absoluteness which external reasons theorists seemed to want 
from reasons. Sustainable reasons are those which agents can accept as sufficiently 
justified to suit the circumstances under consideration and, furthermore, which are 
capable of standing up to those challenges which might be expected to be mounted
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against those reasons. Each of the motivations, attitudes and assumptions we have found 
in our everyday understanding of reasons contributes to the achievement of sustainable 
reasons. So, the avoidance of arbitrariness helps us find reasons which cannot readily be 
undermined, as they do not have an arbitrary basis. Similarly, the sincere expression of 
motivations in deliberation and the expression of reasons means that those reasons are not 
susceptible to challenge by the revelation that they depend on hidden motivations. We 
can better sustain those reasons which are intelligible and which are based on intelligible 
deliberation because we can demonstrate and understand how those reasons were come 
by. And those reasons which constitute practical conclusions and bring us to agreements 
are sustainable because they give us what we want out of reasons.
The challenges which sustainable reasons stand up to need not be explicit or made 
by people other than the agent who is deliberating; it is a familiar part of deliberation that 
we challenge ourselves by asking whether our deliberation is really sound or our 
conclusions are really justified. Sustainability does not guarantee that reasons are capable 
of withstanding all conceivable challenges; just those which seem appropriate to the 
situation. So, if I am choosing a birthday present for a friend, then my reasons are 
sustainable if I can justify to myself or any other interested person why I have chosen a 
particular gift, or spent a certain amount of money, and they remain sustainable even 
though I could not justify the institution of celebrating birthdays by giving gifts.
However, a previously sustainable reason may be undermined by an unexpected yet 
warranted challenge, and thereby come to be unsustainable. If, when shopping for a 
birthday present it was pointed out to me that I was about to spend a substantial amount 
o f money on a momentarily amusing piece of trivial rubbish, when I might do something 
which is perhaps more boring and worthy, but was ultimately more useful and 
compassionate, such as making a contribution to charity in my friend’s name, I might 
find that my previously sustainable reason no longer stood up to scrutiny.
This means that, unlike the immoveable and unchanging edifice of reasons 
imagined by external reasons theorists, those reasons which can be considered sustainable 
because they conform to our common motivations, attitudes and assumptions concerning 
reasons vary from agent to agent and even within individual agents over time. But this is 
what we expect to find within any mature individual facing complex and shifting 
practical situations, and with an understanding of the world which is continuously 
developing; it reflects our experience o f a rational life rather better than the idea that all 
our reasons aare laid out for us and that it is merely our duty to discover them. Moreover, 
the thought that reasons can shift between and within individuals yet are nevertheless 
guided by our desire for sustainability provides us with a way in which reasons can be 
closely aligned to the nature and circumstances of individual agents, yet be subject to 
external judgement and normative pressure; in other words, to offer a way of satisfying 
both the individualistic and universalistic intuitions while remaining compatible with the 
internal reasons account. In order to develop this thought further we shall adopt a 
theoretical framework which not only provides us with a vocabulary to describe and 
assess our common patterns of motivation and behaviour, but which also returns us to the 
roots of our account: the theories of David Hume and, in particular, his account o f virtue.
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3.2 Virtue
It may seem a large and unexpected step from the consideration of the patterns of 
motivation regarding reasons to the overtly moral concept of virtue. However, as we shall 
see, if we continue to follow Hume, common patterns of motivations and our attitudes 
towards them are exactly what constitute virtue and vice. Furthermore, recent 
philosophical enquiries have questioned the emphasis placed on morality in discussions 
of virtue and have asked whether it is correct to perpetuate the distinction drawn by 
Aristotle between moral and intellectual virtues,164 or whether a more comprehensive and 
integrated understanding of virtue is required.165 The existence of such recent work on 
intellectual virtues reflects the increasing attention paid to virtue in recent decades,166 
which makes it particularly important to be clear about the understanding of virtue we are 
using in our discussion. So, we will start by summarising the Humean understanding of 
virtue, before going on to consider whether the patterns of motivations we have discussed 
and the behaviour they produce constitute a virtue in Humean terms. I believe that they 
do constitute a virtue and, unsurprisingly, this claim raises some questions which we shall 
also attempt to answer: whether we can justify calling what we have found a virtue rather 
than a skill; whether we have found a natural virtue or an artificial one; whether by 
introducing the concept of virtue we have unwittingly introduced another source of 
external reasons; whether the virtue fits our account of internal reasons and our intuitions 
about reason; and, finally, how we should judge our external reason theorists with respect 
to this virtue.
3.2.1 Humean Virtues
Hume’s account of virtue is one of the optimistic aspects of his theory, in which 
he builds an understanding of complex human behaviour from basic elements, as opposed 
to the pessimistic aspects of his theory, in which the rational basis for fundamental 
elements of our experience such as causality and existence is tom down, tempting us to 
doubt and despair. It has its foundation in Hume’s most fundamental moral claim: that 
morality is not rooted in reason but in the passions, as expressed in the title of the very 
first section of the book of the Treatise which deals with morals, Moral distinctions not
1 f\lderiv’d from reason. This claim is unpalatable to many, and gives rise to similar
reactions to those which we have already seen in relation to the Humean account of 
action. However, just as we have found with this account, we do not have to accept that 
the stark claim lying at its centre is the whole of the theory. We have seen how a 
sophisticated account of action, reason and motivation can be built upon the central claim 
that reason is subordinate to subjective motivation in the arena of action, and a similarly 
sophisticated account of morals can be built upon the claim that moral judgements are 
also dependent on subjective motivations. Fortunately, unlike our account of action, in
164 Ethics, 1103al4-bl, page 91.
165 For example, see Linda Zagzebski’s book Virtues o f  the Mind. From time to time throughout this 
discussion we will consider the implications o f this recent work for our own enquiry, and shall use 
Zagzebski’s book as a representative of thinking in this area.
166 The beginning of this renewed interest in theories o f virtue is usually traced to G.E.M. Anscombe’s 
paper ‘Modem Moral Philosophy’, published in 1958.
167 Treatise, Book III, Part I, Section I, page 507.
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which we had to do much of the construction on top of the central claim ourselves, in the 
case of morals Hume has done much of the building for us. Large parts o f the Treatise 
and most of the second Enquiry are concerned not just with setting out Hume’s theories 
of virtue, but with employing those theories to identify and explain the virtues we 
recognise. We do not have to accept all o f Hume’s claims about particular virtues to see 
the merit in his theory, and this theory gives us a model for defining the virtue concerned 
with practical reason.
We can summarise Hume’s account of virtue by considering five essential 
elements. The first of these is the basic claim we have already briefly encountered: that 
moral judgements are expressions of passion rather than of reason. This claim has led 
Hume’s theory to be associated with various labels such as ‘emotivist’ or 
‘expressivist’,168 although such labels are often unhelpful as they are more properly 
applied to subsequent theories, some of which are no longer recognisably Humean. Hume 
offers two arguments for the claim. The first is familiar from our account, as it concerns 
the relationship between reason and action. Hume argues that moral judgements are 
essentially practical: in his terms they are, ‘supposed to influence our passions and action 
and to go beyond the weak and indolent judgements of the understanding,’169 and by this 
stage in his theory he has already established that reason alone is not capable of giving 
rise to action. To invoke another potentially unhelpful label, we could say that Hume is 
expressing a form of intemalism about moral motivation; according to him, for something 
to count as a moral judgement by an agent it must contain some sort of impetus capable 
of inclining that agent towards action, even if  the agent never acts in accordance with it, 
and as reason alone is incapable of providing that impetus it can be ruled out as the 
source of moral judgements. Hume’s second argument is based on his theory of the 
understanding rather than his theory of the passions, and depends on observations of what 
it is possible for us to perceive in situations that call for moral judgements. He claims 
that, ‘If the thought and understanding were alone capable of fixing the boundaries of 
right and wrong, the character of virtuous and vicious must either lie in the relation of 
objects, or must be a matter of fact which is determined by our reasoning,’170 and then 
goes on to argue that if we deploy our reasoning to discover such relations or matters of 
fact we simply cannot find them. He says, ‘Take any action allowed to be vicious. Wilful 
murder, for instance. Examine it in all lights and see if you can find that matter o f fact, or 
real existence, which we call vice. In which-ever way you take it you find only certain
171passions, motives, volitions and thoughts. There is no other matter of fact in the case.’ 
This passage continues in a way which shows that Hume believes that moral judgements 
do exist, even though they cannot be derived from reason alone, and shows where he 
believes them to be derived from: ‘The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider 
its object. You can never find it, till you turn your reflection into your own heart and, and 
find a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, towards this action.’172 In other 
words, moral judgements are determined by feelings rather than by the conclusions of 
reason.
168 For example, see Philippa Foot in Natural Goodness, pages 5-6.
169 Treatise, Book III, Part I, Section I, page 509.
170 Treatise, Book III, Part I, Section I, page 515.
171 Treatise, Book III, Part I, Section I, page 520.
172 Treatise, Book III, Part I, Section I, page 520.
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The second element of Hume’s account of virtue is the claim that those 
judgements which are distinctly moral are directed towards the character of agents and 
actions rather than towards the individual agents and actions themselves. “ Tis only when 
a character is considered in general, without reference to our particular interest that it 
causes such a feeling or sentiment, as denominates it morally good or evil.’173 So, if  I 
disapprove of the personal loss I suffer when my pocket is picked I am not making a 
moral judgement, whereas if I disapprove of the act as an example of robbery, or of the 
person who robbed me as a thief, I am making a moral judgement. In practice, o f course,
I am likely to make all o f these judgements together. This element of the theory rids us o f 
any suspicion that moral judgements based on motivations must necessarily be 
expressions o f self-interest: our motivations are sophisticated enough to include attitudes 
of approval and disapproval towards general characteristics of actions and agents which 
may have no direct bearing on our interests.
The third element of Hume’s account of virtue is not explicitly articulated, but is 
rather implied by the list of virtues and vices which he attempts to account for: that 
virtues and vices are sufficiently recognisable patterns of motivation and behaviour for us 
to be able to give names to them. So, in the Treatise, Hume deals with, among others, 
justice, injustice, loyalty and chastity. And his approach to the exploration o f many of 
these virtues and vices is one which is open to misinterpretation: the telling of stories, 
intended to be illustrative rather than factual, about how we might have come to regard 
these patterns of motivation and behaviour as virtues and vices. It is partly in the 
construction of such stories that Hume presents the fourth element of his account, and 
divides virtues and vices into those which are natural and those which are artificial. 
Natural virtues and vices are those which will be valued or despised in all human 
societies, while artificial virtues and vices are produced by contingent circumstances. So, 
for example, Hume imagines an initial ‘state of nature’174 in which humans were bereft of 
the advantages o f civilised society but not of the capabilities and basic inclinations which 
could produce such society, and goes on from this state to describe the origins o f justice 
and property. That Hume does not mean this story to be taken literally is indicated when 
he says that, ‘philosophers may, if they please, extend their reasoning to the suppos’d 
state of nature; provided they allow it to be a mere philosophical fiction, which never had,
1 n c
and never cou’d have any reality.’
Perhaps the best examples of Hume’s division of the virtues into the natural and 
the artificial are the virtues of benevolence and justice, of which Hume claims the former 
to be natural and the latter, in a move which he obviously expects to be controversial, to 
be artificial. Benevolence is taken to be a natural virtue partly because it is universally 
prized, to the extent that, ‘even its weaknesses are virtuous and amiable,’176 but also 
because it is taken to underpin and regulate other virtues: ‘A propensity to the tender 
passions makes a man agreeable and useful in all the parts of life; and gives a just
1 77direction to all his other qualities, which otherwise may become prejudicial to society.’ 
The claim that justice is an artificial virtue may seem less controversial when we realise
173 Treatise, Book III, Part I, Section I, page 524.
174 Treatise, Book III, Part II, Section II, page 544.
175 Treatise, Book III, Part II, Section II, page 544.
176 Treatise, Book III, Part III, Section II, page 655.
177 Treatise, Book III, Part III, Section II, page 653-654.
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that Hume is not using the term in our modem sense, with its connotations o f fairness, but 
to refer to the conventions and behaviour regarding the preservation and respect of 
private property. Nevertheless, he evidently expected a similar reaction to that which he 
would likely get today to his categorisation of justice as an artificial virtue, as he felt
178compelled to defend it as well as to argue for it. O f course, the change in attitude over 
time towards the concept of justice lends weight to its categorisation as artificial: Hume’s 
18th century contemporaries would doubtless be inclined to regard our understanding of 
justice as artificial, just as we would theirs. Hume’s argument was slightly different to 
this, though: it was that it is theoretically possible to imagine a golden age, albeit a 
fictitious one, in which ‘every man had a tender regard for another,’ and, ‘nature supplied
1 70abundantly all our wants and desires,’ and consequently the conventions and 
inclinations which establish private property would not be needed, and justice as he 
understood it would not be regarded as a virtue.
So, we may readily agree that justice as Hume originally conceived it is an 
artificial virtue. It is worth pausing here to consider Hume’s defence of this 
categorisation, however, as it serves to dispel some illusions about the use of the term 
‘artificial,’ and, by extension, some concerns about Hume’s whole scheme of virtues. 
There are three such illusions. Firstly, the artificiality of some virtues could be interpreted 
as somehow meaning that they are less significant than the natural virtues, or that moral 
judgement influenced by these virtues is somehow less legitimate. However, Hume’s 
claim that moral judgements are produced by sentiments does not distinguish between 
sentiments according to their origin. It does not matter whether the feeling of approbation 
or disapprobation has its ultimate origins in human nature or inescapable yet contingent 
characteristics of human circumstances; all that matters is the feeling. Hume himself is 
concerned to avoid the misinterpretation: ‘To avoid giving offence, I must here observe 
that when I deny justice to be a natural virtue, I make use of the word natural only as 
oppos’d to artificial. In another sense of the word; as no principle in the human mind is 
more natural than a sense of virtue, so no virtue is more natural than justice. Mankind is 
an inventive species; and where an invention is so obvious and absolutely necessary, it 
may as properly be said to be natural as any thing that proceeds immediately from 
original principles, without the intervention of thought or reflection.’180
The second illusion is to suppose that because the existence of a virtue such as 
justice is explained by reference to the more efficient satisfaction of the interests o f the 
members of a just society, that judgements about justice are actually judgements about 
self-interest. Hume’s scheme requires not that the sentiments which constitute moral 
judgements are masks or proxies for the satisfaction of more basic interests, but that they 
are actual feelings about what they seem to be about. Again, Hume is at pains to point 
this out: ‘This self-interest is the original motive to the establishment of justice but a
sympathy with the public interest is the source of the moral approbation that attends that
1 81virtue.’ In other words, the explanation of the origin of a virtue may refer to entirely 
different motives from those which promote behaviour in accordance with the virtue once 
it is established.
178 See Treatise, Book III, Part II, Section II, page 545.
179 Treatise, Book III, Part II, Section II, page 545.
180 Treatise, Book III, Part II, Section I, page 536
181 Treatise, Book III, Part II, Section II, page 551.
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The third illusion is to imagine that because, as Hume does, we can attempt to 
trace the lineage of artificial virtues, and because such attempts could reasonably be 
called processes of rational investigation, the artificial virtues could be acquired by 
reason. However, there is an enormous difference between understanding how and why a 
particular society came to value, applaud and exhibit a particular virtue and coming to 
acquire that virtue oneself. Acquisition of the motivations which underpin artificial 
virtues may require long habituation and immersion in a culture, especially as those 
motivations associated with the virtue may be far removed from those which lie at its 
origins. Hume points this out in his account of the development of justice, in which the 
passion of self-interest both leads to and gives way to the passion of sympathy with 
public interest. The idea that we can understand virtue without acquiring it, and 
possibly without even being able to acquire it, is the Humean version of a phenomenon 
we could label the tragedy of virtue. Whatever particular theory of virtue we are 
adopting, it is common to acknowledge that virtues are achievements of character, and 
that they are largely acquired by means such as our upbringing and the lessons of our 
earliest experiences. This means that for most people, by the time we have reached a 
sufficient level of maturity to grasp the concept of virtue, it is too late for us to genuinely 
acquire those virtues which we do not already possess.
The final element in Hume’s account of virtue has already been anticipated in the 
recognition of natural virtues, and the thought that even artificial virtues may be 
recognised in most conceivable human situations: that these virtues and the motivations 
which underpin them allow the formation of a common point o f  view. Elements of the 
common point of view appear in the Treatise, but it is most clearly described in the 
second Enquiry, when Hume says that in making a moral judgement an agent must, 
‘depart from his private and particular situations and must choose a point of view 
common to him with others; he must move some universal principle o f the human frame, 
and touch a string to which all mankind have an accord and sympathy.’18 ’ Part o f the idea 
of the common point of view as expressed here reflects the idea mentioned earlier, that 
sentiments expressed in moral judgements are directed towards the character of acts and 
agents rather than the acts and agents themselves. However, the argument for the 
common point of view goes beyond this thought; it claims that someone making moral 
judgements, ‘expresses sentiments, in which he expects all his audience to concur with 
him.’184 Note that Hume is not claiming that there is a single, definite, common point of 
view from which moral judgements can be made, and which supersedes judgements made 
from the point of view of individual agents. Rather, the idea of the common point of view 
expresses Hume’s optimistic belief that human nature is roughly uniform; or at least 
sufficiently uniform to provide a consensus in matters which are as important to us as the 
virtues. The substantive components of the common point o f view do not have to be (and 
possibly could not be) fully defined, and we are encouraged to remember that the strings 
to which all mankind have an accord and sympathy include the artificial virtues. The 
scope of the common point of view is shown in the Dialogue accompanying the second 
Enquiry in which Hume presents caricatures of ancient Greek and (for him) modem 
French society. He does this in order to point out the differences between them and the
182 See Treatise, Book III, Part II, Section II, page 547 and 551.
183 Enquity Concerning Morals, Section IX, Part I, page 272
184 Enquiry Concerning Morals, Section IX, Part I, page 272
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judgements they would make of each other, but also to point out that a large part o f their 
differences can be explained by material and social circumstances, and to further point 
out that despite their differences they share fundamental characteristics that provide the 
basis for their own understanding of virtue.
We have now seen enough of Hume’s account of virtue to realise that, if we can 
apply it to our common motivations concerning reason, we have a way of satisfying the 
universalistic intuition. When we judge the reasons of others, and expect them to respond 
to our judgements we may, in part, be making judgements about their achievement and 
expression of a virtue; of patterns of motivation and behaviour of which we generally 
approve. Before we apply this account to the motivations we have found concerning 
reasons, though, we must do two things. Firstly, we must ask whether what we have seen 
of the account gives us grounds for accepting it. The most contentious part of the account 
is the initial claim that moral judgements are sentimental. Although this claim is 
undoubtedly compatible with our account of internal reasons, it is not the same as the 
question of whether motivations are required for reasons to exist, it is highly 
controversial, and to attempt to do it justice would take us far from our central topic o f 
reasons. Fortunately, we do not need to settle the claim to engage with the rest of Hume’s 
account of virtue. For this account is not like the Kantian conveyor belt in which a line of 
reasoning leads inexorably to a conclusion but is disrupted if we challenge any of the 
steps along the way. Rather, most of Hume’s account of virtue is based on the naturalistic 
observation that we exhibit common patterns of motivation and behaviour, and that there 
are common evaluations of those patterns. The claim about the nature of moral judgement 
influences our understanding of what is going on when we make those evaluations, but 
does not affect the question o f whether we actually make them. And I think that it is clear 
that we do make those evaluations. When we think about justice or honesty, or any other 
virtue, we think first about their human manifestation in patterns of motivations and 
behaviour rather than the general concepts. So, although the claim about the 
sentimentality of moral judgements is important for Hume’s overall account, we can to 
some extent separate it from his account of virtue: all we need is the thought that virtue is 
a general pattern of motivation and behaviour.
The second thing we must do before we attempt to apply the Humean 
understanding of virtue to our common motivations concerning reasons is to 
acknowledge that most of the discussion of virtue in recent years has been conducted in 
Aristotelian rather than Humean terms, and, furthermore, that at least some of this 
discussion is friendly to the proposition that external reasons exists. We must consider, 
therefore, whether by introducing the concept of virtue, we have introduced yet another 
source of external reasons.
3.2.2 Hume and Aristotle
There are many similarities between Hume’s account of virtue and Aristotle’s. 
They both regard virtue as the language of moral judgements and the vehicle of the moral 
worthiness of agents, as well as something which is embedded within character rather 
than expressed through individual actions. They also both take as the raw material of their 
enquiries an understanding of virtue which is not abstract, but which is embedded in the 
societies in which they live. However, there are two important differences. Firstly,
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Aristotle has a teleological understanding of virtue. For Hume, the explanation of virtue 
and the judgements we make in relation to virtue start with our passions and develop 
according to our histories and social circumstances, with the result that we cannot expect 
that virtues must necessarily drive towards a particular end; while harmonious passions 
might be easier to satisfy, and the consequent virtues easier to attain, there is no 
requirement for the nature o f history and humanity to be that tidy, or for things to turn out 
that way. By contrast, Aristotle starts from the thought that virtues are virtues to the 
extent that they produce and constitute the proper end for human agents. According to 
Aristotle, the proper end for human agents is the condition of eudaimonea, a term which 
is notoriously hard to translate, but which in contemporary virtue ethics seems to be most 
frequently rendered as ‘flourishing.’ Eudaimonea is partly constituted by a desirable 
state of psychology and character, in which actions, reasons and motivations are aligned 
with virtue. There is something of this idea in Hume. Towards the end of his discussion 
of morals in the Enquiries, Hume considers the rewards of virtue:
But in all ingenuous natures, the antipathy to treachery and roguery is too strong to 
be counterbalanced by any views of profit or pecuniary advantage. Inward peace of 
mind, consciousness or integrity, a satisfactory review of our own conduct; these are 
circumstances, very requisite to happiness, and will be cherished and cultivated by 
every honest man, who feels the importance of them.186
However, that last phrase: ‘every honest man, who feels the importance o f  them,’ 
indicates the difference between Hume’s position and Aristotle’s. For Hume virtue and 
the peace of mind that may accompany its attainment are a fortuitous, if  predictable, 
consequence of our typical passions and circumstances, rather than an inescapable 
product of our natures. Furthermore, while the desirability of the condition of 
eudaimonea may lead us to seek it, for Aristotle it is rather more than just desirable: it is 
the proper end for human beings as determined by our nature as a species, and the 
appropriateness of this end to us carries its own normative weight. For Aristotle, we 
should not pursue eudomainea because we want to be that way; we should pursue it 
because it is the way that we should be.
The second difference between Hume and Aristotle is that, whereas Hume’s 
account of virtue is founded in the passions and only allows a limited role for reason, 
Aristotle understands virtue as dependent on a particular form of rationality: phronesis, or 
the virtue of practical wisdom, which constitutes the ability to recognise the wise and 
virtuous course of action called for in a particular situation. It allows an agent, ‘to be able 
to deliberate rightly about what is good and advantageous for himself; not in particular 
respects, e.g. what is good for health or physical strength, but what is conducive to the 
good life generally.’187 This aspect of Aristotle’s theory leads to what is probably the 
greatest difference between the work of modem followers of Aristotle and Humean 
theories such as the one we have developed here. Such theories, especially those of John 
McDowell, are cognitivist in relation to morality, meaning that they regard moral 
considerations as facts which can be grasped and known through the correct perception of
18“ For example, see Rosalind Hursthouse in On Virtue Ethics, pages 9-10.
186 Enquiry Concerning Morals, Section IX, Part II, 233, page 283.
187 Ethics, page 209.
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the pertinent aspects of morally significant situations or choices. Furthermore, as these 
judgements are made through the exercise of phronesis, which is an aspect of rationality, 
they are judgements about reasons. In other words, the current followers o f Aristotle are 
not only the most prevalent proponents of virtue theories, but also tend to be external 
reasons theorists, even though they might not all explicitly declare themselves to be such. 
This is why it is important to determine whether, by introducing the concept of virtue to 
our account, we have also introduced a source of external reasons.
We could attempt to sidestep this problem by claiming that as we have adopted a 
specifically Humean understanding of virtue, we need not therefore consider the 
implications of the Aristotelian account just because we happen to use similar terms. 
However, even though we do not use technical terms such as phronesis or eudaimonea, or 
embrace the concepts which they represent, there is enough similarity between the 
Humean and the Aristotelian account to raise the possibility that the Aristotelians have 
identified implications which are produced by any account using a recognisable concept 
o f virtue, and that these implications lead to external reasons. Furthermore, there are 
aspects of the Aristotelian account which fit our everyday expectations and which accord 
with the universalistic intuition about reasons. So, there is an implication within the 
general concept of virtue that judgements of virtue are things which we can get right or 
wrong. For example, it is part of our common understanding of honesty that we can judge 
someone to be honest, yet be mistaken: we might fail to detect a lie or, more subtly, 
might fail to realise that an agent who acts honestly in a single instance is not revealing 
an honest character but is, through this exceptional act, disguising a dishonest character. 
Similarly, we may fail to recognise that a situation calls for honesty: the degree of 
honesty appropriate to those occasions on which we are asked for our opinion on a 
friend’s new artwork, house or partner is notoriously hard to judge, but we do imagine 
that there is a right answer. It is the thought that virtue judgements may concern matters 
of fact which is contained within the concept of phronesis, which expresses the 
universalistic intuition and which potentially leads to external reasons. Similarly, we 
recognise that there are sufficiently common aspects of human life for us to have a 
recognisable human nature, and for our lives to go well or go badly in characteristically 
human ways. We even intuitively sympathise with the much contested claim that the life 
of someone who is materially successful yet irredeemably vicious has gone wrong in 
some way, even if that person appears content in his or her viciousness. Even if we do not 
refer to eudaimonea by name, once we begin to formalise this recognition o f common 
forms of life and modes of flourishing by talking of virtue, we raise the possibility of 
external reasons.
Fortunately, we do not have to address the entire broad and rapidly growing body 
of virtue theory to see whether the implications of employing the concept o f virtue 
inevitably lead us to external reasons. Two writers, John McDowell and Philippa Foot, 
have recently engaged directly with these questions. By considering their arguments we 
will find not only that these aspects of Aristotelian virtue theory do not support external 
reason claims, but that these theories are rather closer to our account than the external 
reasons theories which we considered earlier. We will start with John McDowell.
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3.2.2.1 McDowell's Argument from Phronesis
The foundations of McDowell’s arguments are expressed in a wide range of 
papers, but the way in which they relate to our discussion is fortunately succinctly 
expressed in a single paper which deals directly with Williams’ account of internal 
reasons: ‘Might there be external reasons?’188 Equally fortunately, as this paper was 
published as part of a collection of essays on Williams’ philosophy, Williams also 
provided us with a direct reply. Recall that the central claim of Williams’ theory and of 
our account of internal reasons is that an agent’s practical reasons are those which can be 
derived from his or starting motivational set by sound deliberation. Unlike most of the 
other challenges we have considered, McDowell is not primarily contesting the role of 
motivations in producing reasons. He takes Williams to be affirming the Humean claim 
that reason alone cannot give rise to motivations and asks, ‘If the rational cogency o f a 
piece of deliberation is in no way dependent on prior motivations, how can we
• 1RQcomprehend it giving rise to a new motivation?’ McDowell’s challenge is directed at 
the constraint imposed by sound deliberation: that is, he is asking whether an agent’s 
reasons can be restricted to those to which he or she could deliberate. The argument goes 
something like this. Firstly, we accept that action cannot be explained in the absence of 
motivation. Secondly, we accept that reason alone cannot produce new motivations 
totally independently o f old motivations. Thirdly, we suppose that if external reasons 
exist, they exist independently of the agent’s motivations. And, finally, we insist that, 
although we accept that motivations cannot be produced by reason alone, we do not need 
to suppose that deliberation is the only route to the agent’s external reasons. As 
McDowell says, ‘The crucial question is this: why must the external reasons theorist 
envisage this transition to considering the matter aright as being effected by correct 
deliberation?’190 In other words, the agent may have reasons which cannot be reached by 
sound deliberation, but rather through non-rational means such as conversion.
McDowell’s argument that reasons exist even though they cannot be reached by 
sound deliberation takes the form of a challenge to Williams’ understanding of reasons. 
His objection to Williams’ account is essentially that it concentrates too closely on the 
explanatory dimension of reason, and does not leave sufficient room for the critical 
dimension of reason. In particular, he argues that the account is ‘psychologistic’.191 This 
term was apparently coined by Frege when arguing that the principles of logic should not 
be constrained by the way in which agents happen to think; that they should be Taws of 
truth’ rather than Taws of thought.’192 In this context, McDowell is using the concept to 
argue that the way in which agents happen to deliberate should not constrain the reasons 
they have. This is obviously entirely contradictory to our account of internal reasons, 
within which, as we have developed it, reasons have come to depend more and more on 
the way in which the agent deliberates. Although McDowell does not say so explicitly 
here, he is invoking the Aristotelian concept of phronesis, and the related concept o f the
188 ‘Might there be external reasons?’, but also see ‘Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?’ 
and ‘Virtue and Reason’ in Mind, Value and Reality.
189 ‘Might there be external reasons?’, page 72.
190 ‘Might there be external reasons?’, page 72.
191 ‘Might there be external reasons?’, page 77.
192 ‘Might there be external reasons?’, page 77.
101
Be Reasonable -  David Knott
phronimos: the agent who has achieved the virtue of practical wisdom as well as the other 
virtues. Williams recognises this when he says that, for a certain type of external reasons 
theorist, “ a correct deliberator’ means someone who deliberates as a well-informed and 
well-disposed person would deliberate,’ and that, ‘in McDowell’s account, this seems to 
be someone like Aristotle’s phronimos, or, as McDowell puts it, someone who has been
1 Q 'J
properly brought up.’ In other words, the idea of phronesis is important here because 
McDowell supposes that the reasons we have which properly represent the critical 
dimension of reasons are those which would be recognised by the phronimos, and any 
current inability to reason in the same way as the phronimos represents a deficiency in 
our capabilities rather than a negation of those reasons. Furthermore, McDowell does not 
suppose that we must be capable of reasoning ourselves into the position of the 
phronimos. He allows that there may be all sorts of ways of getting us to the attainment 
of phronesis through means which, although they could not straightforwardly be 
described as non-rational, nevertheless do not involve a direct exercise of reason: ‘The 
idea of conversion would function here as the idea of an intelligible shift in motivational 
orientation that is exactly not effected by inducing a person to discover, by practical 
reasoning controlled by existing motivations, some internal reasons that he did not 
previously realize he had.’194 In summary, then, McDowell is arguing that the critical 
dimension of rationality is capable of providing us with reasons that are not dependent on 
the particular motivations of an agent, and that action in accordance with those reasons 
can be explained by the possibility of the agent coming to acquire both the ability to 
recognise those reasons and the accompanying motivations through means other than 
deliberation.
I do not propose to follow Williams’ response to McDowell’s paper exactly, but 
rather to concentrate on three points of particular relevance to our discussion. Firstly, 
Williams points out that his account provides for the critical dimension of reasons by 
allowing that an agent’s reasons may not be simple and clear, but may rather be complex 
and obstructed by obstacles: ‘But this does not imply . . . that the agent should be able to 
conduct the deliberation in fact. Perhaps some unconscious obstacle, for instance, would 
have to be removed before he could arrive at the motivation to (|).’195 The possibility of 
deliberative obstacles and their influence on the existence of reasons and how we talk 
about them is, of course, something that we have discussed at length. We have given 
more formal voice to Williams’ thought about obstacles by drawing our distinction 
between strongly internal and weakly internal reasons. If our account did not afford a 
critical faculty to reason then we would only acknowledge the existence of strongly 
internal reasons; but, o f course, we allow that weakly internal reasons exist as well.
The second relevant point within Williams’ response is his acknowledgement o f 
McDowell’s accusation of psychologism, and his rejection of the suggestion that it 
presents a problem for his account: ‘I accept that the account is psychologistic, in the 
sense that on my view a statement about A’s reasons is partly a statement about A ’s 
psychology. I do not see this as an objection, as it is (I agree) an objection to say that a 
theory of arithmetic is psychologistic.’196 I believe that this is exactly the right position
193 ‘Replies’ in World, Mind and Ethics, page 189.
194 ‘Might there be external reasons?’, page 74.
195 ‘Replies’ in World, Mind and Ethics, page 189.
196 ‘Replies’ in World, Mind and Ethics, page 191.
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to take. Any Humean account o f practical reason must accept that it is psychologistic, as 
it is committed to insisting that reasons are dependent on motivations; and it is this very 
relationship to psychology which provides such accounts with their attractiveness and 
plausibility. However, if  we need them, there are additional ways of defusing the 
accusation of psychologism. We can point out, as Williams does, that we are not in the 
business of defining the principles of logic, but of determining the basis on which 
contingent agents possess reasons for action in variable circumstances. The intrusion of 
psychology seems entirely appropriate to the latter enterprise, even if  it is anathema to the 
former. Alternatively, we can point out that we have not argued that all o f the principles 
of practical reason are subject to the psychology of agents. Even Hume allowed minimal 
criteria of truth and falsehood for practical reasons, and within our account we insist that 
deliberation is sound, even if we have said that the boundaries of sound deliberation are 
indeterminate.
The third and perhaps the most interesting point within Williams’ response, 
however, is one which we have not considered in our discussion so far: that the 
phronimos as conceived by Aristotle and implied by McDowell is an ideal type o f agent 
and, even if we accept the theoretical existence of this ideal type, then the reasons 
possessed by the phronimos cannot be the same as the reasons possessed by normal 
agents who are rather less than ideal. As Williams argues: ‘Aristotle’s phronimos (to stay 
with that model) was, for instance, supposed to display temperance, a moderate 
equilibrium of the passions which did not even require the emergency virtue of self- 
control. But, if  I know that I fall short of temperance and am unreliable with respect even 
to some kinds of self-control, I shall have good reason not to do some things that a 
temperate person could properly and safely do.’197 The significance of this point for 
McDowell’s argument is that it throws into doubt whether he has actually discovered the 
potential for external reasons which belong to the agent now, in his or her current 
circumstances and state of virtue, or whether he has only discovered reasons which would 
belong to the agent if the agent was ideal. Remember, McDowell’s argument was that we 
could suppose external reasons to exist by imagining that their apprehension and the 
acquisition of any related motivation to action lie on the other side of a conversion which 
could be achieved through non-rational means. But it is one thing to acknowledge the 
possibility of conversion, and another to say that this gives the current, unconverted agent 
reasons to act now. At the most, it might give reason to seek conversion.
Put more informally, most of us recognise that we could be better than we are, and 
we might even express such intuitions in terms of virtue: we might wish that we were 
more prudent, more steadfast in the face of temptation, and so on. We might also 
recognise that we are not capable of reasoning ourselves to such improvement. So, we 
might adopt programmes of self-improvement, such as forcing ourselves to tell the truth 
in all circumstances, until honesty becomes an ingrained habit. But at most, our ambitions 
give us internal reasons to follow the programme now, not to act exactly as our improved 
selves would. Indeed, it seems impossible that we could act exactly as our improved 
selves would, or, even if the outward appearance of our actions was the same, to act for 
exactly the same reasons. When I have achieved a thoroughly honest disposition, the fact 
of honesty is enough of a reason for me to act. When I am still struggling to achieve such 
a disposition, and am constantly tempted by the ease and rewards of dishonesty, my
197 ‘Replies’ in World, Mind and Ethics, page 190.
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reasons include my wish to attain an honest disposition. An example might be that of an 
alcoholic following the twelve step programme used by Alcoholics Anonymous. Some of 
the steps in this programme are decidedly non-rational, but they are intended to build 
habits of thought and behaviour conducive to remaining sober. The agent the alcoholic 
would ideally like to be has no problem staying sober, but an important part o f the 
programme is to recognise that this can never be achieved; the alcoholic always has the 
reasons of an alcoholic, even if he or she never drinks again. The point here is that, even 
if we can imagine an ideal which we currently fall short of, and even if we can anticipate 
the reasons which we will have when we have attained the ideal, the reasons we have 
now for taking action to attain the ideal remain rooted in the agent’s ambitions: they are 
internal reasons. If we lack both the attainment of the ideal and the aspiration to reach it, 
then we cannot see why that ideal gives us reasons now. It seems that the answer to 
McDowell’s question, ‘Might there be external reasons?’ is, ‘Not in this fashion.’
3.2.2.2 Foot’s Argument from Natural Goodness
The thought that Aristotelian theories hold up an ideal, but do not give agents the 
same reasons as one who has attained that ideal, also applies to arguments for human 
nature and eudaimonea as potential sources of external reasons. Such arguments are 
perhaps best exemplified by the work of Philippa Foot, particularly in her last book, 
Natural Goodness. We do not have space to consider the entire argument or its variants 
here, but can summarise it in four steps. Firstly, the Humean distinction between fact and
value, especially as it was expressed throughout the middle of the 20th century, is decried1 08as false. Secondly, in a manner which strongly reflects Aristotle’s teleological view of 
the natural world, it is claimed that calling an entity such as an animal ‘good’ is exactly 
what transcends the distinction between fact and value. The judgement that an animal is 
good is taken to carry the implication that it is good o f its kind. So, according to Foot, 
‘Nobody would, I think, take it as other than a plain matter of fact that there is something 
wrong with the hearing of a gull that cannot distinguish the cry of its own chick, as with 
the sight of an owl that cannot see in the dark. Similarly, it is obvious that there are 
objective, factual evaluations o f such things as human sight, hearing, memory and 
concentration, based on the life form of our own species.’199 In other words, facts about 
the nature of a species and about an individual member of that species determine our 
evaluation of that individual. Thirdly, the nature of the human species includes all those 
characteristics such as sociability and mutual dependence which give rise to virtues such 
as benevolence, institutions such as making and keeping promises, and, if  we are to 
believe Aristotle, the location of eudaimonea in the virtuous life. To Foot, then, the facts 
of human nature determine those things which we judge to be good about humans, and 
the facts of the conformance of an individual to that nature determines our judgement of 
the individual. If honesty is part of the natural end for our species then discovering 
someone to be dishonest means that we must judge that there is something wrong with 
him or her. We can already see how, if judgements of value depend on fact, reason plays 
a role in evaluation within Foot’s scheme. However, the connection is made even 
stronger by the fourth step in the argument, in which it is insisted that the proper exercise
198 For example, see chapter one, ‘A Fresh Start?’ in Natural Goodness.
199 Natural Goodness, page 24.
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of reason is part of the proper end for humans; to fail to reason correctly on the basis of 
the good for humans is not only to go wrong in reasoning, it is to offend against that 
good. O f course, if reasons are dependent on a universal human nature rather than on the 
contingent nature of individuals, then they are external reasons, and the possibility o f the 
existence of these reasons is raised as soon as we invoke the concept of virtue.
There are two ways in which we can respond to this argument. Firstly, we can 
draw from one of the responses made by Williams to McDowell’s argument for external 
reasons: that the person who has not attained the same level of virtue and practical 
wisdom as the phronimos does not have the same reasons as the phronimos. If the natural 
good of humanity is found in virtues such as honesty and benevolence in an analogous 
way to the natural good of animals being found in conformity to their biological, 
instinctively prescribed forms of life, then most of us fail to attain this good in some way. 
Most of us may tend to honesty much of the time, but we do not all attain a thoroughly 
internalised sense of honesty in quite the same way as a gull chick possesses the instinct 
to cry for food, or even in the way we possess our own instincts and responses, such as 
hunger, pain and some forms of fear. This is especially the case when we consider the 
more exalted virtues such as benevolence and courage, which many of us aspire to but 
fail to attain, and which some of us fail even to aspire to. Questions of virtue and vice 
would not be as important as they are unless we often fell short of virtue and stumbled 
into vice. So, as Williams did of McDowell, we must ask whether, even if we accept that 
there is a determinate human nature which contains an ideal of human goodness, this is 
capable of supplying common reasons to all humans, or whether those reasons may be 
modified or even negated by the contingent nature and circumstances of the individual 
agent. Of course, this response does not rule out the possible existence of external reasons 
based on human nature; all that is required for external reasons is that they apply 
independently of motivations, not that the same external reasons apply to everybody, 
however much that may seem to be the tendency of external reasons theories.
However, the thought that we may fail to attain an ideal of human nature, and that 
this has implications for any reasons derived from that ideal, prompts our second 
response to Foot’s argument, in which we point out that the concept of human nature is a 
perennial source of controversy, and is surrounded by wide-ranging arguments which 
touch on topics as varied as genetics, politics and sexuality. This controversy is only 
exacerbated by the connection Foot attempts to establish between human nature and 
judgements of the good for humans. I tend, unsurprisingly for someone arguing for an 
essentially Humean theory, to believe that there is such a thing as human nature, and that 
it is largely common between individuals, even given phenomena such as vast and 
persistent cultural differences. However, this is not the same thing as supposing, as Foot 
and other followers of Aristotle seem to do, that there is a sufficiently uniform human 
nature to sustain an ideal of fulfilment which is capable of providing us with determinate 
reasons independent of our motivations. The difficulties associated with such a concept 
are apparent enough when we consider subtle variations between individuals, but become 
even more glaring when we think of those people who are unfortunately impaired in 
some way. The potentially thoroughly fulfilled life of someone who happens to be 
disabled makes us balk at the idea that the ideal of human flourishing can only be attained 
by the able-bodied, and also at the idea that such a person somehow fails to attract the 
judgement ‘good’. It could, of course, be argued that such a person would be better off if
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he or she was not disabled, but being better off is not the same as flourishing or attaining 
fulfilment. Furthermore, talk of whether someone would be better off or not without a 
disability misses the fundamental lesson of such an example: that our experience and our 
expectations tell us that there are many ways to flourish and to be ‘good’.200
I do not think that we have done enough here to show that Foot’s, McDowell’s, or 
any other Aristotelian argument must necessarily fail; but we have done enough to show 
that the path from virtue to external reasons is not straightforward and is certainly not 
inevitable. However, we have also seen enough to realise that Aristotelian theories do not 
seem to be in conflict with all aspects of our own theory; certainly not to the extent of the 
other external reasons theories we have considered. Furthermore, some aspects of 
Aristotelian theories fit our experience: we do aspire to ideals and we do give ourselves 
reasons that accord with those aspirations. These thoughts indicate how best to engage 
with Aristotelian theories. As Rosalind Hursthouse admits unlike the theorists we 
considered earlier, neither Aristotle nor modem Aristotelians pretend to be arguing from 
a position wholly outside ethics: “The pretensions of an Aristotelian naturalism are not, in 
any ordinary understanding of the terms, either ‘scientific’ or ‘foundational’. It does not 
seek to establish its conclusions from ‘a neutral point of view’. Hence it does not expect 
what it says to convince anyone whose ethical outlook or perspective is largely different 
from the ethical outlook from within which the naturalistic conclusions are argued for.’201 
I do not want to underplay important theoretical differences such as the concept o f 
eudaimonea as the proper end for humans, but it seems to me that, if  we could set such 
differences to one side, the best way for us to deal with Aristotelian virtue theorists 
within our account is as extremely optimistic internal reasons theorists. So, if  we return to 
the example of McDowell, if  what he means is that the example of the phronimos gives 
us reasons to exercise our capacities to emulate this ideal because we have common 
dispositions best served by achieving that state, then we have no problem; as long as we 
can also allow that is at least conceivable that someone could lack the dispositions and 
therefore lack the reasons. O f course, McDowell is saying rather more than that, and 
whether this is really the right way to deal with his argument is a question to be addressed 
in rather more depth elsewhere. For the time being, though, I believe that we can say that 
the onus is on the Aristotelians to show that virtue leads to external reasons, rather than 
on us to show that it does not, and that consequently we can continue to employ the 
concept of virtue without supposing that by doing so we are compromising our account.
200 We may also note that recent and foreseeable advances in medical technology make this concept even 
more troublesome. If someone is genetically or surgically enhanced to be faster or stronger or to have 
more acute senses than the normal run of humanity, we must ask whether, under Foot’s scheme, we 
should regard that person as defective because o f their variation from normal human nature, as 
belonging to a kind of his or her own, or as raising the standard of human natural goodness for the rest 
o f us.
201 On Virtue Ethics, page 193.
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3.3 Reasonableness
So, we can now consider whether we have found the components of a Humean 
virtue. We shall start by considering whether the motivations, attitudes and assumptions 
which we found expressed in everyday talk of reasons and the behaviour they produce 
generally enjoy our approval. To recap, we found an aversion to arbitrariness, an aversion 
to motivations which disrupt the apprehension and sincere expression of reasons, a desire 
for intelligibility, and a hope that we can reach conclusions capable of producing 
agreement, and we grouped them together under the heading of a desire for sustainable 
reaons. Fortunately, it is not hard to discover what our attitude is towards such 
phenomena, as our positive regard for them is immediately apparent from our ordinary 
behaviour. When we are confronted with the question o f whether we would prefer an 
agent to seek sustainable reasons and to act in accordance with them, or to disdain such 
reasons by failing to look for them, or by, having found them, choosing to act against 
them, our instinctive preference is for the former.
However, we can do more than simply insist on the obviousness of our positive 
regard for the common motivations concerning reasons. As well as giving us reasons 
which meet our expectations in particular instances of deliberation, possession o f these 
motivations and behaviour in accordance with them make us into reliable partners in 
deliberation and action. The reasons of someone who is averse to arbitrariness are more 
likely to be based on considerations which we and they consider to be relevant to the 
matter at hand. If someone is suspicious of the disruption to deliberation that can be 
caused by strong motivations, or of the temptation to present one's reasons insincerely, 
then we can be more confident that what that person professes his or her reasons to be 
really are his or her reasons. An agent who wants reasons to be intelligible is more likely 
to offer reasons that we can understand and, if we are drawn into a debate about those 
reasons, is more likely to be able to present us with deliberation that we can understand. 
And someone who wants reasons to be sustainable is more likely to act for reasons which 
have an appropriate degree o f justification, and is also likely to respond to challenges to 
reasons, either by seeking more robust justification or by accepting the need to seek new 
reasons. In short, the people who possess and heed the motivations, attitudes and 
assumptions we have considered are those whose reasons we can understand and trust.
We can engage with them in practical matters with the expectation that they will either 
share our reasons, or that if  they do not share our reasons, we will have some common 
grounds to resolve our disagreement. We must also recognise that this sort of practical 
engagement does not only happen with others; it also happens within ourselves. Our 
motivations and deliberation are not always so explicit that we are fully aware o f them, 
and we sometimes find that we have to pull ourselves up and work out why we are doing 
what we are doing and why we think that we have particular reasons for action. When we 
do this we hope that we will find that our reasons are sustainable.
O f course, it takes more than just a group of motivations and behaviour that we 
approve of to constitute a virtue. To find such a virtue it must be possible to identify these 
motivations and the behaviour they produce as constituents of a character trait, and 
preferably one that we can recognise from our everyday lives. I believe that we can 
identify such a familiar character trait: reasonableness.. Although reasonableness is not 
cited in the many lists of virtues compiled by writers working in this area, once we have
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suggested that reasonableness is a virtue it seems intuitively plausible: reasonableness is a 
character trait that we recognise, and it is one that we value. In our everyday talk we often 
apply this term to people ('I'm a reasonable man.') but its character is most clearly 
revealed by the way in which we seem to use it most frequently: as an indication of 
agreement to a proposal for action ('That seems reasonable to me.').
To understand what we usually mean by reasonableness when we use the term 
casually with respect to agreements we can imagine a man attempting to come to an 
agreement about action with a friend, possibly about something as mundane as which 
film to go and see that evening, and ask what it would take for the agreement they reach 
to be judged reasonable in ordinary terms. Whatever agreement they reach would 
certainly have to be good enough to satisfy both of them. They could of course reach an 
agreement which satisfied only one of them, because the other was browbeaten into 
submission, or simply decided that the decision was not worth an acrimonious dispute.
But such an agreement would not be judged reasonable; it would be better described as a 
somewhat arbitrary compromise. Reaching a reasonable agreement would also naturally 
involve a degree of understanding, both of the other's motivations and of his or her 
deliberation. If the man does not want to see The Maltese Falcon because he thinks it is a 
nature film and he wants to see a film noir, then the agreement will not be reasonable if 
this misunderstanding is not made explicit. Similarly, the agreement will not be 
reasonable if it is not what it appears on the surface; that is, if one of those people 
involved makes an agreement because he or she knows that it will not work out in the 
way overtly intended, as it has been insincerely framed in the service of some hidden 
motivation. If the man agrees to go to the cinema to see The Maltese Falcon in the 
knowledge that tonight the cinema is showing a different film then the agreement can 
only seem reasonable until it is discovered that it is not so. However, this only means that 
reasonable agreements are incompatible with insincerely expressed or hidden 
motivations, not that they are incompatible with all motivations; indeed, without 
motivations there would be nothing to agree or disagree about, and the most reasonable 
agreements will be the ones in which these motivations are most sincerely expressed. 
Finally, a reasonable agreement is one which has been reached through some sort of 
shared deliberative process. If the man simply insists on going to see the film he wants to 
see without allowing any room for discussion, there is no possibility of a reasonable 
agreement. So, reasonable agreements are those which are not arbitrary, are not distorted 
or insincere, but nevertheless reflect the motivations of those involved, and are 
intelligible; in other, words, those which are based on sustainable reasons.
We can extend this understanding to the character of agents. Because of the 
association of reasonableness with agreements we may primarily think of someone who 
is judged to be reasonable as someone who is prepared to accept compromises. However, 
this does not mean that we think that someone who is reasonable is someone who always 
gives way when challenged, or someone who is always prepared to sacrifice his interests 
for the sake of others. Rather, even in our intuitive association of reasonableness with 
compromise, we recognise that someone who is reasonable has a position to compromise 
from, just as a reasonable agreement is one which offers some satisfaction to the various 
parties involved. Reasonableness is not mere capitulation. We expect that someone who 
is reasonable is someone who in practical matters is capable of seeing that sometimes it is 
just as important to reach a conclusion about action as it is to defend a particular position.
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This does not mean that compromise, agreement or conclusion can always be reached by 
the reasonable agent, as some things are not open to challenge, but it does mean that the 
reasonable agent is capable of seeing when the satisfaction of some motivations is better 
than the satisfaction of all motivations, because only the former is on offer. As ever with 
talk of motivations we must remember that we are not just talking about the efficient 
satisfaction of self-interest; the reasonable agent may be a peace-keeper negotiating, at 
great personal risk, the safe passage of refugees at the expense of surrendering control of 
a town. So, our informal expectations of a reasonable agent are that such an agent is 
someone who is committed to certain practical positions, but who is also committed to 
reaching conclusions about action, and is further committed to reaching such conclusions 
in a manner which is governed by reason. That last commitment is particularly important. 
After all, a literal interpretation o f ‘reasonable’ might be ‘capable of being governed by 
reason.’
These commitments, to specific practical positions, to the achievement of 
conclusions, and to reasoned deliberation, mean that we also have further expectations of 
the character of reasonable agents. Someone who is consistently characterised as 
reasonable may also be expected to be reliable and trustworthy (and possibly even 
somewhat dull; the term reasonableness carries no hint of passion). Perhaps most 
intriguingly, we may also think of someone who is genuinely reasonable that he or she is 
capable of transmitting that reasonableness to others, even if only temporarily; I am sure 
that we can all think of someone who, through sheer persistent application of reasonable 
argument, calms down the most passionate debate. We may even find such an effect 
irritating from time to time, but that is most likely when part of the purpose of our 
passionate debate was to have a passionate debate, and the reasonable agent who 
patiently leads us to a practical conclusion has rather missed the point. Once again, we 
can also express these informal thoughts about the character of the reasonable agent in 
terms of the motivations we have found concerning reasons and deliberation. So, we can 
say, on our ordinary understanding, that a reasonable agent is one who is uneasy about 
admitting arbitrary considerations into practical deliberation, who sincerely expresses his 
or her motivations concerning the matter at hand, who can avoid or regulate the influence 
of strong motivations on the processes of deliberation, even if those motivations are the 
driving force behind that deliberation, whose deliberation we can follow, even if  this 
requires some explanation, who has a position but is prepared to move from it, either to 
achieve a conclusion or if the position is sufficiently undermined, and who has a respect 
for deliberation, to the extent that this respect may be contagious.
So, I think that we can regard reasonableness as a virtue, and can define it in 
terms of the general heading under which we grouped our common motivations, attitudes 
and assumptions concerning reasons; we can say that:
reasonableness is the embedded tendency o f an agent to pursue sustainable
reasons, to be reliably successful in finding those reasons, and to act on those
reasons when they can be found.
By now we are familiar with most of the terms in this definition, but it is worth 
saying a little more about the terms ‘pursues’ and ‘reliably successful’. I have used the 
term ‘pursues’ for four reasons. The first is quite straightforward; the term acknowledges
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that an agent may be reasonable, but nevertheless may fail to find sustainable reasons 
within a particular practical context. Sometimes this may be because the agent is 
incapable of finding the sustainable reasons which do exist, and sometimes it may be 
because such reasons just don’t exist. The important point, though, is that the reasonable 
agent tries to find sustainable reasons, even if this attempt is fruitless, and does not fool 
him or herself into thinking that such reasons have been found when they have not. The 
second reason for using the term ‘pursues’ is that it does not constrain what it involves in 
the attempt to find sustainable reasons; it is an open-ended term. As we have seen, there 
are many different ways of going about trying to find reasons, and part of being 
reasonable is using all of those means which seem appropriate to the practical situation. 
So, the pursuit o f sustainable reasons may involve profound, introspective, solitary 
thought, or it may involve more gregarious activities such as a group of friends playfully 
exchanging ideas about what to do. The third reason for talking of pursuit is that, just as 
physical pursuit o f a quarry is an activity that can be frustrated and misled; the pursuit of 
sustainable reasons may involve acknowledging that sometimes reasons we thought were 
secure have been undermined by challenges which are irksome but nevertheless valid; 
sometimes a pursuit which we thought was over turns out not to be finished. The 
reasonable agent may find that cherished conclusions, reached after a difficult 
deliberative struggle, are thrown into doubt by a chance thought or observation. This does 
not mean that all challenges to reasons will be accepted, but that the reasonable agent is 
the agent who recognises when a reason that seemed sustainable is shown not to be, and 
also realises that it is time to start deliberating again, however tiresome that may be. The 
final reason for using the term ‘pursues’ is simply that it emphasises the motivational 
roots of the virtue; those things we pursue are those things that we care about catching, 
and the reasonable agent cares about finding reasons which are sustainable.
In one sense, the term ‘reliably successful’ has similar implications to the term 
‘pursues’; that is, by standing in contrast to alternatives such as ‘always successful’, it 
indicates that we do not expect that agents will always be able to find sustainable reasons. 
However, the inclusion of the term within the definition also indicates that we expect the 
reasonable agent to be capable of finding sustainable reasons most of the time; an agent 
who consistently set out to find such reasons but failed to do so might be considered to 
aspire to the virtue of reasonableness but not to have attained it. However, we must be 
cautious about the emphasis we place on success with respect to virtues. Zagzebski 
argues that reliable success is a component o f all virtues, saying, for example, that, ‘A 
kind, compassionate, generous, courageous or just person aims at making the world a
certain way, and reliable success in making it that way is a condition for having the virtue
202in question.’ While this claim is basically correct, we must also acknowledge that the 
degree to which the exercise of a virtue must be successful before the agent can be 
considered to possess that virtue depends on context. For example, we may say that the 
success of benevolence is manifested in the material difference an agent makes to the 
lives of others, and then realise that sometimes people we would not hesitate to describe 
as benevolent find themselves in situations where they are frustrated in making this 
difference: consider a doctor, helpless in the face of a ravaging plague, who can do 
nothing to ease the suffering that surrounds him. So, all we expect of virtue is reliable 
success, rather than perfect success.
202 Virtues o f  the Mind, page 136.
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Although we have offered a conveniently brief definition of reasonableness, we 
must also recognise that virtues resist precise definition, and that our understanding of 
them is best acquired through acquaintance, experience and attainment. We can get a 
better grasp of reasonableness, though, as well as reinforcing our claim that it is a virtue, 
by considering our experience of its corresponding vice: unreasonableness. Just as with 
reasonableness, although unreasonableness is not usually included in catalogues o f vices, 
once it has been proposed as a vice it seems intuitively plausible that we should accept it 
as such. Indeed, the feeling of recognition we get at the thought that unreasonableness is a 
vice is even greater than that we get at the thought that reasonableness is a virtue. As I 
shall argue later, we do not typically include reasonableness in our lists of virtues because 
it is often a relatively modest accomplishment; we find it easier to be reasonable than we 
find it to be courageous, or benevolent, or sometimes even honest. By contrast, and 
possibly because of the common attainment of reasonableness, genuine cases of 
unreasonableness stand out. If we can think of examples of people who we would call 
unreasonable - and, unfortunately, I think that most of us have to deal with such people 
from time to time - we have little doubt about what it is that makes us call them 
unreasonable, and we have even less doubt about how we feel about them; 
unreasonableness doesn't just engender an attitude of disapproval, but often produces 
teeth-gritting, fist-clenching frustration and anger.
However, despite this feeling of recognition and common reaction to examples of 
unreasonableness, this candidate for a vice is not exhibited in just one way. Rather, we 
can identify at least four distinct manifestations o f unreasonableness. The first o f these is 
simple laziness in the pursuit o f reasons. As we have seen, the pursuit of sustainable 
reasons does not demand that exhaustive deliberation is undertaken in response to every 
practical question, but it does require that for certain tough practical questions tough 
deliberation is undertaken. Sustainability does not mean complacency; rather it often 
arises from the very trouble taken to reach a conclusion. The lazily unreasonable agent is 
one who is unwilling to undertake difficult deliberation or to contemplate hard decisions, 
but who instead rests content with conclusions which, even if they have some merit, are 
not adequate to the task at hand. A lazily unreasonable agent may be a man who declares 
that he is not going to vote because politicians are all the same, and are only in it for 
themselves. The important thing to note about this sort of deliberative behaviour is that it 
is not simply a case of an agent finding sustainability where we find doubt. Such 
differences do occur, and our debates with others about their reasons are often attempts to 
discover how they can be confident about a conclusion which fails to convince us. If the 
agent is truly exhibiting the lazy form of unreasonableness then there is an element of bad 
faith involved. The agent is not really confident in the conclusion he or she claims to 
hold; confidence is merely claimed as a way to avoid further deliberative work. The man 
who refuses to vote is not really abstaining out o f principle or a genuine disillusionment 
with politicians; he just can't be bothered with the deliberative effort required to engage 
in the political process at all.
The second manifestation of unreasonableness also involves bad faith, but to an 
even greater degree that that exhibited within the lazy form of unreasonableness. That 
manifestation can best be characterised as slyness. Agents can be described as slyly 
unreasonable when they exploit the common conventions of deliberation and common 
motivations concerning reasons in order to get others to act in accordance with their
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wishes, not through persuasion, but through manipulation. In short, they are unreasonable 
because they subvert the reasonableness of others. Slyness works because the motivations 
concerning reasons are common and because these motivations are engaged by the 
judgements of others as well as by our own judgements. So, if someone tells us that 
within a piece of publicly articulated deliberation we have omitted or distorted a vital 
piece of deliberation, we will be discomfited; we will worry that our reasons are subject 
to arbitrary influences, that they are no longer intelligible, that they have become 
unsustainable and so on. We may also become concerned that others are judging us to be 
acting on unsustainable reasons. Our common motivations and our attention to the 
judgements of others mean that challenges to our reasons and deliberation are capable of 
disrupting our confidence, and this can be taken advantage of by the slyly unreasonable 
agent.
We have already met a straightforward example of slyness: the phenomenon of 
bluff described by Williams in ‘Internal and External Reasons’, in which one person 
simply insists that another person has a reason, even though he or she is not aware of it, 
and has no motivations from which that reason could be derived through sound 
deliberation. It takes little more than the assertion that a reason exists to make us wonder 
whether it is truly so. This may be partly due to our underlying awareness of all the 
different ways that deliberation goes wrong; we are often uncomfortably conscious that 
we are fallible, and that we are subject to all of the deliberative obstacles which we 
discussed in the early part of this thesis. Sometimes an insistence that we have a reason 
which we did not previously apprehend is simply right, and on reflection we adjust our 
understanding of our reasons accordingly. Consequently, genuine cases of bluff may be 
rare; an apparent bluffer may sincerely believe that he or she is helping the agent push 
past deliberative obstacles. But our occasional need for this help creates the opportunity 
for genuine cases of bluff.
Perhaps the most insidious form of sly unreasonableness occurs when the sly 
agent exploits the reasonableness of others to distort their deliberation. Imagine that the 
committee which runs an amateur dramatics society is trying to decide what their next 
production might be: Oklahoma! or HMS Pinafore. As often happens in such 
organisations, passions are deeply engaged: two factions emerge, each of which is 
fervently in favour of one of the options and implacably opposed to the other. Some 
members of each faction attempt to be reasonable about the disagreement; they examine 
their deliberation to see whether they are influenced by arbitrary considerations, they 
sincerely attempt to make their deliberation explicit and intelligible, and they wonder 
whether, in the face of such committed opposition, their reasons can really be considered 
sustainable. Other members o f the committee are not so virtuous, however. They 
deliberately introduce considerations into the argument which, although they resemble 
concerns which ought to be taken into account within deliberation are not really factors 
which matter within the context of this particular practical problem at all; they are simply 
attempts to disrupt the process of deliberation, made in the knowledge that the mostly 
reasonable agents who make up the rest of the committee will feel obliged to pay them at 
least some attention. So, an advocate of Oklahoma! Might suggest that it would be 
dangerous to stage HMS Pinafore at a time when the country is in the middle of an 
unpopular and intractable conflict, and the public might look askance at anything with 
militaristic connections. Similarly, an advocate of HMS Pinafore might argue that staging
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a musical such as Oklahoma! in which one of the characters dies in a knife fight might 
exacerbate the recent tendency of local youths to carry knives. Of course, it is not 
inconceivable that people could be extremely sensitive to exactly these issues, and that 
the concerns they voice about them are entirely sincere. However, within our example we 
may suppose that the people who raise these issues are not sincerely concerned about 
them; they just offer a means of subverting the collective deliberation of the committee in 
order to get what they want. Public, collective deliberation is especially vulnerable to 
such subversion, especially when it is conducted in such an outwardly polite context as 
the committee of an amateur dramatics society. Because of our pursuit o f sustainable 
reasons it is difficult to ignore challenges that are made towards our reasons and our 
deliberation. So, once the respective unreasonable proponents of Oklahoma! and HMS 
Pinafore have raised the issues o f youth violence and anti-militarism it is very difficult to 
make those issues go away. One can almost hear the committee members groan as they 
realise that their deliberations have just needlessly grown more complicated, and that 
their previous confidence and simplicity of approach cannot be recovered without being 
rude.
Rudeness is almost expected behaviour from those people who exhibit our third 
form of unreasonableness: autocracy. Autocratic unreasonableness occurs when the 
unreasonable agent adopts a particular attitude to sustainability; he or she may still be 
motivated to seek reasons which are sustainable, but has come to believe that his or her 
approval is all that is required to achieve that sustainability. Similarly, the agent feels no 
constraints to make reasons intelligible to anyone except him or herself, and may even be 
inclined to act on reasons which he or she does not really understand; reasons which 
might be better described as whims. In other words, the unreasonable autocrat issues 
edicts rather than offering proposals for action; such agents have an unwarranted excess 
of confidence in their reasons, to the extent that they are prepared to brook no challenge. 
This phenomenon may look like the variety of solipsism Nagel saw as the consequence of 
failing to recognise others as sources of reasons. There is a definite resemblance between 
autocracy and solipsism as understood by Nagel, but there is also an important difference; 
Nagel's solipsism seemed to arise from within the agent, as a mistaken understanding of 
the nature of agents and their reasons, whereas autocratic unreasonableness often arises 
through the immersion of the agent in institutions of power which simultaneously grant 
the agent authority while preventing that authority from being challenged.
Such institutionalised unreasonableness reaches its obvious peak in despotic 
regimes, and figures such as Caligula are exemplars o f unreasonableness; whims o f the 
moment are taken as foundations of dramatic action, and challenges to those whims are
909taken as treason. ' It is something of a cliche for writers to place the words, ‘I’m a
203 O f course, we have encountered frivolous whims before, and defended them against accusations of 
irrationality; Hume famously said that, ‘T is not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole 
world to the scratching of my finger’ (A Treatise o f  Human Nature, Book II, Part III, Section III, 463). 
The important thing to remember here is that Hume is arguing that the preference would not be 
irrational, not that action on that preference would not be unreasonable in our sense. In most people this 
particular preference would not exist, and even if it did, it is a long way from the preference to 
conclusions about action, through sound deliberation and the consideration of many other preferences. 
The point about unreasonable autocrats is that they do not accept the same constraints on their reasons 
as other people do, and, if they belong to the variety of autocrat we might meet in James Bond stories, 
may progress from trivial desire to global destruction on the basis of thoroughly bad reasons, even with
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reasonable man,’ in the mouths of such despots, usually at a point when they have a 
struggling victim within their power. These words are intended to be chilling because 
what comes next is extremely unlikely to be reasonable; the despot's power makes it 
unnecessary for him to be reasonable, and he is far more likely to propose a devastating 
compromise to his victim's integrity in exchange for a satisfaction of some desire than to 
seek to become a reliable partner in action. However, this form of unreasonableness does 
not only manifest itself in such extreme forms as that exhibited by the rulers of despotic 
regimes. It is also found in everyday situations, particularly in the workplace; it seems 
that we are particularly vulnerable to the temptations of power, and those temptations 
include the opportunity to avoid having to justify our reasons or make our deliberation 
intelligible.
We should note, though, that autocratic unreasonableness does not simply 
constitute the exercise of authority, or inducing people to act without a full explanation. 
There are many occasions on which group efforts must be co-ordinated, and can only 
succeed if members of the group cede authority to a leader who takes responsibility for 
decision making, but is not practically able to explain all of those decisions at the same 
time as realising the goals of the group. We may think, for example, of the captain of a 
sports team who has to make quick decisions about tactics and positioning, but cannot 
operate if these decisions must always be explained to the team members during a game. 
This authority gives rise to autocratic unreasonableness when the original reasons for not 
offering explanation and justification are forgotten, and the exemption from the 
conventions of reasonable discourse become associated with the role, or even worse, with 
the person. Such autocratic unreasonableness can often be particularly frustrating 
because, as mentioned earlier, the conditions which give autocrats power often also 
protect them from criticism and challenge. Someone who is subject to the autocratic form 
of the vice of unreasonableness is not only likely to reject the offer of help to clear away 
deliberative obstacles and apprehend reasons clearly; they may even have people whose 
job is to prevent them from even hearing such offers.
The final form of unreasonableness we will consider differs from the others in that 
it is produced by an excess of the motivations concerning reasons and deliberation rather 
than a deficiency. We can use the label pedantry to indicate the placing of an excessive 
burden on sustainability, to the point where it is more closely resembles the certainty 
sought by external reasons theorists, and where no reasons which we would normally 
accept seems good enough. Pedantry in the service of reasons occurs when the agent 
cannot achieve confidence that any reason suits a particular situation, and picks away at 
the basis for reasons in search of something more fundamental, with the effect of 
undermining his or her own confidence, as well as that of others. The obvious candidates 
for people who suffer from this form on unreasonableness are our external reasons 
theorists; or, indeed, anyone who worries at reasons to the point of plunging into the 
philosophical gloom in which Hume sometimes found himself.204 However, I believe that 
the question of whether such people are really unreasonable is rather more complicated, 
and I shall consider it at greater length later. A more familiar example of this sort of 
unreasonableness is the incessant curiosity exhibited by some children; not just on 
questions such as, ‘Why is the sky blue?’ but also in the repeated, ‘Why? Why? Why?’
respect to their own motivations.
204 Treatise, Book I, Part IV, Section VII, page 316.
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which follows any explanation we offer. It is surprising and sometimes alarming how 
quickly we run out of such explanations, or at least explanations that we can offer 
convincingly, and how much of our interaction with the world is dependent on trust and 
faith. Of course, it is unfair to judge that childish curiosity is genuinely unreasonable. 
Indeed, it may be seen as charming, and it is often regretted that we lose a childish sense 
of wonder as we mature. However, we must recognise that such views have a sentimental 
aspect, and that we would regard an adult who displayed such incessant curiosity while 
attempting to attend to practical matters as irritating, frustrating and, of course, 
unreasonable. As we grow in responsibility for our own actions and the actions of others 
we need to find confidence somewhere and continuous questioning can come to seem like 
self-indulgence. There are places in our lives for radical curiosity and the questioning of 
assumptions that we would ordinarily think of as unquestionable; and one of these places 
is the pursuit of philosophy. However, we must recognise that when we are engaged in 
endeavours which require us to radically question our most basic assumptions we are not 
engaged in the same sort of endeavour as when we try to make ordinary, or even 
extraordinary, decisions about action. Part of being reasonable is knowing which modes 
of enquiry to apply to which situation.
The existence of these different of forms of unreasonableness allows us to 
supplement our earlier definition of reasonableness as the pursuit of sustainable reasons 
by further defining it in relation to the vices it avoids. The requirement that reasons are 
sustainable means that the reasonable agent resists pressure from two directions: he or she 
resists our tendency towards laziness by refusing to accept reasons which are inadequate; 
and he or she resists our tendency towards pedantry by allowing that we can and should 
accept reasons once they are sustainable, even if there are other lines of enquiry which 
could conceivably be pursued. The thought that we have a virtue which steers us between 
the extremes of laziness and pedantry with regard to action has been echoed with regard 
to belief by Linda Zagzebski:
One must be neither too sanguine in one’s convictions nor too obsessed with the 
desire to inquire further before reaching the state of settled belief. One must, in short, 
know when to stop, but also when to start and to continue. The virtue that is the mean 
between the questioning mania and the unjustified conviction has no simple name, as 
far as I know, but it is something like being both properly inquiring and properly 
doubtful.’205
Of course, I think that, within the field of practical reason we can give that virtue 
a name, and that name is reasonableness. And if we want to give it a description similar 
to Zagzebski’s we can do so: it is the mean between laziness and pedantry in questions of 
practical reason; something like being both properly demanding of reasons and properly 
accepting of reasons which are sufficiently justified.206
205 Virtues o f  the Mind, page 154.
206 Although he is not writing about virtues, a similar thought is captured by John Dewey in How We Think, 
when he says that, ‘To take too much pains in one case is as foolish -  as illogical -  as to take too little in 
another. At one extreme, almost any conclusion that insures prompt and unified action may be better 
than any long delayed conclusion; while at the other, decision may have to be postponed for a long 
period -  perhaps for a lifetime.’ How We Think, page 78.
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Despite the existence of the vice of unreasonableness, and the achievement 
constituted by its avoidance, the concept of reasonableness may still seem rather too mild 
to qualify as a virtue. As an everyday term reasonableness has tones o f constraint and 
compromise, and when compared to other virtues such as benevolence and courage, 
which may be exhibited in conspicuously noble and dramatic ways, it may appear a little 
timid. However, there are other virtues which we do not always think of as particularly 
heroic. Honesty, for example, is something which we expect to exhibit and see exhibited 
in most agents most of the time, just as we expect that everybody should be able to attain 
some degree of reasonableness. However, even honesty has its moments o f drama and 
heroism. Consider the fable of the Emperor’s new clothes, in which the boy who points 
out that the Emperor is naked is doing no more than being honest, yet is doing something 
that no-one else would dare. Honesty may also rise above the mundane when it involves 
the recognition and proclamation of dishonesty. We are often too embarrassed to declare 
that someone is a liar, even when we know and he or she knows that this is the case, and 
even when keeping quiet makes us complicit in the dishonesty. Overcoming this 
embarrassment and speaking out is partly a matter of courage, but it is also an expression 
of the love of truth that motivates honesty. Reasonableness can produce similar moments 
of drama and, as with honesty, these typically come when the agent defies consensus or 
refuses to tolerate the corresponding vice.
What counts as a sustainable reason may vary from person to person and culture 
to culture, and is at least partly a consequence of deliberative habits ingrained in the 
culture and the individual. However, as we have seen, sustainability does not mean 
complacency; the term was deliberately chosen because it carries a connotation o f 
stability rather than permanence, and our account allows that, from time to time, 
appropriately critical thought will undermine what was previously seen as sustainable. 
This means that reasonableness, mild as it may seem, may be a component of radical 
social change. I think that it is plausible to claim that the slow collapse o f prejudice in 
some societies is constituted in part by a realisation that ways of thinking and behaving in 
relation to certain social groups are no longer sustainable. This does not necessarily mean 
that the motivations underpinning reasonableness initiate the change in attitudes; that may 
be brought about by means as various as campaigns of protest, changes in language and 
simply living alongside one another. The important thought is that, whatever begins the 
shift in attitudes, there comes a point when the reasonable agent realises that certain 
reasons and certain habits of thought can no longer be sustained; and the reasonable 
acknowledgement of this change may be both hard and praiseworthy, especially in 
comparison to the unreasonable alternative of denial. On a more individual level, the 
identification of unreasonableness may be as courageous and uncomfortable as calling a 
liar a liar. This is especially the case when unreasonableness takes the autocratic form we 
discussed earlier, and the unreasonable agent is in a position of authority over the 
reasonable agent. In calling unreasonableness what it is, the reasonable agent is not only 
undermining that authority, but the very way in which the autocratic agent thinks and 
behaves; imagine a junior minister in the British government telling the Prime Minister 
that not only are the policies he or she is being asked to implement wrong, but the reasons 
for implementing them are unsustainable and worse, that the thinking behind them is 
unintelligible. I do not wish to overstate the case; most of the time most us can be 
expected to be more or less reasonable in an undramatic way, just as most of us can be
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expected to be more or less honest. But there are occasions when reasonableness is 
heroic, and this supports the idea that it is worthy for consideration as a virtue.
The possibility that reasonableness can sometimes be heroic, and the existence of 
the vice of unreasonableness, both indicate that what we have found in reasonableness is 
a genuine virtue, rather than a mere skill associated with the activity o f deliberation. In 
Virtues o f  the Mind, Zagzebski discusses the distinction between virtues and skills at 
some length, identifying several different ways of making this distinction, including the 
need for virtues to be actively expressed in action, the intrinsic value of virtues compared 
to the instrumental value of skills, the possibility that virtues can be faked, and the 
existence o f vices as the opposite of virtues.207 1 believe that reasonableness qualifies as a 
virtue on all these tests: as defined here, reasonableness involves not only the reliably 
successful pursuit of sustainable reasons, but action on those reasons; we 
characteristically approve of the display of reasonableness for its sake, as well as any 
desirable outcomes which reasonable behaviour may produce; the existence o f the sly 
form of unreasonableness shows that reasonableness can be faked; and the existence of 
unreasonableness more generally shows that reasonableness has a corresponding vice.
However, the distinction between skills and virtues does not mean that 
deliberative skills are irrelevant to the virtue; on the contrary, virtues and skills are 
closely related, and particular virtues are associated with particular skills. This is 
certainly true in the case of reasonableness. In the early part of this thesis we talked about 
deliberative capabilities, and how the lack of these capabilities constituted deliberative 
obstacles. We can now recognise that some of those capabilities are skills associated with 
the virtue of reasonableness. We did not attempt to list all deliberative capabilities earlier, 
and I do not propose to present an exhaustive taxonomy of the skills associated with 
reasonableness here; this is partly because it can be difficult to know when one skill 
should be regarded as distinct from another, partly because some skills may also be 
associated with other virtues, but mainly because I believe that any such attempted 
taxonomy would inevitably be incomplete and inaccurate, and would also be of dubious 
value. I believe that it is enough that we can readily recognise that skills associated with 
individual deliberation, such as the ability to determine which people and which 
information to trust, the ability to exercise the imagination to an appropriate degree and 
the ability to maintain clarity about the deliberation which has been undertaken, are all 
closely related to reasonableness, as are skills associated with collective deliberation, 
such as the ability to articulate one’s position clearly, the ability to understand the 
arguments of others, and the ability to participate in fruitful discussion. All of these skills 
help us to find sustainable reasons, and to make the case for these reasons to others. And 
the relationship between these skills and the possession of the virtue of reasonableness is 
that suggested by the nature of the distinctions drawn between them; we can be 
reasonable without possessing these skills, but without them that reasonableness may be 
ineffectual.
So, we have established that reasonableness is a virtue, with a corresponding vice 
and a supporting set of skills. And, as we have defined it as a virtue in Humean terms, we 
have one more job of classification to do: we must determine whether it is a natural or an 
artificial virtue.
207 See Virtues o f  the Mind, 2.4, ‘Virtues distinguished from skills’.
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3.3.1 Reasonableness: A Natural Virtue?
As we have seen, Hume distinguishes between those virtues which we can expect 
to be valued by all cultures at all times, and those which, 'produce pleasure and 
approbation by means of an artifice or contrivance, which arises from the circumstances 
and necessity of mankind.' This distinction matters because, despite what we can 
discover through our theorising, if we share Hume's understanding of virtue we will look 
to our experience and judgements to tell us about virtue in the first instance. If we know 
that a virtue is artificial then we know that there are circumstances in which the virtue 
may not be manifested, not just within individuals who lack that virtue or who are subject 
to the corresponding vice, but within an entire culture. If we know that a virtue is natural 
then we may expect to find it exhibited in some way in every culture and circumstance, 
and also know that if  we do not find it easily then it is either manifested in a form with 
which we are unfamiliar, or that we are incorrect in regarding it as a natural virtue; either 
way, we may deepen our understanding of the virtue. I believe reasonableness is a natural 
virtue, but one whose manifestation varies from place to place and culture to culture, 
because reasonableness remains the same while what is considered reasonable at 
particular times and places changes.
To show this we will use a method which was employed in a basic form by Hume, 
but which has been used by many other writers including, recently, Bernard Williams: the 
method of imaginary genealogy.209 As we have seen, in order to establish that justice was 
an artificial virtue Hume imagined a fictitious state of nature in which the benefits and 
disadvantages of his civilised society were absent but the basic characteristics of human 
nature persisted.210 The assumption is that, if we can see how the patterns of motivations 
and behaviour constituting a virtue develop and become reinforced through judgements 
of approval in that state of nature, even if we vary what we consider that state o f nature to 
contain, then we have discovered a natural virtue. If we can see that the virtue would only 
have developed under particular, specialised circumstances, then we have discovered an 
artificial virtue. O f course, those particular, specialised circumstances may be an 
inescapable part of the world we live in, meaning that the virtue, though artificial, will 
appear in all actual human societies; thus Hume is able to classify justice (as he 
understands it) as an artificial virtue, at the same time as maintaining that it will be 
universally encountered and valued. In Truth and Truthfulness, Williams uses a similar
9 1 1approach but gives it rather more formality, and instead of describing the state of
212nature according to what ‘poets have invented’, says that, ‘In the State of Nature there 
is a small society of human beings, sharing a common language, with no elaborate 
technology and no form of writing.’213 However, despite this less fanciful definition, 
Williams is clear that in considering the State of Nature we are never considering a real 
historical situation: ‘The State of Nature story is a fiction, an imaginary genealogy, which 
proceeds by way of abstract argument from some very general and, I take it, indisputable
Treatise, Book III, Part II, Section I, page 529.
209 For Bernard Williams’ employment of this method see Truth and Truthfulness, especially chapter 2.
210 See Treatise, Book III, Part II, Section II.
211 Williams also acknowledges the work of other recent writers who have used a similar approach, notably 
Edward Craig in his book Knowledge and the State o f  Nature: An Essay in Conceptual Synthesis.
212 See Treatise, Book III, Part II, Section II, page 545.
213 Truth and Truthfulness, page 41.
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assumptions about human powers and limitations.’214 Despite this artificiality, Williams 
is able to use the State of Nature to demonstrate how his two virtues of truthfulness, 
Accuracy and Sincerity, inevitably develop out of the material demands of the situation 
and the existence of differences in knowledge as basic as what Williams calls ‘positional
215advantage’, which might be as straightforward as being up a tree while others are on 
the ground. This means that, in constructing the State of Nature we need make no attempt 
to ensure historical accuracy, but we must make sure that we only imbue the inhabitants 
of our story with the powers and limitations which humans indisputably possess. We 
should note, however, that a requirement of any imagined State of Nature is that it 
constitutes a society; even if we suppose that humans in the State of Nature would not 
form a stable community, we do not imagine that they comprise a group of people who 
have been suddenly thrown together in a primitive situation, as in the Lord o f the Flies.
It has been suggested that, even though Hume uses an abbreviated form of 
imaginary genealogy within his argument that justice is an artificial virtue, his work is not 
compatible with this sort of approach.216 Two charges are usually levelled at Hume in this 
respect. Firstly, it is claimed that his view of human nature is so uniform that it does not 
allow room for the development and variation which is manifest in history and which is 
required to make sense of genealogical accounts. This view of human nature as uniform 
is implied by his construction of a catalogue of virtues without considering whether a 
different person at a different time would construct a different catalogue, and is explicitly 
expressed when he makes claims such as, ‘It is universally acknowledged that there is a 
great uniformity among the actions of men, in all nations and ages, and that human nature 
remains still the same, in its principles and operations,’ and assertions such as, ‘Would 
you know the sentiments, inclinations and cause of life of the Greeks and Romans? Study 
well the temper and actions o f the French and English: You cannot be much mistaken in 
transferring to the former most of the observations which you have made with regard to 
the latter. Mankind are so much the same, in all times and places, that history informs us
9 17of nothing new or strange in this particular.’ The second charge levelled at Hume in 
relation to this part of our discussion is that despite his insistence on the uniformity of 
human nature, his own views are those of a particular culture at a particular point in time; 
he does not present us with humanity’s virtues, but with those of an 18th century 
Edinburgh gentleman. This view is most clearly expressed by Alasdair MacIntyre, who 
says in Whose Justice? Which Rationality? that, ‘What Hume presents as human nature 
as such turns out to be eighteenth-century English human nature, and indeed only one 
variant of that, even if  the dominant one.’218
There is some justification to these criticisms. Hume evidently does expect to find 
a high degree of uniformity in human nature, and he does produce a catalogue of virtues
214 Truth and Truthfulness, page 39.
215 Truth and Truthfulness, page 42.
216 For a recent discussion of this criticism of Hume, as well as a convincing reply to it, the line o f which I
shall largely follow here, see Simon Blackburn’s book Truth: A Guide fo r  the Perplexed, especially
Chapter 8, Section 2: ‘Mind Reading’. Interestingly, Blackburn includes Williams among those who 
have thought Hume incompatible with a genealogical approach, despite Williams’ explicit use of 
Hume’s account of justice as an example of imaginary genealogy in Truth and Truthfulness (pages 33- 
34).
217 Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Section VIII, Part I, 65, page 83.
218 Whose Justice? Which Rationality? page 295.
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which root him firmly in a particular time and place, to the extent that some of the entries 
in this catalogue (such as chastity) appear almost quaint from a modem perspective, and
his arguments for them (in the case of chastity, the assurance for a father of the paternity? 1 0of his children) may even seem repellent. However, these supposed failings are not 
fatal to his overall understanding of virtue, and should not necessarily be regarded as 
failings at all. Any account o f morality or practical reason which makes use of the 
concept of virtue, and possibly any account of morality or practical reason at all, must 
suppose that there is some degree of uniformity in human nature. Only the most radical 
proponents of a blank-slate theory would claim that there is absolutely no such thing as 
human nature, and this is a claim which is at odds with our own experience, our 
knowledge of history and the behaviour and development of non-human animals. In 
particular, it is at odds with our everyday experience of the concepts labelled as virtues in 
Hume’s and other virtue theories; part of the appeal of these theories is that they deal in 
concepts which are familiar to us, and at least some of these appear to be manifested and 
admired throughout human history. Faith that traits such as honesty, courage and 
benevolence are generally valued does not seem unwarranted.
Furthermore, despite his commitment to a common human nature, Hume both 
implicitly and explicitly allows for variations in the development and expression of this 
nature. This allowance is implicit in his distinction between natural and artificial virtues; 
this distinction allows that different cultures in different historical circumstances could 
exhibit and value character traits which are peculiar to them, yet are as deeply embedded 
within individuals and society to the degree that the respect for property Hume calls 
justice was embedded in his own. As mentioned earlier, Hume explicitly acknowledges 
the possibility of cultural variation in a dialogue included with the Enquiries. In this 
dialogue, Hume describes the superficially outlandish habits of two apparently fictional 
communities, before going on to reveal that these are actually societies which his readers 
would recognise: Periclean Athens and the France of Hume’s own time. The point of this 
dialogue is eloquently expressed when Hume says that, ‘The Rhine flows north, the 
Rhone south; yet both spring from the same mountain, and are also actuated, in their 
opposite directions, by the same principle of gravity. The different inclinations o f the 
ground, on which they run, cause all the difference in their courses.’220 In other words, 
Hume has an entirely plausible understanding of human nature; there are aspects of our 
nature which are common, and which produce common behaviour, values and 
judgements, and there are aspects of our nature which depend on material, historical and 
cultural circumstances, but which produce character traits which are nevertheless as 
central to our identities as anything produced by the common aspects of our nature. Given 
this understanding, the criticism of Hume’s parochialism seems rather less relevant. 
Indeed, this understanding means that we should take Hume’s apparent parochialism as a 
warning rather than a criticism. Despite the increased awareness in our own time of other 
cultures produced either by direct encounter or through education and the media we 
inevitably bring our own parochial concerns to the debate (and we must remember that 
Hume was, for his time, reasonably well travelled and conversant with other cultures). 
This means that it is particularly important to apply the Humean distinction which we are
219 Treatise, Book III, Part II, Section XII, O f chastity and modesty.
220 Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles o f  Morals, A Dialogue, 
page 333.
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attempting to apply here, between natural and artificial virtues, and in doing so must use 
methods such as imaginary genealogy to lift ourselves out of our parochial concerns, 
insofar as this is possible.
We can start our excursion into imaginary genealogy by imagining the same small 
society of human beings that Williams imagines in his State of Nature, with no writing 
and no elaborate technology. To this picture we can add that its inhabitants have basic 
human rational capacities and capabilities, and that they are faced with practical 
problems, the resolution o f which is required for survival, to make the society more 
successful in material terms, or just to make its members more comfortable. Some of the 
practical problems faced by the society can be solved by agents deliberating and acting 
alone, while others require collective action and collective deliberation. We can include 
the presence of practical problems in the State of Nature without compromising it as we 
would do if we introduced other elements such as a particular form of government, or a 
particular set of environmental circumstances, because practical problems are always 
with us, whether they concern basic questions such as how to get enough food to avoid 
starving, or rather more exotic questions such as how to avoid missing a television 
programme. Any situation with a complete lack of practical problems would not be a 
recognisable situation. Even if we imagine a science fiction world in which all human 
material wants were satisfied, then we would still face dilemmas concerning 
relationships, power, social organisation and so on; a world in which all of these 
problems were solved without the need for human deliberation would be a horror story 
rather than science fiction. A world of practical problems, whether our world or the State 
of Nature, contains those pressures which produce Williams’ virtues of Accuracy and 
Sincerity; the inhabitants of the State of Nature must be able to trust that those in a 
position to know more than them (such as the man who can see further because he has 
climbed a tree) are accurate in their beliefs and report those beliefs sincerely (when the 
man up the tree says that a lion is coming it is because he genuinely believes that a lion is 
coming and has a sound basis for that belief).
We can proceed in a similar step by step fashion from the pressures posed by the 
existence of practical problems within the State of Nature to the virtue of 
reasonableness. The first step is one of simple survival. Human beings are best able to 
solve the most basic practical problems, such as how to get enough food to eat and how 
to shelter from the weather, through the application of their capacity for reason. Most 
animals do not address the practical problems which face them through the application o f 
reason, or at least not in the same form as that exercised by human beings; their 
instinctive behaviour and physical capabilities provide them with a repertoire of means to 
address their particular range of needs. Humanity is not like that; nature may provide us 
with a set of instinctive responses and physical capabilities but we are, due to whatever 
evolutionary causes, so constituted that we must work things out for ourselves. 
Furthermore, our social natures, and the types of practical problem which face us (some 
of which are created by those social natures) mean that we cannot always work things out 
as individuals; sometimes we need to act collectively, and acting collectively usually 
means deliberating collectively. So, once we place human beings in a State of Nature
221 In following these steps I am taking a similar path to that taken by Miranda Fricker for the virtue o f 
epistemic justice in her forthcoming book Epistemic Injustice, particularly chapter 5, ‘The Genealogy of 
Testimonial Justice’.
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which contains practical problems, we create a need for those human beings to deliberate 
and act as individuals and in groups.
The second step towards the virtue of reasonableness is taken when we realise that 
the inhabitants of the State of Nature cannot achieve practical success through the 
application of the capacity for reason alone; such bare application would involve 
conducting deliberation in the face of every problem as if the agent had never 
encountered that problem or anything like it. The continued practical success o f the 
inhabitants of the State of Nature demands that a repertoire of practical conclusions is 
developed in which individuals and groups can be confident; both so that those 
conclusions can be used again in similar situations, and so that they can be used as a basis 
for further deliberation.
The third step towards the virtue of reasonableness acknowledges that this 
confidence will sometimes be misplaced. Any individual or group will occasionally go 
wrong in practical deliberation, especially from such a basic starting point as we imagine 
in the State of Nature. This means that continued practical success is also dependent on 
the ability to critically appraise the contents of the repertoire of practical conclusions, 
even if these have worked before. At the same time, this critical appraisal must not be 
allowed to undermine confidence in the entire repertoire of practical conclusions; this 
would result in practical paralysis for the inhabitants of the State of Nature. These 
inhabitants must strike a balance between confidence and criticism.
The fourth step towards the virtue of reasonableness is necessary for the previous 
two steps to be effective; in order to be confident in the conclusions of deliberation, and 
in order to critically appraise those conclusions, we must be able to understand the 
deliberation which produced them; that deliberation must be intelligible. And this need 
for intelligibility produces the opportunity that constitutes our fifth and final step; if  we 
understand our own deliberation and that o f our potential partners in action we are in a 
position to build confidence in and critically appraise the way we deliberate as we would 
any other form of action. We can develop our repertoire o f modes of deliberation as well 
as our repertoire of practical conclusions.
Although we have only considered each of these steps briefly, I believe that they 
are sufficiently plausible to be accepted as necessary consequences of a State of Nature 
filled with practical problems and populated by a basic human society facing those 
problems. These steps mean that the inhabitants of that society, if they value their own 
practical success, will value practical and deliberative behaviour which exercises the 
human capacity for reason to produce practical conclusions which are sustainable. In 
other words, they will recognise and value reasonableness. We can demonstrate this 
further by considering alternative ways in which societies and values might develop in 
the State of Nature, and ask whether these alternatives are at all plausible. Let us imagine 
three fictional communities. The first of these approximates to that which he have argued 
will arise within the State of Nature, and exhibits a respect for reasonableness, and we 
shall call it the reasonable community. The other two communities represent departures 
from this situation, and are manifestations of different types of unreasonableness. We 
shall call one the lazy community and the other the pedantic community. Before 
discussing them, though, we must be clear that these communities are not intended as 
basic or original versions o f real human communities; they are wholly artificial. We do 
not imagine them in order to show what could arise in the State of Nature, but rather what
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could not arise.
Members of the lazy community do not place a high value on the justification of 
practical conclusions and consequently are prepared to act on conclusions which have a 
shaky justification, or possibly no justification at all. Another way of putting this is to say 
that members of the lazy community have a high tolerance for arbitrariness. We can 
imagine a society tolerating arbitrariness to varying degrees, from allowing that practical 
conclusions based on completely arbitrary considerations are acceptable, to simply 
acknowledging that a degree of arbitrariness may be inevitable in all complex practical 
questions. At some point, o f course, the degree of arbitrariness allowed becomes 
compatible with our virtue of reasonableness, and the lazy community which allows this 
degree of arbitrariness is indistinguishable from the reasonable community. The line 
between the two imaginary communities seems to be crossed when it is insisted that 
practical conclusions are at least justified on the basis of the their prospects of practical 
success; in other words, our imaginary lazy community accepts practical conclusions as 
good enough to act upon, even if there is no basis for believing that those conclusions 
will produce the practical results desired. There are, of course other grounds for the 
justification of action, but the fundamental question of practical success seems most 
appropriate to the State of Nature we are considering. And, as soon as we imagine a 
community which is prepared to accept the conclusions of practical deliberation even 
though they are not compatible with practical success we can see that such a community 
is either implausible from the outset or implausible as a sustainable prospect, depending 
on the degree of arbitrariness and lack of justification which we suppose it is willing to 
accept. If we imagine a complete tolerance for arbitrariness then we cannot imagine a 
community at all; all that we can imagine is a group of anarchic individuals acting on the 
basis of whatever whim or notion happened to cross their minds, and who would rapidly 
have to change their attitude towards justification or simply die out. If we simply imagine 
a heightened tolerance for practical conclusions which have no justification in terms of 
practical success, then we also end up with a community which will become extinct, 
albeit more gradually.
This extinction is likely to happen for two reasons. Firstly, a community with 
limited concern for the practical success of practical conclusions, to the extent that they 
will act in the absence of the prospect of that success will simply not be practically 
successful; at times its responses to practical problems will be fruitless, and this, in a 
situation such as we imagine the State of Nature to be, with no technology and limited 
resources, will eventually be fatal. We must be clear what we are talking about here: we 
are not simply saying that the lazy community sometimes goes wrong in practical 
matters; all societies and individuals make practical mistakes from time to time, 
sometimes trivial and sometimes catastrophic. Rather, we are saying that because the lazy 
community does not judge practical conclusions on the basis of whether they will 
produce practical success, it will not avoid mistakes, and may go on making a mistake 
even after it has been recognised as such. This brings us to the second reason that the lazy 
community will not last, even if it does not have a complete tolerance for arbitrariness; 
failure to judge practical conclusions according to their prospects of practical success 
means that the lazy community will grow neither its practical nor its deliberative 
repertoires. Because the lazy community essentially does not care about the quality o f its 
practical conclusions, it will not develop the deliberative habits or establish the set of
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deliberative starting points required for new rounds of deliberation to build on the success 
of the old. In the absence of a demand for justification, possible reasons for action stand 
on a par with each other; the prior success of a particular course of action or mode of 
deliberation provides no basis for preferring it over any other. This lack of development 
would not kill the lazy community on its own, of course, unless a particularly challenging 
problem happened along, perhaps in the form of a natural disaster or an aggressive 
predator; in the absence of such challenges a version of the lazy community that was not 
completely tolerant of arbitrariness could conceivably manage a desultory and somewhat 
odd existence. Extinction would come if the lazy community was ever forced to compete 
with a version of the reasonable community, which would not only be more successful in 
choosing fruitful courses of action, but would also be capable of incorporating that 
success within the criteria used for choosing future courses of action.
Of course, there is a third reason why the lazy community would become extinct: 
if  inhabited by recognisable human beings it would either never come into existence in 
the first place, or it would change almost immediately into a version of the reasonable 
community. The need for practical conclusions to have some sort of correlation to 
practical success is so basic that we struggle to imagine how it could not form part of the 
criteria of judgement of reasons for action in every group of rational human beings; for 
this to be the case would require some very odd cultural circumstances lying far outside 
the imagined State of Nature. Surprisingly, though, circumstances have occurred 
historically with some of the characteristics of the lazy community: although they were 
short-lived, did not involve groups of people so cohesive that they could be described as a 
community, and did not pervade every aspect of deliberation for those people involved, 
there have been periods of delusion in which normal judgements of practical conclusions 
have been suspended, and a tolerance of arbitrariness has prevailed. Such periods are 
easiest to spot in the world of commerce and include phenomena such as the South Seas 
Bubble and the Dutch tulip mania of the 17th century, as well as a much more recent 
example: the dot com boom of the late 1990s. However, the existence of these anomalous 
periods need not trouble us too much, due to the unusual conditions required to sustain 
them, as well as the tendency for their collapses to be just as spectacular and rather more 
inevitable than their excesses.
The pedantic community is the opposite of the lazy community. While the 
inhabitants of the lazy community do not demand justification for practical conclusions to 
the degree required to reliably achieve practical success, the inhabitants o f the pedantic 
community demand excessive justification for every practical conclusion. And, just as 
with the reasonable community, we can imagine varying degrees to which this defining 
characteristic of the pedantic community is exhibited by its inhabitants. We can start by 
imagining a version of the pedantic community whose inhabitants are never satisfied by 
any practical conclusion unless it can be shown to possess the certainty desired by our 
external reasons theorists, and diminish the degree of justification demanded until the 
pedantic community is indistinguishable from the reasonable community. The point at 
which we cross from pedantry to reasonableness mirrors the corresponding distinction 
between laziness and reasonableness. We said that we were imagining the lazy 
community when we imagined that its inhabitants did not at least demand that 
conclusions about action were made on the basis of their likelihood to produce practical 
success. We can similarly say that we are imagining the pedantic community when we
124
Be Reasonable -  David Knott
imagine a community whose inhabitants prize the identification of justified conclusions 
about action above actually taking action likely to produce practical success, and who 
would let opportunities for practical success pass if the justification for the action 
required to exploit those opportunities had not been established. Characterising the 
pedantic community in this way acknowledges that deliberation is itself an activity which 
takes time and effort -  sometimes indefinite amounts of time and effort if  a conclusion 
cannot be reached -  and that sometimes going on deliberating is not compatible with 
successful practical action. The stereotypical inhabitant of the pedantic community is 
capable of being paralysed like Buridan’s ass if offered two near-identical options for 
action and compelled to find finer and finer considerations to justify choosing one over 
the other.
Just as with the lazy community we can see that the most extreme example o f the 
pedantic community would be a catastrophic failure; a community whose inhabitants 
sought fundamental justification for every action would simply fail to take any action at 
all. Furthermore, this would even be the case if, as desired by our external reasons 
theorists, there was some fundamental basis for action capable of providing external 
reasons. If there is such a basis then humans seem perennially incapable of clearly 
apprehending it; hence millennia of philosophical debate. Even if, say, Kant was right, 
then the inhabitants of the pedantic community would still be deliberating about whether 
he was right, just like the rest of us. However, again as with the lazy community, even 
milder forms of the excessive demand for justification which characterises the pedantic 
community seem to lead to the extinction of that community. In much the same way that 
the lazy community suffered from wasted effort and resources through pursuing 
insufficiently justified actions, the pedantic community would suffer from missed 
opportunities due to an inability to take decisions. Furthermore, the pedantic community 
is as unlikely to develop its deliberative and practical repertoire as the lazy community, 
albeit for different reasons. Because its inhabitants always demand excessive degrees of 
justification, the pedantic community is unable to develop confidence in its practical 
conclusions. Those conclusions which, however painfully, are established as justified for 
one set of circumstances may not be accepted as justified for a similar set of 
circumstances. Confidence implies that beyond a certain point justification exists without 
having to seek it, or even to articulate it. The inhabitants o f the pedantic community 
cannot be content with such silence. Once again, under specialised circumstances the 
excessive demand for justification and consequent inability to develop confidence might 
not be fatal. However, such specialised circumstances are not found in the State of Nature 
and, just like the lazy community, we cannot imagine the pedantic community surviving 
an encounter with the reasonable community, either because it would be out-competed, 
or, more likely, because it would simply become the reasonable community.
However, we must remember that such a competition would not arise in the State 
of Nature for the pedantic community or the lazy community. Our inability to imagine the 
lazy community or the pedantic community surviving an encounter with the reasonable 
community does not indicate that they would be beaten in such encounters, or that the 
reasonable community is the best of three possible communities: it indicates that the 
reasonable community, which respects the virtue of reasonableness, is the only 
community we can imagine at all in the State of Nature. As a consequence, we can regard 
reasonableness as a natural virtue. This means that, not only can we expect to find
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reasonableness exhibited in some form in all cultures, but also that, if  we find it to be 
compatible with our account of internal reasons our common intuitions about reasons, it 
forms part of our understanding of practical reason, not just for those of us having this 
debate, but for all of humanity. We shall return to the question of whether the natural 
virtue of reasonableness is compatible with our account and our intuitions later. First, 
however, we should sound a note o f caution about our identification of reasonableness as 
a natural virtue.
We should not imagine that we shall find reasonableness exhibited in exactly the 
same way in every culture; although we have said that the only community we can 
imagine in the State of Nature is the reasonable community, we should not suppose that 
humanity lives in uniformly reasonable communities, or that reasonableness is always 
manifested in the same way. To do so would be to deny the evidence of history. In a 
modem, Western, secular, 21st century democracy such as Britain, the idea of 
reasonableness has echoes of broadly liberal values, such as tolerance and fairness, as 
well as an uneasiness with dogma. However, we are also aware that other cultures, some 
current and some historical, do not share such values, and consequently that what they 
consider reasonable will often differ dramatically from what we consider reasonable. In 
understanding this variety we must recognise that the display of reasonableness has three 
aspects: the underlying motivations which lead us to deliberate and act in a reasonable 
fashion; the deliberative skills which enable those impulses to be expressed; and beliefs 
and judgements about what is sustainable, which vary from culture to culture and from 
person to person.
For example, consider the difference between a modem, Western, secular, liberal 
democrat and a devoutly religious Renaissance figure such as Thomas More. From what 
we know of More from his own writing and that of others we would certainly be inclined 
to describe him as reasonable, yet much of what he found to be reasonable, such as his 
own persecution of Protestants and his willingness to die rather than deny the authority of 
the Catholic Church, we would not find to be reasonable today. The difference between 
More and our modem liberal is not necessarily in their reasonableness, but in their 
starting points; they can find reasons which they individually consider sustainable, yet 
cannot follow the same deliberative routes because they do not start from the same place 
and do not have the same deliberative skills. This does not mean that reasonableness is a 
relativist notion, or that what different cultures consider to be reasonable and 
unreasonable is irreconcilable. On the contrary, the motivations and patterns o f behaviour 
which constitute reasonableness remain the same, even if the context of the reasonable 
agent and the subject of his or her deliberations change. Furthermore, the nature of 
reasonableness itself gives us hope for connection between disparate cultures. I do not 
want to claim that reasonableness can solve all disputes or reconcile all differences 
between cultures and individuals; years or even centuries of engagement may be required 
for that, and may even entrench conflict. However, the impulses behind reasonableness 
push in the direction of reconciliation. The desire for reasons to be sustainable keeps us 
alive to the challenges arising from other points of view which indicate that our current 
reasons may no longer be sustainable.
3.3.2 Reasonableness and Internal Reasons
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While we have been attempting to show that reasonableness is a virtue we have 
put our account of internal reasons to one side. We must now return to that account and 
ask whether the virtue of reasonableness complements it or contradicts it. We can ask this 
question at two levels: we can ask whether the individual elements of the internal reasons 
account are compatible with the concept of reasonableness as a virtue; and we can ask at 
a somewhat higher level whether the concept fills gaps within the account and extends 
our understanding of the dependence of practical reason on motivations. In answering this 
second question we must consider whether, if we establish it as part of the internal 
reasons account, the concept of reasonableness as a virtue allows that account to meet our 
common intuitions about reasons rather more completely.
We shall start by considering the five elements of the internal reasons account as 
they have developed in the course of our discussion. Let us briefly recap what these 
elements are. Firstly, the account rests on the basic claim that reasons are dependent on 
subjective motivations, and that consequently external reasons do not exist. Secondly, we 
maintain that reasons can be produced by a process o f sound deliberation, and that this 
process can modify the agent’s motivations. Sound deliberation is not restricted to 
algorithmic, stepwise, reasoning, although it may certainly contain such reasoning, but 
also includes less structured elements such as the exercise of the imagination. Thirdly, we 
insist that both an agent’s reasons and what may count as sound deliberation are 
indeterminate. Fourthly, we claim that the mind itself contains indeterminate 
psychological contents, including the forerunners of beliefs and motivations, which are 
progressively settled into more determinate contents both by the formation of character 
over time and by individual instances of deliberation. Finally, we argue that even internal 
reasons capable of being produced by sound deliberation from the agent’s motivations 
can be divided into those which are accessible to the agent, and those which the agent can 
only apprehend by overcoming some deliberative obstacle. In short, the internal reasons 
account denies any picture in which the agent’s reasons are laid out clearly and cleanly 
irrespective of his or her identity, and in which the agent’s task is to locate the set of 
reasons pertinent to current circumstances. Rather, it presents the agent’s psychology and 
his or her reasons as developing and contingent entities, whose nature is not settled prior 
to the start of deliberation, and which will be at least partly determined by the way in 
which deliberation happens to go. It is this degree of contingency which simultaneously 
satisfies our individualistic intuition about reasons and troubles the universalistic intuition 
about reasons.
The concept of reasonableness as a virtue is compatible with the basic claim that 
reasons are dependent on motivations in two ways. Firstly, and most straightforwardly, 
unlike some of the external reasons theories we have encountered, the concept does not 
demand or imply that reasons exist in the absence of motivations. Secondly, and more 
importantly, it is compatible with the claim because it has been constructed on the basis 
of the implications of that claim. We have reached our understanding of the virtue of 
reasonableness by treating deliberation as an action and by asking what motivations 
might give us reasons to go about that action in a particular way, just as our account of 
internal reasons requires. Furthermore, the second and third order questions we have 
considered (what our attitudes are towards our motivations concerning reasons, and how 
our consciousness of these attitudes and desires for approval influence our behaviour) all 
have motivations at their root. It is, of course, unsurprising that an essentially Humean
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claim about action should be compatible with an essentially Humean understanding of 
virtue.
The concept of reasonableness as a virtue is compatible with the understanding of 
sound deliberation within our account because it has the same influence on reasons and 
deliberation: it constrains the reasons which we judge to be legitimate without 
determining exactly what those reasons are and what that deliberation should be. Sound 
deliberation constrains reasoning because not just any way of deliberating can be 
considered sound, but does not determine reasons because there are many ways of 
deliberating soundly in any particular practical situation. Similarly, there are ways of 
deliberating and acting which are manifestly demonstrations of unreasonableness, but 
there are also many different ways of deliberating and acting in the same situation while 
remaining reasonable. Indeed, the relationships which sound deliberation and 
reasonableness have to our reasons resemble each other so closely that it is tempting to 
say that they are two terms for the same thing, or that one is a component of the other. I 
am reluctant to do this because there are distinct differences between the concepts, one of 
which is particularly important. Although we use the term reasonableness 
indiscriminately in everyday language to refer to reasons, actions and agreements, among 
other things, if we understand reasonableness as a virtue then we understand it primarily 
as a characteristic o f agents. By contrast, sound deliberation is just what it sounds like: a 
description best applied to deliberation rather than agents. Because of this distinction it is 
possible for reasonable agents to deliberate unsoundly; an agent may be driven by all the 
motivations underpinning reasonableness, and may be sincerely attempting to deliberate 
in a reasonable manner, yet make some sort of error in deliberation. Just as we would 
continue to call someone honest who sincerely reported a false belief, we would continue 
to call someone reasonable who made an unwitting error which rendered an instance of 
deliberation unsound. Similarly, an agent may deliberate soundly yet be thoroughly 
unreasonable; the agent who is subject to the sly form of the vice of unreasonableness 
may follow an impeccably sound deliberative route which serves the purpose of 
distorting, suppressing or confusing the deliberation of others. So, I think that it is best 
for us to say simply that the concept of sound deliberation is compatible with the concept 
of reasonableness as a virtue, and that the reasonable agent will want to deliberate 
soundly, even if  this desire is not always satisfied.
The way in which the concept of reasonableness as a virtue is compatible with the 
indeterminacy of reasons and deliberation is similar to the ways in which it is compatible 
with our understanding of sound deliberation. This is hardly surprising, as it is one of our 
claims that what counts as sound deliberation is essentially indeterminate. Our primary 
illustration of the implications of indeterminacy was to imagine near-identical agents in 
near-identical situations who can nevertheless follow different deliberative routes to 
radically different conclusions about their reasons for action, and to argue that these 
differing deliberative routes could be considered sound and the conclusions they issue in 
considered justified. Our understanding of reasonableness also allows that both agents 
could be considered reasonable. Of course, our understanding of reasonableness allows 
that different starting points for deliberation and different deliberative routes may be 
considered reasonable by different individuals and different cultures; but that is not the 
situation that we are considering here. Reasonableness as we understand it allows that 
different deliberative routes may be followed by near-identical agents because all it asks
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is that the agent pursues sustainable reasons. And this allows that many different paths 
may be followed, even if these paths start from the same point and the agents pursuing 
them have much the same deliberative repertoire. However, as well as allowing for the 
situation described in our primary illustration of indeterminacy, the virtue of 
reasonableness also has a deeper relationship with indeterminacy. What may be 
considered reasonable is itself not fully determinate. Our definition of reasonableness, 
whether as the pursuit of sustainable reasons, or as the mean between laziness and 
pedantry in questions of practical reason, deliberately employs terms whose meaning is 
less than fully determinate. I believe that this essential indeterminacy is a necessary 
feature o f a virtue understood in Humean terms, and potentially a virtue understood in 
any theoretical terms at all; although we may attempt to delineate and describe such 
virtues and even to speculate about their origins, when we do so we are building on an 
untheorised, unarticulated recognition of that virtue, without which we cannot genuinely 
understand it at all. The essential indeterminacy of reasonableness is such that we 
determine what is reasonable or unreasonable by the application of judgement and 
recognition to individual agents, reasons and actions, rather than through the application 
o f rules or determinate criteria.
The concept of reasonableness as a virtue is also compatible with both of the 
senses in which we understand the phenomenon of steadying the mind. The sense we 
have concentrated on so far in our discussion is that in which the contents of the mind are 
settled within individual instances of deliberation; when thinking about what to do the 
agent is beset by a range of considerations and possibilities, some of which become 
settled into beliefs about what to do, and some of which become settled into desires, both 
for outcomes and for means of achieving those outcomes. The desire for sustainability 
underlying the virtue of reasonableness reflects this phenomenon; it expresses the wish 
that we should not only reach justified conclusions within particular instances of 
deliberation, but that those justified conclusions should become part of our deliberative 
furniture, providing an established start point from which the next instance of deliberation 
can proceed. Thus, steadying the mind, even in the context of individual instances of 
deliberation, does not just mean settling the mental contents required to carry out that 
piece of deliberation; it constitutes a development in the deliberative repertoire o f the 
agent. Of course, this leads us to the second sense of steadying the mind, which has not 
concerned us so much in this discussion: steadying the mind as the establishment o f 
character. As a virtue, the concept of reasonableness is thoroughly compatible with this 
sense o f steadying the mind. Virtues are attainments of character which we expect to be 
realised through a long process of education, cultural immersion, personal experience and 
practice.222 Each of these processes, along with the development of a deliberative 
repertoire through individual instances of deliberation, steady the unsettled contents o f 
the mind into constituents of character. Furthermore, reasonableness reinforces some of 
the points Williams was trying to make through his discussion of steadying the mind. The 
fictional character of Rameau was interesting because the way in which his fleeting
222 We have only briefly considered the means by which virtues are attained, partly through our discussion 
of the difference between virtues and skills, and partly through our excursion into imaginary 
geneaology, although the latter was of course not intended to show the actual attainment of virtue by 
actual agents. For fuller treatments of this subject from a largely Aristotelian perspective, see Sabina 
Lovibond’s book Ethical Formation and M.F.Bumyeat’s paper ‘Aristotle on Learning to be Good’.
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character was formed resembled the way in which all of our characters are at least partly 
formed (through the social situation he found himself in and the way in which he 
interacted with others) but the steadiness of his character did not resemble ours at all (it 
was continuously reconstituted as he flitted from one social situation to another) with the 
result that he was thoroughly unreliable, not through any maliciousness, but through 
sheer volatility. By contrast one of the effects of our mind becoming more steady for 
most of us is that we become more reliable, and this is certainly the case as the virtue of 
reasonableness becomes embedded in our characters.
Finally, we come to the significance and treatment of deliberative obstacles within 
our account. We said that such obstacles both create reasons which would otherwise not 
exist and obscure reasons which agents would otherwise accept, and I labelled those 
reasons to which the agent could deliberate soundly without having to overcome 
significant deliberative obstacles strongly internal reasons, and those reasons to which 
the agent could only deliberate if deliberative obstacles were overcome weakly internal 
reasons. The concept of reasonableness as a virtue not only fits well with this concept, 
but also offers us an alternative to this perhaps rather inelegant terminology, as the 
boundary of the reasons which may be acknowledged by the reasonable agent will often 
coincide with the boundary between strongly internal reasons and weakly internal 
reasons. The distinction between strongly and weakly internal reasons allows that the 
deliberation of agents can be considered sound even if it settles on reasons which are not 
as good as those which lie on the other side of deliberative obstacles. The importance of 
reasonableness to this idea is two-fold. Firstly, it seems natural to say that an agent who 
seeks and acts on reasons that can be apprehended through sound deliberation is 
reasonable, even if the path of that sound deliberation has been influenced by deliberative 
obstacles; although we must also acknowledge that sometimes the reasonable agent will 
be expected to overcome deliberative obstacles as part of being reasonable. Secondly, it 
also seems natural to say that an agent’s perception of what is reasonable, formed by his 
or her historical and personal circumstances, can itself constitute a deliberative obstacle. 
When we originally discussed deliberative obstacles we considered several of the forms 
which such obstacles could take. One of those forms was deliberative habits; the 
tendency to follow the similar paths to those we have followed in the past, particularly if 
those paths have been successful. The virtue of reasonableness is not exactly the same as 
habit; habit has connotations of laziness and complacency which do not fit with the 
demand for sustainability. However, the demand for sustainability also means that we 
seek reasons which are good enough rather than reasons which are perfect, and the very 
discovery of reasons which are good enough and the continued practical success of action 
on those reasons may prevent us from apprehending reasons which are even better, or 
which are more suited to a changed situation.
For example, consider the Imperial Roman court as described by Tacitus. For the 
inhabitants of this particular historical situation it is entirely reasonable to take such 
practical precautions as having food examined for tampering, or taking bodyguards when 
visiting supposed friends. If you or I were thrust into such a situation without preparation 
we would find these precautions not just unreasonable but melodramatic, and as a 
consequence might not survive for long. Conversely, agents who had existed in a state of 
reasonable paranoia who found themselves in a new position where most people could be 
trusted most of the time would still tend to deliberate, on the basis o f their prior
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experience and knowledge, in a suspicious and fearful fashion. Given their background, 
such modes of deliberation would be manifestations of reasonableness, but this 
reasonableness would stand in the way of more trustful and fulfilling relationships with
223others. ' This is why, as we argued earlier, reasonableness can sometimes be heroic; the 
imagination required to perceive that what seemed sustainable is no longer sustainable, 
and the effort required to get others to see that this is the case, may be extreme.
So, it seems that the concept of reasonableness as a virtue is at least compatible 
with the individual components of our internal reasons account. However, I believe that 
the concept does more for our account that simply provide us with a way of 
understanding the consequences of our common motivations and reasons; it provides us 
with a way of satisfying the universalistic intuition regarding reasons which we have so 
far been only partly able to satisfy. Remember that we found two ways to satisfy this 
intuition within the bounds of our account, even before introducing the concept o f the 
virtue of reasonableness. Deliberation does not always go well. Sometimes it is beset by 
deliberative obstacles, meaning that while the agent can deliberate soundly to one set of 
reasons, an observer who is not subject to these obstacles may deliberate soundly to 
reasons which are both different and better. The observer’s judgement may legitimately 
differ from the agent’s, even though we also say that the agent has found genuine reasons. 
And sometimes, of course, the agent's deliberation is simply unsound; even without the 
help of deliberative obstacles, the agent has made some error of inference or logic and 
consequently supposes him or herself to have discovered reasons which do not actually 
exist. However, these two ways in which our account allows that observers can 
legitimately make better judgements about the reasons of agents than agents themselves 
do not do enough to satisfy the universalistic intuition. These two ways of going wrong in 
deliberation seem merely to be deficiencies in information or deliberative skill, which 
could be corrected with the help of the observer. Of course, it is not quite that easy; the 
deliberative obstacles we have discussed include habits and a lack of deliberative 
capabilities, which might take years of training and experience to change, if, indeed, they 
could be changed at all. However, the thought remains that these habits could be changed 
and capabilities established in principle, even if this would be practically difficult; there 
is a sense that deliberators who have gone wrong in the ways we have discussed are 
simply in want of the right sort of help, and that with the right help their perceptions of 
their reasons would happily fall in line with those of the observer.
The true concern o f the universalistic intuition is the intractable allegiance or 
resistance of agents to reasons despite our attempts to persuade them otherwise. The 
universalistic intuition indicates that if  we continue to disagree about reasons when 
deliberative obstacles have been cleared out of the way and unsound deliberation has 
been acknowledged or corrected, then we must have recourse to something that will settle 
the disagreement; there must be a way of showing that one of us is wrong, and that if  
whichever one of us is wrong persists in our error, we are doing something wrong. In
223 O f course, maintaining this mode of deliberation would not be likely to be very reasonable for very long. 
For an agent to continue to stay generally suspicious in the face of trustworthy, honest and open 
behaviour from all others and to be considered reasonable he or she would have to have been subjected 
to an extreme betrayal. Unfortunately, such situations are not inconceivable. Jews and other groups who 
considered themselves to be accepted members of German society in the 1930s were subjected to a 
betrayal that would make it reasonable for them to doubt the intentions and attitudes of those they have 
lived alongside with apparently normal relationships for many years.
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other words, we want our judgements to have a normative bite which goes beyond the 
correction of deliberative error. At the same time we must remember that, most o f the 
time, our universalistic intuition about reasons is no more than an intuition; it is not an 
articulated principle, and it is not absolute. As an intuition, it can be satisfied with less 
than proof of the existence of universal, inescapable reasons; it can be satisfied with the 
demonstration that we have grounds for challenging the reasons of others on the basis of 
more than simply skill or circumstance. I believe that the concept of reasonableness as a 
virtue gives us these grounds.
O f course, reasonableness cannot satisfy the universalistic intuition by providing 
universal reasons; our understanding of reasonableness is such that agents can be 
considered reasonable even though they acknowledge and act for divergent and 
potentially contradictory reasons. However, it does provide a normative framework for 
judging the way agents come by their reasons and maintain faith in them; those people 
whose deliberation, reasons and actions possess certain characteristics are taken to have 
attained a virtue; while those whose deliberation, reasons and actions do not are taken to 
be in the grip of a vice. When we challenge the sustainability of an agent’s reasons, we 
expect that, if that agent is reasonable, he or she will care enough about such challenges 
to respond in some way, just as an honest agent would feel compelled to respond to an 
accusation of lying. The reasonable agent whose reasons have been challenged is likely to 
attempt to find further justification for those reasons, or, if that justification cannot be 
found and the challenge is serious, to modify those reasons, or even to come around to 
the challenger’s point of view. The important thing is that the challenged agent’s 
reasonableness provides a point of engagement; unless the challenge is obviously 
frivolous or without merit, the reasonable agent cannot leave it unaddressed without 
feeling uncomfortable. This point of engagement does not provide us, as challengers and 
judges of the reasons of others, with guarantees that we are right, or that the agent will 
respond in the way we want, by accepting our judgements and challenges; but, as 
mentioned, I do not think that such guaranteed acceptance is what we are after. Rather, 
we are after a way in which our judgements can get a normative and motivational grip on 
the agent, and this is what the virtue of reasonableness gives us. The challenged agent 
will not necessarily come to agree with us, but if the agent is reasonable and our 
challenge is worthwhile, the agent cannot simply ignore us.
Despite the hold on the agent provided by the virtue of reasonableness, it may 
seem that it still fails to satisfy the universalistic intuition in two ways. To start with, it 
may seem that the grip provided by judgements of reasonableness is not strong enough or 
does not go deep enough; while it may get agents to engage with us about their reasons it 
does not determine what those reasons are. It gets us argument rather than obligation. I 
think that to criticise the virtue of reasonableness on these grounds, or to attempt to look 
for something further which might give us obligation is to make two mistakes. Firstly, it 
is to misunderstand the universalistic intuition. As we have argued, this intuition is not 
that we must have absolute, universal reasons with which we must all comply, regardless 
of our motivations or deliberative circumstances; as we understand it, it is that we expect 
that there must be some normative pressure that we can bring to bear on those people 
who persist on disagreeing with us about their reasons. We do not expect that the source 
of this pressure must determine reasons, that it guarantees agreement, or that it even 
guarantees that we are correct in our judgements about the agent’s reasons. A desire for
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or an insistence on the existence of absolute, universal reasons has moved beyond the 
universalistic intuition about reasons that most of us share to a specific type of theoretical 
position; a theoretical position which we have considered and rejected. The second 
mistake made by anyone claiming that the virtue of reasonableness does not do enough 
work to determine reasons is to suppose that reasonableness or any other virtue must 
precisely prescribe behaviour. Reasonableness does not determine reasons because it does 
not comprise a set of rules about which reasons can be considered legitimate or what 
forms of deliberation can be considered sound; rather, it is the expression of common 
attitudes to deliberation and reasons, and these attitudes influence the way in which 
agents go about finding and keeping reasons rather than determining what those reasons 
are. We do not judge people to be reasonable solely on the reasons for which they act, but 
rather on the means by which they come by those reasons, and the way in which they 
defend or modify them if challenged. Of course, some reasons are so obvious that any 
reasonable agent will discover and act for them; but only some reasons.
The relationship o f reasonableness to reasons can be considered through analogy 
with the relationship between other virtues and the behaviour they produce, particularly 
with the relationship between the virtue of honesty and the expression of the truth. 
Attainment of the virtue of honesty does not mean that the honest agent will always 
discover the truth, and certainly does not determine what the agent believes to be true; 
rather, it entails a certain attitude towards the truth and towards expression of the truth. 
We must be careful to remember that this is only an analogy, of course. Without getting 
into questions concerning knowledge and the nature of truth which I am not well 
equipped to handle, we may suppose that the truth has a rather more determinate and 
independent existence than the reasons of a particular agent at a particular time. However, 
as long as we remember that it is merely an analogy, it is a useful one; honesty 
determines attitudes towards the truth rather than the truth itself; and reasonableness 
determines attitudes to reasons and deliberation rather than reasons themselves. The 
analogy with honesty is also helpful because it reminds us just how much purchase 
judgements of virtue can gain on agents. Judgements of honesty matter greatly to most 
agents; an accusation of dishonesty will almost always elicit a response, and often a 
vehement one. Furthermore, the implication that a judgement of character is being made 
is often drawn from the expression of a judgement about a particular claim; ‘Are you 
calling me a liar?’ is as recognisable a response to an accusation of dishonesty as, ‘Are 
you saying that I’m lying?’ Accusations of unreasonableness may not produce such a 
dramatic response, but they do sting and they do typically produce some form of 
response; and, after all, we have acknowledged that reasonableness is usually among the 
milder of the virtues.
The second source of suspicion that the concept of reasonableness as a virtue is 
inadequate to satisfy our universalistic intuition about reasons resembles the first, and is 
based on a general criticism of accounts such as ours which argue that reasons are 
dependent on motivations. Such accounts are open to the possibility that agents exist 
whose motivations give them reasons which are incomprehensible to us, and it is 
therefore possible that agents exist whose motivations do not incline them towards 
reasonableness. They are unreasonable versions of the sensible knave. When we 
challenge their reasons they may be indifferent to the grounds of our challenge, and to the 
existence of the challenge at all; reasonableness does not provide us with a point of
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engagement for such agents. The fear is that these agents are not only difficult or 
impossible to persuade, but that they escape judgement altogether. This fear is founded 
on a genuine possibility. We can imagine two types of agent who lack the impulses which 
incline most of us to be reasonable. The first is admittedly rather implausible; the agent 
who does not care at all about the sustainability of reasons. This agent would be 
undismayed even if unable to explain the reasons on which he or she was acting to him or 
herself. However, within the terms of our account, such an agent would still have reason 
to behave reasonably, even if not directly inclined to reasonableness because, as we have 
seen, some degree of deliberation in accordance with reasonableness is required to be 
consistently practically successful. Assuming that the agent had some motivations, then 
he or she would therefore have indirect reasons to deliberate and act as if  reasonable. The 
worry, therefore, is that such an agent only behaves as if  reasonable for instrumental 
purposes, in much the same way that an agent who cared nothing for the truth could 
decide that being outwardly honest was more instrumentally successful than trying to 
maintain a network of deceit. Such an agent might respond to accusations of 
unreasonableness, because they indicated that his or her actions might be ineffective in 
realising their intended ends, but still would not care about being reasonable.
The second case is a character who is rather more plausible and rather more 
sinister; the agent who is concerned to make his reasons intelligible and sustainable to 
him or herself, but who does not care about the opinion, trust or judgements of others, 
and who therefore is not concerned to make his or her reasons outwardly intelligible or 
sustainable to others. We have already considered such a possibility when we considered 
the forms which the vice of unreasonableness can take, and identified the sly form of 
unreasonableness, in which the agent uses the forms of reasonable discourse in order to 
subvert the reasons and actions of others, while masking his or her own reasons. And the 
correspondence of the agent who does not share our motivations concerning reasons with 
a vice indicates how we can allay the fear that such an agent or the other variant we have 
just considered escapes judgement. Any virtue theory, whether it is rooted in motivations 
or otherwise, allows that people are not always virtuous; if  they were, then virtue would 
not be considered an attainment and would not elicit praise. However, this does not mean 
that vicious people escape judgement, even if they are so vicious as to be incapable of 
understanding that judgement. We hope that they will respond to the expression of 
judgements about their behaviour, and that even if they do not yet grasp a virtue 
sufficiently to be motivated by perception of its lack, they care enough about the good 
opinion of others to change their ways. But, of course, if  they do not care, this does not 
by itself invalidate our judgement, and does not prevent us from expressing our 
judgement in other, more practical ways, such as withdrawal of trust, denial of 
cooperation, ostracism and, depending on how the agent’s viciousness manifests itself, all 
of the other less pleasant sanctions available to society. So, far from allowing wayward 
agents to escape judgement, the understanding of reasonableness as a virtue gives us a 
language in which judgement can be passed, even if the subject of that judgement is deaf 
to it.
To summarise, the claim that reasonableness is a virtue does not satisfy the 
universalistic intuition by giving us universal reasons which none of us can escape.
Rather, it identifies a character trait which makes us sensitive to external judgements 
about our reasons, and also inclines us to seek reasons which can withstand the
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judgements of others. This does not mean that people will always acknowledge the 
reasons which we want them to, or that we can judge them to be irrational if  they do not; 
but it does mean that they should respond to warranted judgements about their reasons, 
and that we can judge them to be unreasonable if they do not. And I believe that this is all 
that the universalistic intuition requires; we may hope that we are always right in our 
judgements about our own reasons and the reasons of others, but we also accept that we 
can sometimes be wrong, and that consequently that what we should reasonably expect in 
response to our judgements is engagement rather than obedience. The concept of 
reasonableness as a virtue, then, is not only compatible with our account of internal 
reasons; it is essential to it as a means of understanding why we deliberate as we do, how 
we can judge the deliberation and reasons of ourselves and others, and how we can better 
satisfy the universalistic intuition even in the absence of universal reasons.
3.3.3 Reasonableness and External Reasons
We will conclude our discussion of reasonableness by asking whether the external 
reasons theorists we have considered not only have flawed arguments, but whether they 
are being unreasonable by promoting and defending them. Of course, it is tempting to 
claim that such people are unreasonable, if  only for polemical reasons. There are aspects 
of unreasonableness which they are definitely not subject to: they have no tolerance for 
arbitrariness, or for the hidden influence of motivations. However, superficially they may 
seem to offend against reasonableness in two ways. Firstly, it may seem that, because we 
have identified flaws in their theories, that they are clinging to reasons which have 
become unsustainable. However, while some people who make apparent external reasons 
statements may be guilty o f this, I do not think that this is the case for any of the external 
reasons theorists we have considered here. By contrast, while I hope that I have taken 
some steps in this thesis to show what is wrong with a particular set o f external reasons 
theories, I would not pretend to have undermined them to the extent that continuing to 
defend them would be an example of unreasonableness; at the most I may have given 
their proponents another set of challenges to answer. The reasons on which the external 
reasons theorists we have considered base their arguments are not held unreflectively; the 
external reasons theorists have an extensive theoretical and motivational basis for holding 
them, and many possible means of response to challenge. Convincing these theorists that 
their reasons for arguing as they do are unsustainable might be an eventual future 
achievement, but for the time being all we have done is taken another step in a debate.
Secondly, it may seem that the deliberation of our external reasons theorists is 
pedantic, as it insists on the relentless exercise of pure reason to the extent that it sweeps 
away all foundations except those that can be found within reason itself. In order to save 
themselves from scepticism they carry on deliberating until they take themselves to have 
found a basis for reasons within some universal location, such as the structure of 
rationality, or the rational implications of inescapable elements of human nature. 
However, as far as we have found, we do not need to be rescued from scepticism through 
the discovery of such universal foundations; all we need are reasons that are sustainable. 
And if they are not good enough we go on deliberating until they are; but not to the extent 
of attempting to find an answer to all possible practical questions. The relentless 
reflection which characterises the external reasons theories which we have considered is
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not, in the first instance, intelligible to us, not necessarily because we cannot understand 
the paths which are followed, but because we cannot understand why anybody would 
follow them.
However, there is a sense in which it is too harsh to describe external reasons 
theorists as unreasonable on this basis. They are not seeking the answers to questions 
about mundane practical problems, but to questions of extreme seriousness, whether they 
are considering particular moral dilemmas to which we appear to have no solutions, or 
are considering the general question of what could possibly be the basis for all reasons. 
So, given the seriousness of these questions, a degree of reflection so great that it 
undermines the sustainability of any normally satisfactory reasons may well be 
appropriate. What is not appropriate, however, is to suppose that settling such questions 
is necessary to settle any practical question at all; the seriousness of the question of what 
could provide the answer to all practical questions does not mean that all practical 
questions share in this seriousness. Consequently, we can say that external reasons 
theorists are reasonable in their approach to ultimate questions, even if we claim that they 
find the wrong answers, but unreasonable if  this approach is taken to all instances of 
practical deliberation. In passing we should also note that this conclusion about external 
reasons theorists (that those we have considered should generally be judged reasonable 
even if their theories are wrong) illustrates the additional dimension of judgement which 
the concept of the virtue of reasonableness makes available to us. We can take it that 
external reasons theorists are motivated to seek the truth, and therefore that if their 
theories are incorrect then they have reasons to abandon them and seek alternatives. 
However, they are operating within a context which makes even their mistaken 
deliberation reasonable.
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3.4 Consequences
So, we have done more than defend our account of internal reasons; through the 
introduction of the virtue of reasonableness, we have developed it to the point where it is 
capable of satisfying both the individualistic and the universalistic intuitions about 
reasons. Within our account, reasons belong intimately to the agent because they are 
dependent on the agent’s material circumstances, deliberative circumstances and 
motivations. Reasons are not just peculiar to individual agents but to the deliberative 
paths followed by individual agents. Yet at the same time we have a normative 
framework forjudging the reasons and deliberation of agents, and an expectation that 
agents will respond to our judgements at least by re-examining their reasons, and by 
engaging with us if their judgements continue to differ. Our position does not hold out the 
prospect that we can all agree on our reasons because those reasons are all the same; 
rather, it holds out the possibility that if we were all reasonable we could at least attempt 
to agree on the individual reasons that individual agents possess. Furthermore, our 
normative framework gives us a way to judge those people who not only have bad 
reasons, but also refuse to respond to our reasons or to engage with us. There is, of 
course, no further guarantee that this judgement of unreasonableness will have any 
influence on the unreasonable agent, but this does not invalidate the judgement, any more 
than persistent cowardice or dishonesty invalidate judgements about courage or honesty.
As we said at the outset of our discussion, the account we have ended up with is 
neither complete nor systematic; certainly not in the same way as the external reasons 
theories we have considered. Rather, it is a patchwork of claims and concepts, some 
descriptive and some normative, which are compatible with our experience o f reasons 
and with the discipline we demand of a philosophical theory. However, I believe that 
such a patchwork is appropriate to our subject which, as we have seen, is in large part 
indeterminate and resistant to theory. It is tempting to try to draw our various claims and 
concepts together in to a systematic and unified whole, underpinned by some 
transcendent principle. But, as we have seen, this temptation may lead us to accounts 
which are satisfying as theory, but which are thoroughly at odds with our experience. 
Better, I think, to take the more humble approach of filling in the holes in our patchwork, 
paying sufficient respect to the elements of our account in which we already have 
confidence, and to our everyday understanding of our experience. This way we get an 
account which, like our reasons, is good enough.
Humility about the ambitions and scope of theory does not prevent it from having 
consequences for our everyday lives. Hume apparently set out to describe and explain 
morals and action rather than to prescribe them, but it would be disingenuous to suppose 
that he intended to leave everything as it was. And, while much of our discussion has 
been intended to establish a recognisable and resilient account of practical reason with 
predominantly theoretical implications, the introduction of the virtue of reasonableness 
has consequences for our everyday relationship with reasons. The adoption of any virtue 
theory necessarily has consequences, most importantly for moral development, either as 
part of upbringing or as part of the way we live our lives. O f course, because virtues are 
recognisable character traits, they are prominent in our moral development already; if 
they were not then it would be implausible to claim that they were identifiable as virtues. 
However, there is a different inflection of thought and judgement which accompanies the
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recognition of a virtue as a virtue. Once we recognise a particular virtue we begin to 
realise that behaviour which contradicts that virtue is not just an isolated aberration; it is 
an expression of who we are and an influence on who we will be. The same is true of 
reasonableness. If we understand this virtue then when we are tempted to browbeat 
agents into acting for reasons which they don’t accept, or to settle for reasons which are 
not good enough, or to subvert the reasoning of others for our own ends, or to issue edicts 
about reasons that brook no challenge, or to pursue justification far beyond what is called 
for, then we realise that giving way to this temptation would not just mar a particular 
instance of deliberation, but would be a step towards unreasonableness. We realise that 
we should stop bluffing or being lazy, sly, autocratic or pedantic, especially in 
philosophy; and start being reasonable.
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